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ABSTRACT
Argument
This thesis is concerned with the study of argument in organizational 
settings. It proposes that argument as a means of persuading others 
has been neglected in favour of an emphasis on the social and 
political aspects of organizational life. Using the Theory of 
Personal Constructs and the techniques of Cognitive Mapping a new 
theory of argument is developed which attempts to incorporate man as 
a valuing and a reasoning being. Three research settings in which 
argument had a significant influence are studied, and the use of 
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This thesis is concerned with the study of argument as a means of 
persuading others, in particular with the role of argument in 
contributing to influence and change in organizational life. Explicit 
discussion of argument is strangely neglected in accounts of 
organizational life, yet a significant portion of that life is spent 
in preparing and rehearsing arguments that are going to be used in an 
attempt to influence decisions and future policy. This suggests that 
individuals are well aware of the persuasive force that a ’good' 
argument is capable of producing, or conversely are sensitive to the 
dangers of putting forward untested arguments. There is something 
about ’having a good case’, as Thorndike describes it:
"For certain types of questions at least, there is a certain 
inherent logic and plausability in the right choice which 
makes it more possible to build up a good argument on that side..."
(Thorndike 1931).
Neglect of argument as a topic in its own right is probably closely 
associated with the rationalistic and objective overtones that 
traditional studies of argument generally foster. Within the context 
of organizational behaviour it would seem worthwhile to follow a 
similar programme to that suggested by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
(1969) in the realm of argumentation research. That is to 
re-consider argument as a means of persuading others, rather than as 
a study in logical thought. This would begin to provide theories and 
practices which can be used to more effectively construct and debate 
arguments within organizations.
The following chapters tackle the nature of argument in theory and in 
practice based on field work in three different research settings. 
Chapter 1 discusses the nature of argument in general terms, and 
considers some of the issues involved in discussing a topic which is 
more frequently placed in a rational, scientific, logical framework, 
within the subjective and interpersonal framework which characterizes 
much of knowledge of organizational behaviour. Chapter 2 continues 
the theme of Chapter 1 in a more precise way and develops methods of 
recording and analysing argument through Personal Construct Theory, 
and Cognitive Mapping. Chapters 3» 4, 5 and 6 use this framework to 
look at argument in different situations and with data obtained in 
different ways. From these chapters hypotheses about the 
effectiveness of argument emerge and are evaluated. Chapter 7 draws 
some conclusions from the work presented.
To discuss argument is inevitably to discuss the nature of 
interpersonal relations within a social setting, yet the notion that 
the ’argument' can be isolated and treated in isolation as a separate 
entity from the arguer is a common one, both in theoretical research 
and everyday life. We less rarely say 'John argued well', we rather 
say 'John put forward a good argument’. The extent to which it is 
possible to separate 'John' and the 'argument' in terms of the 
influence which the event of 'John arguing’ can exert, is a 
fundamental issue in discussing the nature of argument. An example 
may illustrate this better.
As a partner in a firm of management and computer consultants I was 
recently presented with the following argument over the important
issue of how we should divide our time over future projects, by a 
fellow partner. The extracts are adapted slightly from notes taken at 
the time.
PAUL: "...I think we ought to concentrate on the Homeworthy venture.
a lot of the programming is already done, and the budget gives 
us plenty of time to work up a cutting algorithm... It should 
not be too difficult as the basic steps can be taken from the 
algorithms that we already have..."
My response was:
TIM: "... should we really put all our eggs in one basket, what if
we get stuck on the algorithm, it’s a very complex area you 
know, we’d then have committments that we could not fulfil, 
what about the printing project, at least this is something 
we’ve tackled before..."
When studying this sort of interchange in the context of argument a 
primary question is, "to what extent is each participant influenced
by the content of the other’s argument", that is by the substantive
case that they have put forward, in contrast to any other factors 
which may influence them. For instance, my partner had apparently 
interpreted the event as one in which he needs to put forward some 
sort of case about our capabilities for completing the project. But I 
was conscious in framing my reply of a number of factors potentially 
influencing me.
Paul will be disapointed if I say no.
I was originally annoyed that the project had been taken 
taken on by him without prior consultation.
I was more interested in the Printing project.
I thought that, as usual, Paul was underestimating the size of the task, 
Paul does know a lot about cutting algorithms.
It was true that a lot of the basic programming had been completed.
It was a generous budget.
So in assessing my partner’s case on our capabilities I am also 
including my values, a judgement of his expertise, interpersonal 
issues, and his substantive argument. Any one of these may be 
sufficient to effectively ignore the influence of each of the others.
To look at argument as a means of persuasion in this type of 
situation, which is not untypical of the field work in this thesis, 
is to attempt to determine the contribution that argument makes to 
the interaction. What is meant in this context by argument is better 
illustrated by the interactions within each research setting but a 
general guideline is:
"Argument is an attempt to persuade others to a point of view 
or course of action, by a set of linked propositions, through 
the use of language,"
This is what is intended in this thesis by the use of words argument, 
substantive case, debate, and reasoned debate. There are many other 
ways in which my Business Partner could have attempted to influence 
me, for example, by taking me for a drink, or by threatening to 
resign if I did not support him. To some extent these other ways 
have been ignored in this work, which focusses on argument as such. 
But the features of an event which encourage participants to 
interpret it as one in which argument can occur, as opposed to some 
other sort of event are important aspects of understanding argument.
I have often felt that many recent theories of organizational life 
have shied away from a study of arguing man, almost in a belief that 
reason and argument necessarily fall prey to the political and social 
whims of powerful actors. Yet whenever I have been involved in
organizational change, preparing a good case and attending to the 
internal politics seem to have proceeded hand in hand. I am 
motivated therefore to look again at a study of argument as a means 




General metaphors of argument
Some insight into the nature of argument is provided by individuals’ 
reactions and comments when their point of view has failed to gain 
acceptance with colleagues (Wilensky 1967). Some illustrative 
remarks are:
’’it was all sewn up before I went in..."
"we were right but they won’t admit it..."
"he’s just totally irrational... he won’t listen to reason"
Although such reflections are sometimes a way of explaining failure 
to others and reveal the arguer’s concern with his lack of influence 
(Meltsner 1979), they also point to expectations that the arguer has 
about the nature of the event in which he was involved. Such 
expectations about argument as a rational process not only imply 
criteria on which the argument should be decided but also prescribe 
the roles to be taken by the arguer and audience. Broadly speaking 
there is an implication that the argument be decided by reference to 
its content and structure alone, and that the audience should behave 
as objective and non-involved participants. ’Non-involved’ means that 
the participants do not take into account the consequences of the 
argument for their personal values and beliefs (Rokeach 1973). It 
also suggests that the argument is open to examination on primarily 
logical grounds, and that there are non-personal objectives (such as 
an organizational goal), against which the argument can be assessed.
In an organizational context this is put most succinctly by Ackoff in 
a discussion on the nature of Operational Research:
"The prevailing concept of objectivity is based on a distinction 
between ethical-moral man who is believed to be emotional, 
involved and biased, and scientific man who is believed to be 
unemotional, uninvolved and unbiased."
(Ackoff 1979,(i))
This notion of argument as a rational, objective activity, has 
considerable influence on individual actions, and the means that are 
used to attempt to persuade others. For example Operational Research 
and Management Science are disciplines which have developed under the 
encompassing banner of "the application of science to management", 
consequently the style of argument used by a large proportion of 
those involved in these activities takes the form of argument as a 
rational process. This not only colours the arguments that are 
presented, but also the role that is seen as appropriate by those 
within the discipline. This is quite readily seen especially in early 
Operational Research work, but the ’scientific’ overtones of 
Operational Research also influence current debate (Collcutt 1981, 
Tate 1977, Tocher 1961). The Operational Researcher is often 
portrayed in this model as the discoverer of ’the’ problem and its 
consequent solution. The nature of the interaction with the client 
becomes that of expert advisor and layman. In this setting the means 
of persuading the client that solutions should be implemented often 
takes the form of ’rational’ argument in which the O.R. worker has 
only to communicate his findings to the client for them to find 
acceptance. If the client is a rational being and the findings are 
rationally based, then no other persuasion is needed. Replacing the 
word ’rational’ with the word ’scientific’ makes the above argument a 
very familiar one in reports of Operational Research projects (White
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1975). Whilst no Operational Researcher indulges in, or believes that 
this is all that is involved in his work (Rivett 1981), nonetheless 
it is a basic metaphor which influences research and practice (Dando 
and Sharp 1978). This metaphor similarly influences other disciplines 
for example economic studies, (Smithin J.N. 1980, Begg 1980). The 
adequacy of this metaphor is not at issue here. Of interest in the
context of argument are the close links between the concepts of
argument, objectivity and rationality, and the way in which adoption 
of these metaphors tends to preclude attention to social and 
political factors. For instance it is not uncommon within O.R. 
literature and informal discussion between O.R. workers to hear the 
failure of a piece of work to be implemented by the client, described 
as a failure of the client to fully appreciate the implications of 
the work (the client is irrational), rather than as an inappropriate
piece of Operational Research (Rice 1981).
Rationality and argument
Argumentation studies normally focus upon this metaphor of argument as 
an essentially rational process, with the consequent allusions to 
objectivity and non-involvement that this entails. The prevailing 
model for argument is that of a court of law, and the interaction 
between an advocate and a jury. As in judicial proceedings the jury 
are asked to put aside their personal opinions and prejudices and 
consider the argument ’on its merits’. The process of argument is 
therefore primarily concerned with the nature of claims and their 
relation to evidence. Again there is often an underlying assumption 
that it is possible to establish the truth or otherwise of any claim 
that is put forward (Thouless 1974). Within the literature few assume
that personal values and bias do not influence events, but there is 
an assumption that the argument may in theory proceed independently 
of the arguers. Such a model could be dismissed as more of a 
prescription of how decisions ought to be made rather than a 
description of the decision making process. Yet studies of mock 
juries (Baldwin and McConville 1979) suggest that individuals take 
very seriously the role of unbiased observer, and make stringent and 
explicit efforts ’to be fair’. In a similar way senior managers are 
often anxious to describe themselves as people who take advantage of 
rational decision aids. The use of outside experts is one example of 
this. Such experts are often cast by the manager (and by themselves) 
as unbiased observers whose advice, as a consequence of this lack of 
bias, must be given extra weight (Sims and Smithin 1982). Wilensky 
(1967) describes the effect of a new budgeting system within an 
American governmental agency as:
"The experience appears to have satisfied a longing to 
believe that they were proceeding according to the 
canons of rational methods of calculation"
The court of law model of argument is more restricted than the analogy 
might initially suggest. Whilst in practice lawyers may be concerned 
with a variety of means of influencing the jury, argumentation 
studies and courses (Anderson and Dovre 1968) have focussed almost 
exclusively on the nature of evidence and its presentation. For 
example many textbooks on argumentation treat the process of argument 
as one of logical reasoning. By this is meant the manipulation of 
premises and conclusions through the rules of inductive and deductive 
logic; examples of the following sort appear frequently:
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All industrial concerns need to make profits 
Organization X is an industrial concern 
Organization X needs to make profits
So, for instance. Bell and Staines (1979) urge potential arguers to 
examine arguments (written and verbal) for the logical connections 
between the statements. Errors in argument therefore arise from 
logical errors and common fallacies in the use of syllogisms (Kirwan 
1978, Geach 1976). The lack of persuasive force of an argument is 
attributed to logical inadequacies of this sort rather than to any 
other cause. Work on human thinking by researchers into artificial 
intellignece is perhaps the most recent example of the application of 
rational assumptions to theories of organizational behaviour. For 
example many recently produced expert systems work on logical and 
statistical models of argument (Duda and Gaschnig 1981, Newell and 
Simon 1971). There is a close link here to work on decision theory, 
which provides further examples of rational assumptions about 
argument and decision making (Raiffa 1970, Simon 1957, Kaufmann and 
Thomas 1977).
The issues that arise from argumentation studies, decision theory, and 
some expert systems work often seem to be of more interest to 
logicians and philosophers than to managers (Smithin and Eden 1984). 
They concentrate on the performance and competence of human actors 
with respect to formal logical reasoning, as opposed to the wider 
ranging ability to structure debate in a persuasive manner. This 
emphasis upon rationality and logical reasoning as an essential part 
of argument carries with it some powerfully influential assumptions 
about the nature of argument, and it is difficult to separate an
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understanding of argument from these rationalistic overtones. What
is the appeal of this very prevalent view of argument?
The appeal of rational argument
Rational expectations about argument are prevalent and influential, 
so it is worthwhile considering the source of their influence in more 
detail. For a modern worker, a practical problem arises immediately 
in such a discussion, since notions of reason and rationality cannot 
be easily disentangled from a discussion of scientific thinking and 
logical positivism. Notions and norms about reason and rationality 
are so much a part of western culture that it is difficult to view 
such ideas as particular aspects of this culture, they seem rather to 
be embedded in the nature of man himself. Yet the idea of a rational 
argument and its firm link to a method of acquiring knowledge is 
something which has developed from the work of Galileo, Descartes, 
and Newton. Roszak for example sees it as a psychological reaction to 
the religious intolerance and scholastic thought that was prevalent 
in Descartes’ time (Roszak 1972, Descartes 1637, Ree 1974). 
Aristotle’s view of argument and Descartes’ are as Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca point out set within very different frameworks and 
purposes. For Descartes the purpose of rational argument was to 
challenge the intellectual climate of his day, to challenge the 
influence of religious doctrine. For Greeks of significant social 
standing, the ability to present a good case was essential to 
survival in the democratic state (Sanders 1970, Allen 1966). So there 
is a sense in which understandings of the nature of reason and 
rationality are linked to particular social and political trends and 
are not necessarily inherent to man’s being. That methods of
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argument are similarly linked is illustrated by the contempt with 
which Machol recently described l4th century philosophical argument 
(Machol 1980) and the contrasting seriousness of the debate in the 
eyes of contemporary observers (Russell 1946), It might therefore be 
possible to re-cast a view of argument and rationality into a 
framework which is more helpful to the practical study of argument.
To do this however, a more detailed understanding of the essential 
appeal of rational argument is needed.
The appeal of rational argument seems to have two fundamental bases:
a) An ethical appeal to argue in a particular way
b) The bait of sure and certain knowledge which may be obtained by
arguing in a particular way
These are each discussed in the following sections.
(a) The ethical appeal of rationality
The ’summons of a civilized dialogue* is essentially an appeal for
reasoning man to behave in a particular way, and qualities are 
demanded such as candour, patience, emotional coldness, self control, 
and detachment. That the scientific/rational appeal is in part an 
ethical and moral one is nicely illustrated in a well known statement 
by the scientist Karl Pearson:
"The scientific man has above all things to strive 
for self-elimination in his judgements, to provide 
an argument which is as true for each individual 
mind as for his own."
(Pearson 1937)
As a moral statement it is also a moral assertion about the nature of 
knowledge. What is to count as true knowledge is defined in a
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particular way, so that pre-scientific, or non-scientific knowledge is 
inferior to knowledge gained through the process of rational inquiry. 
Similarly arguments which have a base in personal experience have 
less validity than properly rational arguments. It is only necessary 
to observe, or feel, the emotions aroused when someone is accused of 
being irrational in the course of an argument to realize the moral 
appeal that rational argument carries. As Ayer (1936) and Koyre 
(1965) state the 'merely subjective' (note the merely) has no place 
in the ontology of rational thought.
A recent example of the acceptance of the consequences of the moral 
appeal of rationality is that of the psychologist Skinner who 
explicitly rejects any analysis of behaviour in terms of the purposes 
and values of subjects, since this cannot become knowledge of a 
sufficiently 'pure' kind (Skinner 1938, 1953). Note that the 
principal reason for his behaviourist approach is not that cognitive 
psychology is wrong in its treatment of experience, but that it is 
unable or unlikely to provide data and theories of a sufficiently 
scientific (as Skinner defines it) kind. More practically this 
concept of rationality makes consideration of purposive behaviour 
problematic since it is specifically designed to exclude subjective 
information.
(b) The bait of sure and certain knowledge
The bait of sure and certain knowledge is also an attractive appeal 
of rationality. Observation and logical inference lead to knowledge 
which is as 'secure as numbers'. Rational argument leads by 
unambiguous paths from statements which are self-evident (or at least
14
agreed), by simple steps, to conclusions which are more complex, but 
equally sure. This link between the psychological experience of self 
evidence and the process of reasoning (the essence of Cartesian 
analysis) rests on assumptions of cognitive simplicity and cognitive 
linearity. That is the rules of reasoning are essentially simple 
rules, and that cognitive material is organized into discrete units 
(what Abelson for example calls implicational molecules (Abelson 
1973)).
It has become clear through the work of Wittgenstein (1969) and 
Moore's analysis of the concept of certainty (Moore 1939) that the 
idea of self-evidence, as used here, does not only imply something 
which is evident to self. But it can only be meaningful to say that 
something is self-evident, if it would also be self-evident to any 
other human being presented with the same situation. This is in part 
what being certain means. Thus rational argument through 
self-evidence is linked to certainty. It is this link to certainty 
which produces the compulsive power of this approach to argument 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969).
An interesting historical example of this use of the power of 
rationality is discussed by Eden and Harris (1975). In their analysis 
of decision making studies of the 1950's and 1960's they show how 
early theories relied heavily upon rational deductive logic in order 
to draw conclusions about the nature of good and bad decisions. Such 
approaches relied primarily upon statistical and scientific methods 
to assess managerial arguments and decisions. Dissatisfaction arose, 
Eden and Harris suggest, because of the mismatch between the criteria
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demanded by a rational approach and situation specific criteria used 
by decision makers.
Towards a framework for practical argument
The discussion of rationality and rational argument is intended to 
point out the powerful and subtle influences which the notion of 
rationality brings to bear on the process of argument. There is 
throughout an implicit assumption that any attempt to discuss 
argument solely in these terms is not adequate. This theme is 
developed in the following sections. Within the context of argument, 
however, it is crucial to recognize that because rational argument is 
inadequate as a vehicle this does not mean that notions of rational 
argument can be easily dismissed (Reardon 1981). As the foregoing 
sections indicate, notions of rationality are ubiquitous and 
influential in any argument.
However, ’much of psychological literature suggests that rational 
decision making is not the empirically dominant mechanism of choice’ 
(Stein 1977), and that plans for action finally rest on political and 
value laden judgements. The study of argument faces what Stein 
calls, in the context of policy making, the paradox of psychological 
logic.
It is therefore necessary to construct a theory of argument which can 
embrace both the rational and the valuing aspects of man. A first 
step in doing this is to look more closely at the nature of thinking 
and reasoning. The following sections examine a number of different 
theories of reasoning which have different degrees of adherence to a 
model of man as a rational being.
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Thinking as a logical process
A typical entry in a dictionary (Garmonsway 1965) defines argument as 
"reason urged in support of a theory". But what is involved in the 
process of reasoning? To answer this question is to look at 
reasoning as psychological rather than a philosophical process. Henle 
(1962) was a psychologist who perhaps most closely linked the 
philosophical and psychological processes of reasoning. He proposed 
that although individuals do not usually observe or indulge 
explicitly in careful syllogistic argument, nonetheless the processes 
which the mind goes through are governed by the same rules as the 
formal syllogism. He quotes Kant as saying "logic is a science of 
the necessary laws of thought, without which no employment of the 
understanding and the reason takes place". The laws of logic are the 
laws of thought. In various forms this idea has been enormously 
influential on the course of experimental psychology in the realm of 
thinking and reasoning (see Flew 1975 for an overview). Much of the 
work of Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) and Abercrombie (I960) for 
instance, has been concerned with the individual’s ability to perform 
acts of deductive and inductive reasoning. These tasks are also 
closely linked with studies of problem solving ability. Central to 
these theories is the examination of the ability to reason from 
simple statements to more complex statements in a linear way. Very 
often the tasks assigned to individuals are relatively simple 
puzzles, simple in the sense that the description of the problem only 
includes a small number of variables. The difficulties of translating 
the results of these studies into situations which are not closely
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controlled is well known but nonetheless reveal thinking as a 
prepositional activity. That is, hypotheses are formed then tested 
and changed in an attempt to make sense of a situation. More 
interesting in this context are studies which consider the effect of 
the use of logic in everyday situations. Dickson (1981), in his study 
of managerial decision making, found that many managers were prepared 
(at least publicly) to change their views when inconsistencies of a 
logical nature were pointed out to them, in this case inconsistencies 
in rank ordering of utilities. More generally, the study of folk lore 
and simple aphorisms makes the point that cultural wisdom carries 
with it many general lessons about logical (syllogistic) argument.
For example, the expression "one swallow does not make a summer" 
warns against arguing from the particular to the general, in this way 
it represents a cultural distillation of issues to do with inductive 
reasoning. Many other categories of syllogistic style are similarly 
covered by tales and aphorisms. Logic does play a part in reasoning, 
but perhaps as a background to other features (Abrahams 1968, Goodwin 
and Wenzel 1979).
Thinking as a subjectively rational process
It is significant that many of the studies of logic and reasoning 
work with relatively simple problems. Study of more complex 
scenarios, such as those faced by managers in organizations, quickly 
produces a realization that cognitive abilities are necessarily 
limited, by lack of time, by lack of access to information, and by 
the range of options that need to be attended to. In such a 
circumstance the strict requirements of logical analysis are unable 
to cope. The Abelson-Rosenberg theory of psycho logic (Abelson 1973)
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envisages individuals acting in a subjectively rational way, by which 
is meant that human beings reason according to predictable mental 
processing rules but these rules do not necessarily correspond to 
those of formal logic. Individuals reason within a personally defined 
context. Cognitive material is organized into implicational molecules 
and each individual molecule is self contained. As with strictly 
logical models there is an assumption of cognitive simplicity and 
linearity, so that the construction of knowledge is an inferential 
'building block' process. This 'if-then' thinking characterizes a 
common feature of human thinking. Armstrong and Eden (1979) describe 
a technique of 'Socratic questioning' which explores implicational 
thinking in exactly this way. By asking individuals a simple 'why' 
question they were able to elicit implication chains of this nature.
The theories of cognitive consistency and of related theories such as 
Heider's Balance Theory are similarly based on a notion of subjective 
rationality (Heider 1946, Cartwright and Harary 1956). A simple 
Balance Theory model is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. The predictive value of the theory lies in the rationality 
assumption of consistency in that if P likes 0 and P likes M, but M 
does not like 0, then there is likely to be some tension or problem 
for P which would need to be resolved either at a higher level of 
balance or in some additional construction. However consider the 
response of P if asked about this issue, he may say:
"It's not an issue for me. I like people who disagree 
with me."
In this circumstance the more global assumptions of consistency are
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unable to access the reasoning of this individual. To understand or 
argue with this individual more information is needed. As Abelson 
points out in relation to consistency, it all depends on what you 
mean by ’like’. Such general rules about consistency are in practice 
continually broken, since there are many situations in which 
individuals prefer the novelty of inconsistency, or the excitement of 
imbalance (Maddi 1969, Maddi and Berne 1964, Abelson 1969).
In addition to these problems of meaning produced by subjectively 
rational theories, there are other difficulties in understanding 
individual reasoning which are now considered in the light of 
subjective theories of thinking.
Subjective theories of thinking
Thinking as a logical process or as a personally consistent one are 
essentially theories of thinking set within a rational scientific 
framework, and whilst the influence of themes of consistency and 
rationality may be very large within our society, a more subjectively 
oriented theory seems to be needed to explain individual behaviour.
A basis for such a theory comes from Ackoff’s distinction between 
Rational Man and Emotional Man (Ackoff 1979, (i),(ii)).
The description of man implied by the previous section is that of man 
as a self-consistent, reasoning being. So far, implicitly, the 
expression ’providing a reason* has be taken to mean ’explaining a 
statement (or action) in terms of other statements and the 
conclusions which may be drawn from them’. Yet often when 
individuals are asked to provide a reason for what they say or do 
this is not a request for them to make their argument structure
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explicit, but is a request for them to make explicit some of the 
values that they hold. As Fisher says:
"Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they 
are reasoning animals."
(Fisher 1978)
Wallace’s discussion of the logic of good reasons emphasizes the 
place of values in any discussion of argument or reasoning:
"A good reason is a statement offered in support of an 
ought proposition or of a value judgement"
(Wallace 1963)
But what is implied by man as a valuing animal? Rokeach’s definition 
of value has been widely used and quoted:
"to say that a person ’has a value’ is to say that he 
has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct 
or end state of existence is personally and socially 
preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end states 
of existence."
(Rokeach 1973)
As Eden, Jones and Sims (1979) point out, whilst such a defintion may 
be conceptually helpful, the notion of value is difficult to apply 
operationally. It is easy to sympathize with the despairing tone of 
Bowen’s article, which recognizes both the need for and the 
difficulty of accounting for values in organizational research (Bowen 




can't say why, it just is 
criteria for judging outcomes
This is one of the few approaches which recognizes the significance of 
looking at 'values' as 'the act of valuing', rather than attempting to 
categorize or define particular values. The act of categorization 
(eg: good, happiness, egalitarian society) must inevitably face the 
same problem of Abelson's cognitive consistency, in that it all 
depends on what you mean by happiness. The categorization approach 
also makes it difficult to account for the more dynamic aspects of 
value. For example, as particular values are pursued the nature of 
that which is pursued changes.
To describe man as a valuing animal is not to describe particular 
values that he has, but to make a statement about human activity, to 
point towards a 'striving' quality that characterizes human life.
This aspect is captured in Kelly's theory of Personal Constructs:
"To our way of thinking there is a continuing movement 
towards the anticipation of events, rather than a 
series of barters for temporal satisfaction, and this 
movement is the essence of human life itself."
(Kelly 1963)
For his metaphor of man Kelly looks to another aspect of the 
scientist, not the scientist as a rational, detached observer, but 
the scientist as an inveterate inquirer into the world of his 
experience.
Valuing man behaves purposively. Such an activity may sometimes be 
described as a striving towards an explicit end state (as for 
Rokeach), even though that end state is not thought to be attainable
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(Ackoff and Emery 1972), or it may described as a less focussed 
desire to move away from a given current state of affairs (Eden 1978).
A subjective theory of thinking needs to capture the nature of man as 
a valuing animal, and the influence of values on the process of 
reasoning. The theory of personal constructs (Kelly 1955), is a 
theory which attempts to account for individual behaviour in terms of 
the ways in which an individual makes sense of his experience. The 
fundamental postulate of Construct theory states that:
"A person’s processes are psychologically channelized by 
the way in which he anticipates events.
The process of placing an interpretation on experience, of construing, 
arises from the individual attending to the replicative nature of 
experience, and differentiating one aspect of that experience from
another. This differentiation, or construct, then forms part of a
larger construct system, which guides the construing process (Kelly
1977).
For example, from the experience of knowing Peter, Stefan and Mary an 
individual may construe that Peter and Stefan are friendly whereas 
Mary is aloof. The construct ’friendly...aloof’ forms a basis for 
placing an interpretation on other aspects of experience (eg: other 
friends). The replicative nature of experience is not usually 
stressed in discussion of construct theory (Bannister and Fransella 
1971) but clearly if experience were not replicative there could no
basis for differentiation. The idea that our experience is
determined by our attention to its replicative features, is similar 
to Hume's philosophy of critical skepticism. In the context of
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argument it is important because the replicative nature of experience 
forms the basis for the understanding of rationality and consistency 
within Personal Construct Theory.
An individual’s construct system is therefore a way of representing 
experience to himself, of making sense of the world. What counts as 
experience for each individual is defined by his construct system.
Each individual comes to construct for himself a characteristic ’view 
of the world’. This assumptive world (Young 1977), forms the basis of 
the individual’s definition and interpretation of particular events 
(Eden and Sims 1979).
The discussion on subjective thinking, so far, is intended to suggest 
that the intelligibily of argument depends crucically upon having 
access to individuals’ idiosyncratic interpretations of the event, 
which will include that individual as both a valuing and a reasoning 
entity. Personal Construct Theory offers some facility for being able 
to do this; in particular construct theory offers a new framework for 
understanding the nature of rationality, and it is the construction 
of this framework which forms the final part of this chapter.
The discussion of reasoning as a strictly logical activity, to 
reasoning as a personal and idiosyncratic process, has built up 
gradually a different picture of man from that of rational man 
described earlier. This is important with respect to argument, since 
it suggests that an understanding of argument will require access to 
both the reasoning and the valuing aspects of each individual. Before 
completing the model suggested by construct theory, this is an 




The introduction provided a brief guideline on what may be taken to be 
argument, it was suggested that:
"Argument is an attempt to persuade others to a point of 
view or course of action by a set of linked propositions, 
through the use of language"
This implies certain assumptions about the nature of the events which 
are tackled in this thesis, namely:
a) The argument occurs primarily as an oral or written interaction.
b) The arguers’ primary intention is to persuade others.
c) The arguer expects to persuade others through their adoption 
or partial adoption of his arguments.
In summary the arguer is making some claim for the attention and 
belief of others (Toulmin 1958). This will exclude from consideration 
arguments which are presented for reasons other than the above. For 
example, attempts to filibuster, or interrupt an interaction for 
other purposes.
But more widely than this, an argument of this sort conceptually 
represents an interaction between two (or more) interpretations of 
experience. Reardon describes the task of persuasive argument as:
"persons assist each other in the shaping of their private 
and shared versions of reality"
(Reardon 1981)
This is very different from the view taken by Bell and Staines who
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wish to enable students of argument to:
"analyse and evaluate sophisticated scientific argument"
(Bell and Staines 1979)
The quote from Fisher earlier in this chapter emphasized in relation 
to argument a familiar dichotomy of approach between argument as a 
rational activity, concerned with objective (public) criteria, and 
argument as a social event, concerned with the communication of 
individual values. Such a split is reflected in the literature on 
argument which divides between persuasion theorists and argumentation 
research. Argumentation research has been concerned with matters of 
logic, jurisprudence and forensic science. Persuasion theory has 
tackled issues of attitude change, communication, and attribution 
theory, and is more concerned with issues of social psychology 
(Fisher and Sayles 1966, Miller and Nilsen 1966, Crable 1976, Orr
1978).
Reflection on the experience of argument suggests that neither of 
these approaches adequately characterizes the nature of the 
experience, in a way which would enable an arguer to gain some 
predictive ability and hence control over the experience. Emphasis 
on the individual interpretation of argument is not really able to 
explain the powerful and compulsive influence of rational/logical 
inputs to debate. The idea of rational logical argument can make 
little contribution to arguments which rest in part on personal 
values.
At the root of discussion about argument is the experience of being in 
an argument. Any argument occurs in a particular context, and is just
26
one part of a complex social event, only one outcome of which is the 
gaining the interest and perhaps acceptance of the ideas contained in 
the argument. It is an event in which personal relationships, power, 
individual style, presentation, may all be relevant to understanding 
’what is going on’. Indeed that there is ’something going on’ that 
each participant can agree that ’it is going on’ is seriously 
problematic (Sims 1979).
The experience of argument forms the fundamental base for data, yet 
experience is necessarily mediated through individuals’ expectations 
and interpretations of the event in which they are participating. In 
placing an existential emphasis on the way in which we come to 
understand the nature of argument, it is possible to proceed in two 
ways; through a phenomenological process of concentrating on the 
phenomena, and also in a more metaphysical style by asking what 
conditions need to be fulfilled in order to have ’such and such* an 
experience, and represent it to ourselves in a particular manner.
This section has broached an understanding of argument as part of a 
wider context of interpreting and understanding experience, and 
representing that experience to others as a set of reasoned 
propositions. This framework is fully developed in the following 
section using the theory of personal constructs.
A framework for the study of argument
The views of argument as a rational process, or as a way of 
individuals communicating values, carry with them implications about 
the nature of human interaction. Consider two opposing argumentative 
interactions.
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A common strategy in argument is an appeal to the facts:
"you’ve got to look at the facts "
Whatever else it is this strategy is strongly pre-emptive, since in 
setting the argument in a rational, objective framework (or 
attempting to do so), it limits socially the argument strategies 
available to opponents.
In this context an attempt to argue that
"it all depends on what you mean by the facts..."
which may be an attempt to dispute the framework, is made to look 
like a dispute within the objective framework as to the nature of the 
facts.
A similarily pre-emptive argument occurs when in an argument someone 
claims:
"It may be irrational but that’s how I feel"
In this context any attempt to move the discussion into an objective 
framework may now be socially excluded.
The process of argument depends crucially therefore on the individual 
frameworks erected by the arguer and audience, but these frameworks 
have to be built against a wider normative framework of social 
expectation which underlies the setting for any argument. By its very 
nature argument is an intersubjective activity, it is concerned with 
the interaction of subjective worlds. Personal Construct Theory,
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which was introduced in an earlier section through the fundamental 
postulate of the theory, is primarily a theory about subjective 
worlds. Two further statements of the theory tackle issues of 
intersubjectivity, they are the Commonality corollary and the 
Sociality corollary, which are:
"To the extent that one person employs a construction of 
experience similar to that employed by another, his or 
her processes are psychologically similar to those of 
the other person"
(Commonality corollary)
"To the extent that one person construes the construction 
processes of another, he or she may play a role in a 
social process involving the other person"
(Sociality corollary)
These corollaries give two distinct meanings to intersubjectivity.
The commonality statement is concerned with ’having the same 
experience as someone else', in which case those portions of the 
individual subjective worlds which relate to that experience are the 
same (or similar). This is a way of defining objective knowledge (and 
all that such a notion entails) in terms of its psychological 
effects. For instance, objective knowledge might be defined as that 
knowledge on which we employ constructions similar to those of other 
people, and moreover are constructions which are relatively stable 
over time. Any rule, such as a rule of logical reasoning, can be 
seen to act as a means of ensuring that psychological constructions 
within the context delimited by the rule have a feature of 
commonality. Intersubjective commonality can thus be seen to be a 
way of explaining many of the features of the rational aspects of 
argument.
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However, intersubjectivity may also arise through understanding a 
part of another’s subjective world, but not accepting it as one’s 
own. This is represented through the Sociality corollary which 
defines the subjectivity of others’ in terms of one’s own 
subjectivity. The private and value oriented aspects of argument are 
contained within this notion of sociality. It suggests that it is 
possible to understand the nature of values which the individual does 
not himself hold. This sort of intersubjectivity is described by 
Eden, Jones, Sims and Smithin (1981) as:
’’It may be that members of the team find it useful to have 
a deeper awareness of their colleagues views, and a 
richer view of the team, and this additional understanding 
leads to changes in the way the team operates which are 
beneficial in the longer term."
Argument is therefore also concerned with processes of intersubjective 
sociality.
As Kelly suggests the notion of commonality is concerned with the 
influence that culture or social expectations may have on the 
individuals’ interpretation of experience. In the context of argument 
this notion of culture is widened to include experiences which are 
more usually referred to as facts, objective knowledge, and certainty. 
The plausability of an argument to an individual is thereby influenced 
within these terms by the way in which the individual relates the 
argument and his subjective world; this is not a simple matter of 
listening and evaluating since the argument that is ’heard’ is 
mediated though the individual’s construct system.
From the viewpoint of an individual listening to an argument, his
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knowledge within his subjective world is characterized by his belief 
in the commonality of that knowledge with others. In other words he 
can construe others’ construing and in so doing gains some measure of 
what he judges to be commonality between his own construing and that 
of others. Knowledge and processes which are often described as 
objective or rational seem to have a characteristic within this 
construing process that individuals construe them to be knowledge or 
processes that everyone (including themselves) construes in a similar 
way. For instance, beliefs about physical objects such as, ’this is a 
table’, are usually of this nature. If an individual were to meet 
someone whose construing of this experience was very different it 
would be difficult for him to play any part in a social role with 
that individual. A common response might be to reconstrue the event 
as one in which ’the person is trying to illustrate some 
philosophical point’, rather than to change the interpretation of 
’this is a table’. The tensions produced for individuals who are 
artifically placed in an environment where such beliefs are open to 
doubt (Asch 1955) are considerable and illustrate the compulsion of 
such beliefs.
In contrast beliefs which are construed as applying to groups of 
people, rather than everyone, have a different characteristic. For 
example ’nationalisation is a good thing’. Here it is possible for 
individuals to play some social role in respect of someone who does 
not hold this belief, although again in extreme cases (eg: an 
argument between an atheist and a devoutly religous person about the 
existence of God) no sociality is possible (Trigg 1973).
Thirdly beliefs which are construed as being common to very few people
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provide a different basis for interaction, since a necessary part of 
conveying those beliefs to others must concern establishing a basis 
for understanding in terms of other commonalities between belief 
systems.
Analysis of subjective worlds thus begins to provide a framework which 
encompasses argument between individuals whether it is formed as a 
rational process or as a personal, valuing one. The following factors 
are therefore relevant in analysing argument within this framework:
a) To what extent do the arguer and audience play a 
social role in respect to each other?
b) What commonality do arguer and audience perceive between 
their construing of the argument event (both as to the 
nature of the event, and the substantive content of the 
argument)?
c) To what extent do arguer and audience perceive their 
construing of an event to be supported by others?
The effect of these factors on the persuasive appeal of the argument 
can separated and discussed, but they may not be linear or additive. 
The methods for representing and gaining access to individual 
argument are developed and discussed in the next chapter.
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Summary of Chapter 1 
Reasoning and valuing
This chapter proposed that the study of argument as a means of 
persuading others is a neglected feature of organizational life. Yet 
individuals do apparently spend significant time and energy on the 
preparation of arguments which are intended to persuade others.
Perhaps this neglect is partly due to the theoretical difficulties 
that a study of argument as a practical activity presents, since it 
is both a social interaction, and is also frequently described as an 
objective and rational activity. It was argued that the framework 
which presents argument as a primarily rational activity which can be 
studied objectively, is not able to adequately explain an actual 
argument between individuals. A 'rational* framework excludes from 
consideration the personal and idiosyncratic interpretations of the 
event, which define ’the event’ for each participant, and thus rob 
the framework of much of its explanatory power. The basic model chosen 
for studying argument is therefore one which focusses upon individual 
interpretation of experience, and has a subjective model of man at 
its centre.
Nonetheless the rational and logical aspects of argument cannot be 
ignored, and have to be explained rather than eschewed within this 
model. Indeed they are critical to an understanding of the importance 
for persuading others of ’having a good case’. For example, the 
exploration of the appeal of rationality suggests that there is both 
a strong ethical appeal to argue in a particular way, and an appeal 
of obtaining knowledge which is ’as certain as anything can be’.
Such appeals are reflected in the various studies of argument, and in
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the more everyday comments that people make about argument. If there 
is as Thorndike put it, 'something about having a good case', then 
what is it, and how can it be included within an essentially 
subjective model of man (Thorndike 1931).
The gulf that exists between persuasion theorists and argumentation 
studies is illustrative of the conceptual difficulties of studying 
argument, and emphasizes the need for a model of man as an arguer 
which describes man both as a reasoning and as a valuing animal.
The discussion of different models of thinking, varying from thinking 
as an essentially logical activity to subjective theories of thinking 
leads to Kelly's theory of personal constructs. In this theory man 
as a rational and detached scientist is replaced by msui the scientist 
who is an inveterate inquirer into his own experience. Each 
individual places an interpretation on events in order to make sense 
of his experience, to predict and control events. This for Kelly is 
the essence of human activity, it is a process of 'striving towards' 
and it is the metaphor of man which underlies the study of argument 
in this thesis.
Two corollaries of Kelly's theory provide a framework for combining 
the rational and logical aspects of argument with the social and 
political aspects of argument. The sociality corollary is concerned 
with individual's ability to understand others' interpretations of 
experience. To the extent that individuals can play a social role 
with respect to each other then persuasive argument is possible 
between them. In an extreme instance where individuals cannot make 
sense of (that is are not able to empathize with) another view of the
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world then their arguments are not credible to each other. The 
sociality corollary is thus concerned with many of the individual and 
idiosyncratic aspects of argument. The commonality corollary is 
concerned with the extent to which individuals interpret experience 
in a similar way. Similarity of interpretation leads to a reservoir 
of shared and agreed experience, and thus forms the basis for 
understanding the aspects of argument common to all, that is, the 
rational and logical features of argument. The theory of personal 
constructs thus offers an essentially subjective model of man, but is 
potentially able to account for aspects of experience which are more 
often thought of in terms of rationality.
A complete definition of what is meant by argument in the context of 
this thesis is not attempted because argument as an entity in its own 
right cannot be entirely separated from the 'event* in which it 
occurs. This chapter attempted only to define the features of events 
which make the activity of using linked propositions to persuade 
others a significant one, and this is the working definition of 





In this chapter the nature of thinking is further explored in relation 
to methods of capturing and representing invdividual cognitive 
systems. The technique and ideas of cognitive mapping are described 
in relation to other methods, using an example set of data based on 
the field work of Chapter 3. The use of cognitive mapping in 
exploring and analysing argument is discussed. Finally some more 
general methodological issues are examined in relation to obtaining 
authentic data about individual argument and the conclusions which 
may be reasonably drawn from such an exercise.
The nature of thinking
In Chapter 1 various models of thinking were described in terms of 
the psychologicial theories that they represented. Much of the 
discussion on the nature of thinking revolves around the link between 
logic and psychology, of which the discussion of the influence of 
rationality on debate is a part. Views on this link range from the 
notion that logical laws exist prior to experience, usually referred 
to a 'logicism', to the view that the laws of logic derive from 
experience, often called ’psychologism*. A discussion of the history 
of these ideas is given for example by Bolton (1972). A relevant 
issue for the study of argumentation in this debate is raised by the 
work of Husserl (1911) Husserl reflects an important concern with the 
psychological experience of logical relations. Like Descartes, in a 
rather different context, Husserl was intrigued by the vivid and
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compelling quality of experience that logical laws produced. The 
feeling of being certain was compulsive and powerful and seemed less 
under psychological control than other experiences. It is interesting 
though that Husserl turned not to the objects which might produce 
this experience, but to the mind which was experiencing these 
compelling phenomena as the key to his inquiry. The work of this 
thesis faces a similar issue, in that argument is also concerned with 
psychological compulsion or more generally the effect of argument on 
thinking (Churchill and Ameriks 1973, Edie 1976). The key to this 
inquiry is the individual experience of ’being persuaded*. Chapter 1 
has argued that a suitable theory of argument must include aspects of 
argument as a social phenomenon and must be able to encompass our 
experience of logical relations if it is to be of use in explaining 
argument.
The need for a subjective view arises primarily from a pragmatic need 
to deal with the experiential nature of thinking in, for example, an 
organizational setting, since as Richards (1929) suggests it is with 
this realm of opinion and dispute rather than facts and laws that 
civilized man is most concerned. In view of this need a method of 
representing argument will require a theory of cognition and its 
description which is able to cope with individual cognitive systems.
Representing cognitive systems
The philosopher John Dewey has had considerable influence on 
researchers* conceptions of thinking as a practical activity. His 
identification of thinking with problem solving remains at the core 
of many approaches to the study of cognition, including those of
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Piaget and Kelly. In this context the term problem solving has wider 
connotations that its more restricted use in the field of 
experimental psychology. For Dewey problem solving expressed a 
fundamental human activity of making choices, judging, and assessing 
actions in respect of an external world (Dewey 1910, 1925). Thinking 
arises in response to some problem confronting the individual, or 
which he perceives as confronting him, and in which he needs to make 
some sort of assessment and choice. That choice may be carried out 
through some kind of mental or actual simulation of the consequences 
of that choice (Sims 1979). The utility of thinking arises from its 
symbolic nature, in that the assessment may be carried out through 
the means of symbols rather than as a physical operation. This is 
its distinctive characteristic. The purpose of thinking as envisaged 
by Dewey was to provide the individual with a potential means of 
controlling his environment. That control develops through the 
individual being able to construct mental models of his world. If 
this control is to be effective however then these symbolic 
operations must be testable for their adequacy in controlling the 
environment. ’Reality testing’ is a significant part of thinking.
The nature of the ’reality’ against which this testing occurs is 
nonetheless extremely problematic, as Chapter 1 suggested, and 
reality in this context is more adequately characterised as an 
individual intepretation of reality only part of which may be in any 
way ’held in common’ with others, or be in touch with the physical 
world. It is clear too that the testing and judgement of the match 
between mental model and perceived reality is influenced by the 
nature of the mental model itself. The often quoted aphorism of
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Thomas and Thomas sums up the nature of this ’reality testing’ quite 
well :
’’If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences. ’’
(Thomas and Thomas 1928)
Men’s freedom in this regard is not universal since those who are at 
some variance with the ’commonly held world’, both of social norms 
and physical laws, face considerable challenges in terms of 
biological and social survival. The early work of Freud (I887) placed 
considerable emphasis on the development of the cognitive system 
through its relation to reality, or more precisely, a perceived 
external world. The mind develops from a concern with what Freud 
called primary processes, in which instinctual wishes seek immediate 
satisfaction, to an increasing concern with the external world in 
which secondary processes of repression and deferment of wish 
fulfilment occur. With a distinctly materialist conception of nature 
Freud suggested that the pressure for this kind of development, and 
hence for the development of thinking (as represented by the ego) was 
primarily that of biological survival. Thinking is inevitably a 
controlling process. Freud for example saw the ego as the mechanism 
by which instinctual life and the external world could be brought 
into some kind of dynamic equilibrium (Strachey 1973).
The work of Piaget similarly stresses the development of a cognitive 
system which enables the individual to become increasingly adapted to 
his environment (Piaget 1954). The development of intelligence for 
the child begins with an infant exploring his world in a physical way 
and building up a rudimentary cognitive system through the
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co-ordination of his actions. For example, a child by finding that 
one pebble is heavier than another discovers a physical relation in 
the world. By discovering that the number 5 remains whether he 
counts from right or left of a row of pebbles, he uncovers a 
mathematical or more abstract relation in the world. The system is 
developing through the abstraction of experience.
Both Freud and Piaget who are rarely associated through their work, 
have a conception of cognitive systems in which the development of 
thinking arises primarily as a way of controlling the individual's 
relation to his environment, and in part the nature of that 
environment. 'Predict and survive' might be a motto that each would 
have accepted. The work of Kelly, introduced in Chapter 1, similarly 
views man as behaving in this way. Man is a scientist theorizing 
about the world, and continually testing those theories for their 
adequacy. When viewed in the context of the work of Dewey, Freud, and 
especially Piaget, the work of Kelly is not as isolated as is 
sometimes presented (Bannister 1977). The principal difference 
between Piaget and Kelly is that whereas Piaget was concerned with 
the development of the cognitve system (cognitive structures as he 
termed it), Kelly is concerned with describing those structures and 
their subsequent development in the mature individual. The processes 
of development, however, through the replication of events and 
abstraction, closely mirror those of Piaget. The influence of a 
developed cognitive system on its own future development is massive, 
the interaction with the physical world of the senses less relevant. 
Thinking for the mature individual is significantly channelled. Thus 
Kelly more than any other worker stresses the individuality of each
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cognitive system, and the variey of systems which have developed to 
enable individuals to cope with their environment.
This conception of a cognitive system and its purpose determines to 
some extent the way in which cognition is described, and represented, 
and the features which are signalled as worthy of attention. Before 
tackling the issues and nature of the description, it is important to 
tackle one aspect of the partial nature of this description, namely 
the emphasis on conscious, cognitive elements of thinking. This also 
emphasizes that in discussing argument this thesis is focussed upon 
the cognitive and language based aspects of persuasive argument.
Non-language based aspects of cognition and argument 
The symbolic rather than physical nature of thinking raises the issue 
of the nature of those symbols and consequently the relation of 
thinking to language (Greene 1975, Searle 1978). For the purposes of 
this thesis it is adequate to propose a fairly transparent relation 
between the two, because argument is so dependant on language as the 
ostensible means of persuading. These issues are not however trivial 
in regard to assessing the status of the models of argument that are 
constructed and used. For example. Personal Construct Theory 
discusses the issue of non-verbal expression, which means that 
constructs may carry less definable meanings. Yet these aspects are 
instrinsically difficult to make explicit, and may anyway be 
fundamentally changed if they became explicit since explicitness 
implies expression by language. In the work mentioned earlier Eden, 
Jones and Sims (1979) reported considerable difficulty in identifying 
individual’s values with particular verbal labels, or even groups of
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labels. Given the nature of values their expression as an explicit 
verbal statement may be only a partial representation of a particular 
value or goal. It may be possible to link a group of concepts 
together under the heading ’these are to do with a particular value’, 
but it may not be possible to make that value explicit.
The description of thinking as a language based structure, and a 
number of such schemes are described below, is therefore a partial 
activity, and the interpretation of such structures in relation to 
the mental life of the individual is fraught with problems, some of 
which are reflected in the discussion of methodology at the end of 
this chapter. In this thesis such structures are to be taken as 
useful representations of thinking which can provide insight into 
those aspects of thinking (in relation to argument) which are 
language based, and can give some information on the individual’s 
interpretation of his world. They are social products not mental 
entities. That there may be some link between the social product and 
the mental life of an individual is likely given the utility of the 
social product. But a cognitive map is primarily a representation of 
thinking, not a model of the mind.
Cognitive mapping as a representation of argument
The technique of cognitive mapping, as described here, was developed 
at the University of Bath by Colin Eden and others (Eden, Smithin and 
Wiltshire 1980) as an operational means of representing individual 
construct systems. Cognitive mapping is rather different from the 
other techniques, such as repertory grids, which emanate from 
construct theory. Repertory grids more generally elicit constructs
M2
from elements and do not provide the explanatory links between 
constructs (Fransella and Bannister 1977). Apart from the particular 
advantages of using cognitive mapping for describing argument which 
are discussed in the following passage, it was selected as a method 
because of the close links with Personal Construct Theory.
Nonetheless it is only one possible way of describing argument, and 
others (based on other theories of cognition), are briefly described 
to show other, quite similar, possibilities. It is the intention of 
this thesis to suggest that some of the aspects of cognitive mapping 
are useful in representing argument, but the general arguments of the 
thesis rest on Personal Construct Theory not on a particular method.
At this stage it is assumed that it is possible to get to know about 
others' thinking in a reliable and authentic manner. A discussion of 
this issue of methodology is discussed in a later section. The 
examples used are taken from an analysis of the Diaries of Richard 
Crossman as a Labour Minister of Housing 1964-66 and concern a 
planning decision at Hartley in Kent (Crossman 1975). These data 
form the basis for Chapter 3 and are discussed in detail there. Here 
they are used to illustrate more generally the principles of a 
cognitive map and some possible forms of analysis in relation to the 
study of argument.
Personal Construct Theory suggests (Chapter 1) that the basic building 
blocks of a cognitive system are constructs. Constructs arise through 
the replication of events by an individual and are his abstraction 
from those events of a particular property that he sees in those 
events which may be applied to other events. The extent to which a 
construct may be applied to other events depends upon its range of
convenience. Each construct may therefore cover a variety of other 
events, and to the extent that a construct is itself an event, 
constructs may subsume other constructs. The construct system is thus 
a hierarchical system, and thinking and analysis may occur at 
different levels of the hierarchy. A construct has a rather 
different property to a concept as the latter is normally described 
(Cohen 1977). A construct arises from a contrast or differentiation 
between events, and is that feature or property seen in those events 
that distinguish them in some way from each other. A cognitive map 
in concerned with constructs which are of an operational rather than 
a conceptual nature, and relate therefore to specific issues. One 
construct for Crossman in relation to the planning decision was 
identified as:
Green belt not inviolate .... Green belt inviolate
The ’Green belt not inviolate’ part (or pole) of the construct was 
placed first as this seemed to be Crossman’s own viewpoint and the 
one that he explicitly expressed. The second pole represents his 
envisaged alternative to ’Green belt not inviolate’ in this context.
The notion of the envisaged alternative or contrast is helpful in 
understanding the meaning of a statement in a particular context, it 
gives some idea of the movement that the individual sees as possible. 
It represents, in terms of construct theory, an explicit expression 
of the channel for this particular part of the individual’s mental 
model. For example in another document (earlier) on Green Belt the 
phrase ’green belt not inviolate’ was used, but in contrast with the 
phrase ’non green belt land’ This suggests a construct of:
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Non green belt land .... green belt inviolate
This suggests different possibilities. For example, a planner who 
wished to argue for a particular development on green belt land, 
would be helped in choosing his strategy by knowledge of these 
envisaged alternatives. In the above simple case the two different 
constructs suggest different lines of argument that may be persuasive 
The second construct implies no conception of building on green belt 
land, land is either ’inviolate green belt’, or ’non green belt land’, 
The first construct envisages this possibility. When arguing against 
the second construct strategies involving re-designation of the land 
might be more effective, but when arguing against the first 
construct, argument about building on green belt in exceptional 
circumstances may be fruitful. If there were only two constructs then 
an extrapolation of this sort would not be very soundly based, but it 
provides an example of the way in which the contrasting nature of 
constructs gives clues to the world, as that individual may see it, 
and consequently to the arguments which will need to be addressed 
when attempting to persuade him to a course of action. Many 
constructs however, do not have a constrast explicitly stated, this 
may be because of a number of features of the event. For instance, 
the constrast may be implied but not expressed, or the ’logical’ or 
obvious opposite may convey the meaning intended. An equally useful 
clue to meaning is the relation of the construct to other constructs 
directly affecting it in an associative or causal manner. Causal 
chains of constructs are the basic way of representing argument 
within a cognitive map. Various comparisons of chains of linked
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constructs offer the main mechanism of describing and comparing 
arguments. (Note that the term construct and concept are used 
interchangeably in the later chapters of this thesis). The following 
example represents as a cognitive map (codes) of a brief section of 
the Crossman Diary.
"one just had to have [developments] like this in the 
green belt to deal with the population explosion... 
and prevent it spilling further and creating even 
further urban sprawl..."
This could be represented as a cognitive map as shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 A small cognitive map
development in 
green belt 










A link between two constructs represents that the first pole of the 
one construct leads to or affects in some way the first pole of the 
other construct. It also implies the complementary relation that the 
second pole of the first construct leads to the second pole of the 
other construct. For example, in the map above this implies that 
’development in green belt’ leads to ’decrease spillage’ which leads 
to ’contain urban sprawl’. It also implies the ’opposite argument’ 
that: ’no development in green belt’ leads to ’spillage* which leads 
to ’further urban sprawl’.
Not building on green belt is not according to the original statement 
the sole cause of spillage, clearly without a population explosion 
the issue would not arise. So ’population explosion’ leads to 
’spillage’. Each set of links on the map represents part of an 
argument and is the support that would be used to put forward the 
case. In this case it is the two chains with starting points of 
’population explosion’ and ’development in green belt* that jointly 
lead to the outcome (in this case urban sprawl).
There may be instances where the poles are oppositely linked to that 
described above. That is, the first pole of one concept leads to the 
second pole of another. This is indicated by a minus (negative) sign. 
There is no significance in the use of negative links other than 
this. A general guide to the technique can be found in Smithin 
(1982). In interpreting the cognitive maps and lists of constructs 
given in this thesis the following points may be helpful.
Concepts consist of two contrasting poles (not all the poles are made 
explicit). Concepts are linked by an arrow indicating that one
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concept affects another in some way. Phrases or concepts which are 
in some way linked to a concept but not causally, are connected by a 
straight line (connotative link). Concepts are shown as bi-polar or 
as a single pole followed by ellipsis (dots). Concepts not shown in 
this way (or with [+] and [-] proceeding the text) are monotonie 
concepts, and should be intepreted as having implied poles of, ’an 
increase in .... a decrease in’ (see ’spillage’ in the above example)
Computer aid and Cognitive mapping
As the examples in chapter 3 show, any argument worth the energy and 
attention of busy individuals is much more complex than the simple 
example discussed above, and can typically consist of 100-200 
concepts and 200-300 links. At this stage the use of computer 
software to manipulate and store data can be a considerable 
advantage. In this thesis use has been made of a software package 
called COPE, which is designed to assist with the manipulation and 
exploration of cognitive maps. There are also available within the 
package various methods of analysing a cognitive map, and these are 
used at various points in the thesis. A full discussion of these 
features is provided in the context of their use in later chapters. 
Generally speaking the software package is used as a transparent tool 
in the study of cognitive maps. This means that its function is to 
allow the user to perform tasks whose principles are determined from 
the theory of cognitive mapping, and which could in principle be 
achieved without the aid of the software. Figure 2.2 shows the output 
from the computer package of the arguments on the map in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.3 shows how the cognitive map was entered as a computer 
model. A general description of the package and commands available
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can be found in the COPE User Guide and Reference Manual (COPE 1983). 
In this thesis the package is generally regarded as a tool (like a 
pencil) and so the technicalities of its use are not discussed. An 
overview of the use of COPE can be found in Hewitt and Smithin (1981)
Full discussion is given on the relevant theories of cognitive
mapping where these are used, either manually or in conjunction with 
the computer package, at the appropriate points in the thesis. Note
that in general computer output has been re-typed on a conventional
typewriter, or re-drawn from the computer output where a cognitive 
map is involved, so that the presentation is consistent and clear.
The cognitive map is a representation of part of the thinking and 
argument that an individual expresses which partly describe the ways 
in which he has come to make sense of experience.
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Figure 2.2 Text output of the cognitive map of figure 2.1 




may lead to 
+3 ... an increase in spillage
which can lead to 
-4 further urban sprawl
Consequences
+2 development in green belt (Hartley)
may lead to 
-3 ... a decrease in spillage
which can lead to 
+4 contain urban sprawl
Consequences
-2 no development in green belt
may lead to 
+3 ... an increase in spillage
which can lead to 
-4 further urban sprawl
Figure 2.3 Entering data to the COPE computer package
use demo
Creating new model DEMO 
Model DEMO
t 1=Demonstration of COPE 
t3%
Irpopulation explosion.
2=development in green belt (Hartley), no development in zreen belt 
3=spillape
4=contain urban sprawl.further urban sprawl
1 +  3
2-3
3-4
1 population explosion ..............
2 development in green belt (Hartley)
3 [+]spillage .........................
4 contain urban sprawl ..............
. . . . [nci. jpcoulati.or; explosion 
. . no development in ^reen celt
 [-] spillage













may lead to 
... an increase in spillage 
which can lead to 
further urban sprawl
bye
End of model DEMO
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Some models of thinking compared
So far in this chapter it has been suggested that a distinctive 
feature of thinking, especially in relation to argument is its 
implicative, structural and predictive nature. To illustrate this, 
and set the technique of cognitive mapping in a wider context, the 
argument set forth in the above section is recast in the form of two 
alternative models (balance theory and argumentation analysis). This 
also assists in identifying some useful features of cognitive mapping 
in respect of representing argument.
(1) Balance theory
Balance theory, originally introduced by Heider (1944) and further 
elaborated by Osgood and Tannebaum (1955) proposed that an 
individual's cognitive structure could be analysed in terms of the 
relations between triads of cognitive elements which are connected in 
an affective relationship. Some possible triads are shown in Figure 
2.4. The plus sign indicates a positive affective relation, which in 
this example might be termed a compatibility between the elements, 
and the minus sign an incompatibility. So for example, 'decrease 
spillage' is compatible with 'development in green belt*. When 
considered in isolation there is no incompatibility between 'decrease 
spillage' and 'preserve amenity value*. It is only in relation to 
the third element, when these cognitive elements are brought into 
relation with each other, that an incompatibilty arises between 
'development in green belt' and 'preserve amenity value*.
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Figure 2.4 Balance theory representation of sample data
Decrease spillage 
•+* /  %  4"
Development in 
Green Belt Preserve amenity value
Decrease spillage
Development in already 
spoilt Green Belt -— Preserve amenity value
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This in balance theory represents an imbalance or strain in the 
cognitive structure. It is a disjunction which creates a pressure to 
be resolved into a more balanced state. That resolution can come 
about through a change in the relation between the elements, or 
through a change in the elements themselves.
"If no balanced state exists, then forces towards this state 
will arise. Either the dynamic characters will change, 
or the unit relations will be changed through action or 
through cognitive reorganizaion. If a change is not possible, 
the state of imbalance will produce tension."
(Heider 1946)
One possible resolution, which is in effect the predictive nature of 
this model is shown in Figure 2.4. The predictive value of the theory 
lies in the construction of triads, the recognition of potential 
conflict, and the suggestions of new compatible structures which the 
original structures may be transformed into. Note that there is an 
element of channelling in this theory too in that there are only 
certain ways, given the original structures, in which changes may 
occur. It is also an individually oriented theory, in that the links 
between the elements can be specific to an individual, although the 
theory is not always presented in this way. This theory has rarely 
been used in complex decision making, and has tended to be used to 
study the preferences of large numbers of subjects over a small field 
of elements. This theory of cognitive balance and the related work 
of cognitive dissonance, both emphasize the role of mental models for 
’making sense’ of the world, and have suggested ways of analysing 
those structures in terms of explaining and predicting behaviour.
One disadvantage of these theories, apart from their lack of exposure
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to complex situations, is that the causal links between the elements 
of the triads are not made explicit. In terms of representing 
argument this leaves out of account the way in which ideas are linked 
in a supportive sequence. Whilst this can sometimes be inferred from 
the elements this is not always the case. Whilst the language of the 
elements can remain close to that used originally, some difficulty 
was experienced in structuring the data in the form of triads. This 
imposes an additional constraint on the modelling process, and 
potentially makes it less transparent to the user and modeller. 
Transparency refers to the ability of the model to represent what it 
is modelling in a way which makes the transition between the original 
data and the model quite clear. It can help to make use of the 
technique for ’lay’ users much simpler. For the researcher it assists 
checking on the relationship between the model and data, and can help 
to ensure that research conclusions are properly grounded (Glaser and 
Straus 1967).
(2) Argumentation studies
In constrast to balance theory, argumentation studies do describe the 
causal or supportive structure of arguments, but there is no clearly 
elaborated underlying model of cognitive change and development. So 
the theories do not provide a predictive model of man (Toulmin,
Rieke, and Janik 1979). This argument is sketched below in terms of a 
more traditional argumentation study (Bell and Staines 1979). The 
unit of analysis in this case is a statement. Statements are 
categorized in terms of the function that they perform in the overall 
argument. The claim is the objective or goal of the argument, which 
the other statements are attempting to prove or support. In this case
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it might be: 
no more urban sprawl
Another category is that of the grounds for the claim, these are 
usually the given elements of the situation, eg: facts, events, 
common beliefs. A warrant is the rule or belief which links the 
grounds to the claim. So the general form of the argument might be:
It is agreed that G(grounds) has happened, now when G happens this leads 
to C (warrant). Hence C is true (claim).
In this case it might be analysed as:
There is a population explosion (G). A population explosion will 
lead to spillage (W). Development on green belt will prevent spillage 
Hence, contain urban sprawl (C).
Again in argument analysis, as with balance theory and cognitive 
mapping, there is an emphasis on the elements of the argument and the 
links between them. Clearly a decision to examine the grounds rather 
than the warrant will lead to a different argument strategy. In the 
one case disputing the facts eg: is there really a population 
explosion, and in the other disputing the links between grounds and 
claim; will the population explosion lead inevitably to spillage. As 
Toulmin emphasizes the strategy is partly determined by the context 
of the argument (Toulmin 1958). For example an argument in ethics may 
be tackled very differently from an argument in science, especially 
in regard to the status given to different features of the argument.
In addition to the difficulties mentioned above, the location of this 
work within a broadly rational model of man makes it unsuited to the
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task of this theis, also like balance theory it does not seem to have 
been applied to practical argument settings. However the basic 
mechanism of representation of argument is not that dissimilar from 
that of cognitive mapping. Also the choice of the statement as a unit 
of analysis ignores contrasts and thus may not reveal some of the 
meaning of the statements. There is also in practice a greater 
emphasis on reduction, and the consideration of the elements in 
isolation from each other, although this does not seem to be a 
necessary feature of the approach.
The purpose of these comparisons is two-fold. It illustrates the 
point that the use of construct theory, and cognitive mapping, is not 
very different to the way in which argument is often analysed, but 
there are some specific advantages in using a cognitive map.
a) The use of constructs and the notion of contrast, provides important 
information on the meaning intended by the arguer, and on the 
possible channels for change that he envisages in the situation.
So for example the use by Crossman of the contrasting pole of
'green belt not inviolate ....  green belt inviolate' gives information
on what 'green belt' means to Grossman.
b) The cognitive map is a more flexible representation, and directly 
expresses causal links between constructs, and thus explicity 
represents chains of argument. See for example Figure 2.1.
c) Through the use of associated computer software the cognitive map
provides access to a greater degree of complexity in argument than
might otherwise be possible. This is shown for example in Chapter
3 where the combined model of Crossman's arguments could not be 
easily explored or analysed manually, because of the number of 
concepts and the complexity of the links between them.
Finally it is interesting to note that all these models have in common 
a view of thinking as a propositional 'if then' type of activity, 




In the above description of three ways of representing an argument, 
the certainty with which an argument is put forward (modality) was 
not discussed. Yet as Toulmin emphasizes the nature of the modal 
qualifiers is an important determinant of the effect of the argument. 
In the above examples it is respectively to do with, the strength of 
the link between concepts, the strength of the incompatibility 
between two cognitive elements, and the certainty which can be 
ascribed to the warrant (Toulmin 1958).
Toulmin illustrates the effect of modal qualifiers and the 
psychological reactions that they produce with the following example:
Consider two arguments using the modal qualifier cannot:
1) You cannot lift that two ton weight
2) You cannot speak of a fox's tail
In the first example we feel that the modal qualifier 'cannot' is more 
appropriately or strongly used, since it refers to physical 
impossibility, that is, you certainly cannot. Whereas in the second 
example it is actually possible to talk of a fox's tail rather than 
the brush, even if it is not done at the Hunt Ball. The second 
example is more in the nature of a terminological impropriety.
But in addition the appropriateness of a modal qualifier depends upon 
the context in which it is used. This thesis provides an example of 
this. As its subject matter is broadly speaking that of social 
science, there is a predominance of subdued qualifiers in the
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presentation of theories. The use of 'most*, and 'generally', and 
'broadly', as opposed to 'all', 'always' and so on. This has both a 
tactical and conceptual implication. The tactical implication is that 
the use of 'all' includes the reader, so that it is always possible 
to induce the response 'but that's not true of me', or at least 
points the reader straightaway to think of exceptions. The use of 
'most' in the same context, conversely leaves the reader free to 
include himself or not as he wishes, and points towards the 
commonality of the example. So for instance a statement like:
'Most people are discomfited by someone pointing out a logical flaw in 
their argument'
Is received very differently from the statement
'All people are discomifted by someone pointing out a logical flaw in 
their argument'
The only difference between these statements is the modal qualifier.
Consider however a statement in a scientific context:
'Most electrons carry a negative charge' 
compared with:
'All electrons carry a negative charge'
Here the acceptability of the arguments is reversed. This is the 
conceptual point of modality. Our understanding of the effect and use 
of qualifiers relates closely to the beliefs we hold in common with 
others about the nature of the world, and the type of knowledge that 
we believe is attainable in a given context. Modal qualifiers are 
therefore closely related to the notion of the commonality between
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construct systems. It is this commonality which enables us to judge 
the use of qualifiers in a given context. Qualifiers are also 
concerned with the range of convenience of a given construct, social 
constructs may not apply to all people, but scientific constructs 
must have as wide a range of convenience as possible, as that is one 
of the agreed criteria for the adequacy of a scientfic proposition. 
More generally Kahneman and Tversky (1982) have pointed to recent 
research on choice and proability in decision making that suggests 
people are sensitive to the difference between certainty and high 
probability, but not very sensitive to differences in probability 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
In a cognitive map modality is tackled in two ways. Firstly through 
the expression of contrast some notion of the exclusivity of the 
construct can be obtained, and some knowledge of the range of 
elements to which it applies. Secondly the strength with which a 
given link is held can be represented, for example using the software 
it is possible to mask out concepts and links which are regarded to 
be less certain (in a rank ordering fashion), and so examine the 
argument only in terms of its most significant elements.
There may also be a need to express the certainty of belief in a more 
measured way, through a rank ordering, or as a proability, as is done 
with system dynamics (Coyle 1977) or expert system models for 
decision making (Barr and Feigenbaum 1981). There are significant 
problems with this however in terms of the amount of effort that is 
need to evaluate a map in this way. It represents however, a possible 
area of future research, and is discussed under this heading in the
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final chapter.
Methodology for this thesis
It may seem a little odd that the methodological discussion should 
follow after the discussion of theory and method which it is supposed 
to comment on, but following Eden and Harris it is important to 
determine the aims of the inquiry before methodological choices can
be made. This gives a less prominent, though no less important, role
to methodological issues (Eden and Harris 1975, chapter 6).
In the above sections the issue of a researcher getting to know about
and represent his own, or someone else's thinking, was taken for 
granted, although it was pointed out, especially in relation to 
Balance Theory, that the model construction process is problematic in 
terms of.the ’fit’ between model and the original data. As the data 
was collected in three different ways, there are some issues which 
are relevant only to each method. The methods and these specific 
issues are described in detail in the appropriate chapters, and the 
general foundation for all the methods is described here.
Before discussing the methodology specific to the task of this 
thesis, the purpose and nature of methodological debate is clarified 
so that the implications of the methodology are made apparent. 
Methodological choice arises in any research and concerns the nature 
of the inquiry as a whole. It establishes the criteria on which the 
work may be evaluated, and sets up the rules which determine the 
selection of data; what is to count and what is not to count as 
support for a theory or methodology.
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An accurate discussion of the methodological problems for the study 
of social life is that of Eden and Harris (1975), who see the 
fundamental problem in the study of a social system as that of its 
inherent complexity. This complexity arises from the variety of the 
system elements and the fact that such variety renders an exhaustive 
description of the possible system states an infeasible task. The 
uncertainty in deciding which features to abstract from this variety, 
in any study, which Eden and Harris call probabilism is the essence 
of methodological choice. Where should the system boundary be drawn?
Rules for drawing this boundary around knowlege are plentiful, and the 
choice of a set of rules is of course the methodological choice. One 
representative set of rules is that of Logical Positivism (although 
strictly speaking this name covers a wide variety of different rule 
sets), which may for the purpose of this discussion be considered 
together. The principle of verifiability (Ayer 1936), which defines 
knowledge in terms of what can be empirically shown to be the case, 
is a principal rule of this methodological approach. The rules of 
empirical enquiry, or variations of them, thus define the system 
boundary. They are the criteria for the variety reduction exercise.
Such rules however have an inherent circular and self-fulfiling 
character, for example, since empirical inquiry can only provide by 
definition certain sorts of data it cannot offer any information which 
relates to the the adequacy of the bases on which it is established. 
This is the circular nature of methodological choice (Norman 1976).
If further fundamental rules were posited to justify the original 
rules, then these further rules must themselves be justified, and 
there is an infinite regress. Hegel's conclusion from this was that
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it was not possible to secure the foundations of any inquiry, in the 
way that some philosphers and scientists had hoped. What is possible 
through methodology is to make explicit the the bias that the choice 
of method brings in, and to further inquire whether the choice fits 
the purpose of the inquiry. This suggests following Eden and Harris 
that purpose should define methodology, rather than vice versa. For 
example positivist approaches to social research are usually 
criticized on the grounds that there is a mismatch between the 
purpose of finding out how decisions are made and the methods used to 
do this. The criteria of Logical Positivism are inadequate for 
selecting data in relation to that purpose.
"If there is no objective other than that of building a 
model of a system that exists within a defined system 
boundary then there can be no reasonable way of conducting 
the variety reduction exercise"
(Eden and Harris 1975)
This also implies that the issue of methodological choice is a dynamic 
rather than a static one, and that there should be an interaction 
between data selection, theory, and the rules for the selection of 
the data.
An appropriate methodology for the study of argument 
Chapter 1 argued that argument to be adequately explained as a 
feature of organizational life, must include argument as part of a 
social process and as an activity indulged in primarily by 
individuals. Which is to say that the outcome of an argument cannot 
be solely explained with reference to the public, consensual rules 
that establish criteria for ’rational* behaviour. It is also
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necessary to take account of the personal ’logic’ or rules that 
individuals use in assessing or taking part in argument. Such rules 
it has been argued in this chapter can be usefully represented and 
studied through the theory of personal constructs and the development 
from this of cognitive mapping. Such a choice of method and theory 
has carried with it an assumption about the unit of analysis which is 
to form the base of the inquiry. This unit is clearly taken to be a 
phemonenal one, that is the account that an individual gives of his 
experience. Perhaps the need for this choice in relation to the 
pupose of understanding argument is best illustrated by contrasting 
it with an alternative choice, which is common in persuasaion 
research, namely that of dependent and independent variables obtained 
from experimental situations. This also may illustrate the more 
general criticisms of Positivist methodologies in relation to this 
field of work.
The ’variable’ choice seems inadequate precisely because it excludes 
the individuals’ own experience of a situation as a relevant 
explanation of the event. Harre (1979) describe this same worry in 
relation to current work in social psychology:
"Most of social psychology seemed to me to be concerned 
more with the reactions of idealized automata in bland, 
anomic environments than with the way real human beings 
carried on their affairs together."
(Harre 1979)
But then as discussed earlier. Positivist methodology has a different 
purpose to understanding behaviour, it has rather, a concern with 
obtaining ’sure and certain’ knowledge. Reason and Rowan (1981) in
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establishing the need for a new paradigm of social research make this 
point even more strongly:
"people are seen as isolable from their normal social 
context, people are stripped of all that gives 
their action meaning and in this way they are trivialised."
(Reason and Rowan 1981)
It is not so much that they are trivialised, but that the data 
obtained in experiments does not relate to the express purpose of the 
experiment, but is used as though it should. Crucial in this regard 
is the tendency to generalize and abstract rules of behaviour:
"The whole language of .... dependent and independent variables
and so forth is highly suspect. It assumes that people can be 
reduced to a set of variables which are somehow equivalent across 
persons and across situations."
(Reason and Rowan 1981)
Actually there is no doubt that people can be reduced to a set of 
variables it is done frequently in the course of much experimental 
research, but is this is a useful way of developing practical theories 
of individual behaviour?
The following considers in more detail some of the methodological 
problems of 'variable* research, and compares them with an 
alternative method.
a) Consideration of a few variables in a laboratory experiment necessarily 
places the subject in an environment which is unusual, and not the 
normal context in which he makes decisions. If these influences are 
absent how can the decision making theory be transferred back to the 
normal context without assuming that those influences were
66
negligible. But how can that assumption be made without a study or 
theory about those influences? It also ignores (Milgram 1965) the 
influences of the new situation, that is, the situation of ’being the 
subject of an experiment'.
b) The actions which the subject is asked to make are also usually 
of a highly restricted nature, and are not things which he normally 
does. The things that we 'normally do' are much more an integral part 
of ourselves than a 'one off experimental task which we see as a 
'one off situtation. So again the transfer of theory is questionable,
c) More practically the subjects tend to come from particular groups 
in society, for example college students. How these results can be 
related to other people is not clear.
Chapter 1 has argued that an individual interpretation of argument is 
necessary to understanding particular argument events. The research 
has therefore been designed to focus on individual accounts and 
descriptions of argument, and to follow the course of debate between 
a limited number of individuals. The research therefore studies 
arguers in relation to their everyday tasks. Following Harre and 
Second (1972) and others (Lyman and Scott 1968, Gowler and Legge 
1980) the unit of analysis is taken to be the individual's account of 
his actions
One difficulty in using accounts is that of indexicality.
Indexicality refers to the problems of interpretation which arise 
because the meaning of an account depends in part on the separate 
cognitive systems that the account giver and listener have developed. 
In listening to an account, the listener inevitably selects for
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attention portions of it which sound more interesting to him rather 
than the account giver, and thereby inevitably misses some of the 
meaning which the account giver intended to convey. The methods need 
to provide therefore for a way of checking that this meaning can be 
made more explicit, and so open to more careful consideration. 
Feedback to the account giver can be a helpful check in this respect, 
or if the original data is available to other researchers there is 
some possibility for checking interpretation. Additional sources and 
cross-reference are useful in this respect. The transparent nature of 
cognitive mapping, discussed earlier, can also make checking of data 
against future models easier and less prone to this kind of 
distortion.
The authenticity of the account must also be considered. Does the 
account adequately represent the view of events that the account 
giver had at the time that the events were occurring? In relation to 
argument this can be an especial problem, since there is a social 
pressure to provide justifications for action rather than to provide 
an account of the reasons that led to the action. To some extent this 
points to a need for attention to the relationship between the 
researcher and the account giver in which some form of trust is 
established. This often implies the need for a careful negotiation 
between researcher and researched as to the nature and needs of each 
party. Even so there can be no final check on authenticity, indeed 
there may be occasions when the account giver is not able to 
distinguish between a post event justification and a prior reason for 
action. For document research it points to the need for there to be 
cross-referenced accounts of the event where possible, or at least
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indications that the account 'fits’ others' impressions of the 
account giver.
Of overall concern is the way in which the researcher 'addresses' the 
data that he discovers, and the way in which he discovers it. The 
work in this thesis is broadly governed by the related work of the 
sociology of defining the situation (McHugh 1968), of grounded theory 
(Glaser and Straus 1967), of ethnomethodologists and perhaps most 
directly with the symbolic interactionist working with a 
dramaturgical model of organizational life (Mangham 1978, Blumer 
1969).
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Summary of Chapter 2 
Representing argument
Chapter 1 suggested that argument should be studied within the 
context of a subjective model of man as a reasoning and a valuing 
being. The personal construct theory of Kelly was introduced as a 
way of combining the rational and the social aspects of argument.
This thesis proposes however not just a new theoretical basis for 
understanding argument but also a method which will be of practical 
use in the preparation and performance of argument. This chapter 
therefore tackled the issues involved in representing and describing 
argument.
Representation of argument is closely linked to an understanding of 
the nature of thinking and cognition. Cognition has variously been 
described as a purely logical operation of the mind, and 
cohstrastingly as an entirely subjective process. A common feature 
of most of these descriptions, including that of problem solving 
activity, is the sequential or 'if-then' nature of thought. Thinking 
is essentially a prepositional structure according to these schemes. 
Even though these structures do not necessarily follow the rules of 
logic they do nonetheless have a coherent and interpretable 
structure. The coherency and consistency of each individual 
cognitive system is as the contrasting work of Piaget, Freud and 
Kelly implies a result of individuals' attempts to structure 
experience in a predictable way. In the context of prediction the 
issue of modality, that is the strength with which a proposition is 
put forward, is significant because different contexts imply the use
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of different modalities.
Argument can be seen as an expression of part of an individual's 
interpretation of experience, and an attempt to persuade others to 
adopt part of that system as their own.
Cognitive mapping, balance theory, and argumentation studies were 
described as methods of representing argument each with a different 
degree of adherence to subjective models of man. They illustrate 
further the 'if-then' structures used to describe thinking.
Cognitive mapping was described in detail as this is the method used 
to represent argument in this thesis, it has some advantages over 
other methods. For example it is relatively easy for non-experts to 
follow, and the causal structure of the models makes it easy to 
represent the essential structure of an argument. However its 
adoption as an appropriate method follows from its roots in Personal 
Construct Theory, and the close link between basic theory and method 
that this enables.
The choice of a method and theory leads naturally to a discussion of 
methodology. It was argued that the role of methodology is to examine 
the 'fit' between the aims of an inquiry, and its methods. To reveal 
rather than to eliminate bias, and so potentially ensure that the 
methods are appropriate to the aim. As Eden and Harris argued it is 
only by knowing the aim that other choices can be evaluated. The 
circular nature of methodological choice implies that methodology 
alone cannot firmly ground any inquiry. Also the methods will 
inevitably contain at least an element of self-fulfilment, since the 
choice of any method will restrict the possibilities that are
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envisaged. For example, the use of cognitive mapping will to some 
extent 'guarantee' that arguments have a particular structure in this 
thesis, since cognitive mapping has an inherent model of argument 
within it.
The aim of this thesis is a better understanding of argument in 
organizational settings, leading to practical methods which may be of 
use in the preparation and practice of argument. The research design 
has therefore taken the form of a study of three different settings 
in which argument was according to the available evidence a 
significant influence. These settings were studied with techniques 
which enable the researcher to focus on argument. The test of this 
work is whether these ideas and methods prove a substantial aid to 
understanding argument in these restricted conditions. Of interest 
will be the features of argument that act persuasively in different 
situations, and the wider implications that this may have for the 





In this chapter the theories developed in the first two chapters are 
applied in greater detail to an analysis of a personal diary, in 
particular to the analysis of an issue in which argument as a 
persuasive medium seemed to play a significant part. The bulk of the 
chapter is concerned with showing how the techniques were used to 
gather and assess the data, and showing how the theories can assist 
in understanding the nature of the argument. This chapter focusses 
upon understanding values and looks in detail at how individuals’ 
values affect the persuasiveness of arguments.
The research setting
The research was based upon a reading and analysis of the Diaries of 
Richard Crossman. Richard Crossman was a prominent Labour Party 
member of Parliament holding a variety of senior cabinet posts from 
1964 to his death in 1974. This included the period of the Labour 
Party government under Harold Wilson from October 1964 to 1970. The 
issue taken from the diaries covers the period from October 1964, 
(immediately after a general election), to February 1965. During this 
period Crossman was Minister of Housing (Crossman 1975).
In October 1964 Crossman was considering a planning application from 
S.R.L. Investments Ltd, who intended to develop 420 acres of 
agricultural land near the village of Hartley in Kent. The 
development provided residential accomodation for 5,000-6,000 people. 
The land in question formed part of the proposed Green Belt for Kent
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under a proposal from Kent County Council in I960. A public inquiry 
had been held, and the Department’s inspector had recommended that 
planning permission be refused. The final decision on appeal rested 
with Crossman.
The issue is of interest because it is possible to follow in some 
detail over a period of months Crossman’s changing arguments about 
this planning decision, as the consequences of the decision became 
more serious for him personally, culminating in a debate in the House 
of Lords. Because it was his first major planning decision Crossman 
took some care over considering the arguments put forward, and it is 
possible to follow these through the diary. It provides therefore a 
good opportunity to look at the way in which arguments are evaluated 
and marshalled by an individual in coming to a decision, and the way 
in which those arguments change when the consequences of the decision 
are unexpected. The diary material also potentially provides access 
to personal and individual reflections by Crossman which he brings to 
bear in assessing and preparing arguments, but which are usually
CL
un^ailable from public reports of events. Before turning to the issue 
in detail the following sections tackle the research and 
methodological questions which are raised in using this sort of 
material.
The use of personal diaries as a base for research data 
It is important to distinguish between the use of a diary as part of a 
piece of historical research, that is, research which is attempting to 
make statements about historical events or figures, and the use of the 
diary as part of social research, that is, an attempt to make
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statements about the author of the diary. The Crossman diaries were 
published in 1975, and later serialized in the ’Times’ newspaper. The 
Diaries caused a heated public debate focussed mainly on the issue of 
open government, and the right of politicians to reveal details of 
discussions between members of the government (Robson 1976, Young, H. 
1977). A great deal of the popular debate also concerned the accuracy 
of the diaries, about which there was some controversy (Klein 1977). 
Wilson’s account of the events over devaluation claims that 
Crossman’s interpretation of there being a series of covert meetings 
and conspiracies between senior members of the government to be a 
typical piece of Crossman fantasy (Wilson 1971). Such issues are less 
relevant to this thesis because the focus of interest is on 
Crossman’s own interpretation of the events. The issue that arises 
for this thesis is whether or not the diaries may be considered a 
genuine reflection of Crossman’s views at the time. The following 
problems may arise in making an assessment of the adequacy of the 
diaries as a genuine reflection of the diarist’s views.
a) Whilst a diary may initially be supposed to reflect a diarist’s 
opinion, it may be that the diary is written for another purpose, for 
example to create an appropriate historical picture of the author. 
Indeed for influential figures this may be an especially relevant 
problem (Haines 1977).
b) The diary may act as a means of justifying rather than explaining 
action, and may contain an element of self-deception.
c) The text of diary may be less carefully written than an article 
intended for publication, and may contain unintentional mistakes.
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d) There is often no opportunity for the researcher to check his 
intepretation of the diary directly with the author.
Empirically it may be possible to make some assessment of the 
material in relation to the above points, for example by comparing 
contemporary accounts and by considering the context in which the 
statements are made. The contemporary accounts and descriptions of 
Crossman lend considerable support to the idea that the diaries do 
represent Crossman’s views as they were at the time. Even if his 
’’perception was often clouded by his arrogance”, (Haines 1977) this 
was equally true of his personal style in Government, as it was of 
his reflections in the diary (Klein 1977, Jones, G. 1977). In accounts 
by Wilson and Barabara Castle (who was his closest friend in 
political life), there is no suggestion that the diary content is 
anything other than ’authentic Crossman’, even if the content may be 
a very different interpretation of events to their own (Castle 1980). 
Indeed a number of commentators now use the Crossman Diaries as a 
source of data about the period (Middlemas 1979), and government more 
generally (Coates 1980), and raise no doubts about the nature of the 
diaries as a genuine personal record. In the introduction to volume 1 
Crossman also considers this issue. He states that the diary entries 
were usually dictated on the day indicated, and ”In particular I have 
tried to avoid self-deception, especially about my own motives....”. 
The Diaries were re-dictated prior to publication, at which point 
Crossman called in an outside advisor to check the new text against 
the original.
The intention of the above survey and checks is not to provide an
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in-depth inquiry into the genuineness of the views expressed, such a 
task could only be attempted at considerable length, and is of 
doubtful value. Rather it was intended to show that as far as those 
who have expressed a view on the issue were concerned, the diaries do 
faithfully represent Crossman’s views at the time. With these diaries 
there has never been any real doubt on this issue, which is why they 
were chosen, but such an issue would need much closer investigation 
where contemporaries questioned the nature of the Diaries in this 
way.
The use of diary material also carries with it some advantages, over 
other sources of data, including interviews. Diaries are likely to be 
a more personal account, in that they are written privately, and 
usually in the knowledge that their content will only be available to 
others, some years hence, when the author may be no longer closely 
involved with the personalities and events described. Unlike 
interviews, in which the personal interaction may colour the data, 
the written diary is not provided for a specific audience. For these 
reasons also, it may be less likely to be intended to persuade 
justify, threaten, cajole, manipulate, evoke sympathy and support or 
otherwise influence an audience (Holsti 1976).
In the context of argument the written word also has an advantage of 
potentially providing a more structured account (than a verbatim 
transcript) of arguments involved, and the argument struture may be 
more emphasized. Writing also sometimes provides a forum for 
privately rehearsing arguments and thus the development of the 
argument can be seen in more detail.
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As it is written at the time of the events being described the diary 
also offers an opportunity to follow the development of an issue, and 
the changes that occur may be recorded. Such data would not usually 
be available from a retrospective account, in this resect it is 
interesting to compare Wilson’s book to the Crossman Diaries. In the 
use of documentary evidence, especially into events which have 
occured some years past, there is always a shortage of data, and so 
the conclusions drawn are always partial and fragmentary. However as 
an insight into Crossman’s thinking as he acted as a Labour Minister 
these diaries are an excellent base.
The following sections describe the development of the Hartley issue 
in stages. The stages roughly correspond to the dates in the diary 
when Crossman chose to write about Hartley, and each represents a 
particular group of events. The cognitive maps in Figures 3.1 to 3.3 
are highlights of original coding of the diary, and therfore the text 
of the concepts may differ marginally from the computer models 
printed in this chapter. The principal references to Hartley in 
volume 1 of the diary are given at the end of the chapter. This 
description in terms of highlighted cognitive maps and interleaved 
explanation represents an alternative way of presenting an account of 
the arguments (compared to a more familiar style such as an essay), 
and focusses upon the essential structure of the arguments involved.
A more detailed analysis is provided in a following section.
Hartley - early stages, Crossman is against building at Hartley.
Part of the cognitive map drawn from the diary entries in October 1964 
is shown in Figure 3.1. At this stage the issue covers no more than
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a brief paragraph describing the day’s events. Three concepts and the 
arguments around them seem to sum up the features of the problem for 
Crossman :
[FIRST MAJOR PLANNING DECISION]
This seems to touch on the reason why the issue is thought worthy of 
mention, and relates back to Crossman’s worries about his lack of 
experience in the housing and planning field. He had been expected to 
be given the Social Services Department on which he was an 
acknowledged expert, and the early pages of the diary are taken up 
with this worry. His actual discussion of Hartley is very brief, and 
he sums up his case concentrating on the amenity value of green belt, 
which he feels is sufficiently important to turn down the plan.
[AMENITY VALUE OF GREEN BELT IS VERY IMPORTANT]
A third concept and related arguments seems to be linked with 
Crossman’s relations with his Departmental officials. Their advice 
was apparently to overrule the inspector and allow the development at 
Hartley.
[INSTINCT TO DISAGREE WITH OFFICIALS]
In respect of the argument used, the points to note from the 
description and cognitive map are:
a) The issue is decided mainly in Crossman’s mind through the amenity 
value argument, which he holds to be a stronger case than that of his 
officials.
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Figure 3.2 Hartley change of mind
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Figure 3.^ Hartley -_________text
CROSSMAN DIARY - VOLUME 1 
PAGES 114 - 115___________
However, I thought we had weathered the storm when there came a debate 
in the House of Lords on the initiative of Lord Molson, the chairman of the 
Town and Country Planning Association.^ One of my first engagements as 
Minister was to be the guest of the T.C.P.A. at their annual dinner and there 
I found myself sitting next to Molson. Perhaps I had drunk too much, perhaps 
I was merely irritated by his stuffy manner, but I defended the Hartley 
decision very strongly to him over dinner. Three weeks later I got all this back 
a thousandfold when he launched the debate in the House of Lords and was 
supported by Lord Morrison and Lord Chorley from our side of the House. 
Altogether, it was an extremely damaging debate—it made Hartley a national 
and not merely a local parochial issue. Finally, just before Christmas, there 
was a vicious and brilliantly clever cartoon by Osbert Lancaster in the Daily 
Express headed ‘Double Crossmans hip', and also to my surprise I found a 
strongly worded leading article in the Sun inspired by Sydney Jacobson.
The new line of attack they all directed at me was to say that Span is a 
speculative group of builders who bought up the land at £70 an acre and 
would make vast profits. Though this sounds terrible, it is in fact an absurd 
charge, because what Span did was to buy the land at a low enough price to 
enable them to use- only one-third of it for house building and to allocate 
two-thirds of it for public spaces, schools, hospitals, in order to create their 
model village. That’s a perfectly adequate reply, but alas, as the Minister 
who is in charge in a judicial capacity, I haven’t been able to reply.
What 1 war able to do was to have a special conference about my Chelmsley 
Wood decision just before Christmas. This time I took good care. I carefully 
briefed the Midland press; I got hold of Brian Redhead of the Guar<Üan and 
gave lunch to the architectural correspondent of The Times  ̂ who is also 
editor of the Architectural Review  ̂ and as a result—with great luck—on the 
day of these attacks on me by Lancaster and Sydney Jacobson I actually had 
leading articles in the Guardian and The Times defending what I had done as a
short-term measure but warning that it wouia oe unienaoie lu tue ivu*
I am also planning to publish my third big decision, on Stannington near 
Sheffield soon. It will be very difficult to attack me on this.
However, I am still highly vulnerable on Hartley; and over this recess I 
have been wondering whether instead of merely having a press conference 
about Sheffield I shouldn’t have a press conference on the whole issue of the 
green bel$, which would include Hartley as well as Stannington. I shall also
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b) Crossman is prepared to address the arguments because it is the 
first planning decision he has faced, and he has little previous 
experience in this field.
c) Even at this descriptive level of analysis other issues are seen 
to bear on the decision, such as his relationship with his officials
Hartley - change of mind
By 5th December the decision on Hartley has been made, and was to 
allow the development. How had this change occurred and why? The 
argument that ’won the day’ is shown in Figure 3.2. It is the 
argument which Crossman mentions in October as that put forward by 
the Developers, and which he rejected as not being a strong enough 
case to outweigh the ’amenity’ value argument. An important part of 
the map is that related to the concept:
[GREEN BELT IS NOT REALLY GREEN],
(The initials JM refer to M.P. James Macoll, Crossman’s Parliamentary 
Private Secretary, and on the computer listings (Figure 3.6), BM 
refers to the M.P. Bob Hellish).
Macoll was keenly interested in planning and had been involved in 
planning issues for a number of years (MacColl 1957). Another 
important influence that Crossman mentions is one of his civil 
servants, Jimmy James, who he mentions has helped to persuade him to 
this different view on Hartley.
From the point of view of the argument, what seems to have happened 
here is that Crossman is gradually developing a more elaborate 
(through trying out ideas and seeking advice), view of the nature of
85
Green Belt land. Rather than being a single monolithic concept it has
split into two, namely:
[PRESERVE TRULY GREEN BELT LAND ____ SPOIL ALL GREEN BELT LAND]
The preservation of the land which is still truly green belt now 
becomes the objective, so that the amenity value arguement would 
still apply to this, but is weakened when applied to all green belt 
land. That is, some of the current green belt land has already been 
spoilt and so does not have the amenity value that Crossman attached 
originally to all green belt land. At the end of the section there is 
some mention of possible rows within the party because of this 
decision. At this point Crossman seems to believe that these rows are 
mainly due to a failure by Jim MacColl to consult the local M.P.’s
before the decision was taken. As in October Crossman mentions that
he is sure that he is right!
In this context Crossman appears to have been actively prepared to 
look for and be persuaded by arguments in a specialism which was new 
to him. The arguments put forward were essentially arguments in the 
context of planning, and the two people Crossman particularly 
mentions are deeply interested in planning issues. Jimmy James and 
Jim MacColl seem to have put forward a good case, and one that 
Crossman was prepared to listen to. Crossman himself has defined this 
as an arena in which this sort of argument may take place, and he is 
row prepared to defend this decision because it is ’technically’ 
right. The authority and expertise of Jimmy James and Jim MacColl 
seem to have been very influenital here. Earlier sections of the 
Diary also suggest that Crossman was receptive to these arguments
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because of a more general concern that he had with the nature of 
Ministerial decision making. The concepts around
[DIGEST ESSENTIAL INFORMATION]
reflect this concern, in addition Figure 3.5 shows a small map 
representing Crossman’s reflections about the nature of Ministerial 
decision making, a subject which he discussed on a number of 
occasions, see for example the section on page 99 of the Diary.
At this stage Crossman talks about planning issues mainly in 
isolation to other issues, and seems prepared to consider them on 
this ’technical’ basis. Such a decision making style seems to be an 
important element in the way in which the Hartley decision was taken.
Hartley - a political storm
Away from Parliament for the Christmas recess, Crossman writes that he 
has been thinking a lot about what he calls ’his first major upset, 
the Hartley affair’. It is he says ’looming up bigger and bigger in 
my political life’. Figure 3.3 shows part of the map of this 
reflection, and it is clear that there are a number of strands of 
argument which have turned this into a political row. The debate in 
the House of Lord’s which appears to have been sparked off by a 
private argument between Crossman and Lord Molson, turned the affair 
into a national issue. Also the reaction of the local M.P.’s and 
Labour Party against the decision seems to have been more forceful 
than Crossman expected (Hansard, 21st December 1964).
In this latter respect the portion of the map around the concept:
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[DECISION GOES DOWN BADLY ___]
reflects criticisms of inconsistencies in Crossman’s actions. 
Crossman’s actions and arguments seem to contradict his own socialist 
views and previous Labour Party policy on green belt land. A cartoon 
in the Daily Express which Crossman quotes summed this up as ’Double 
Crossmanship’.
Also Crossman admits that he completely underestimated the vehemence 
of the reaction from supporters of the preservation of green belt 
(the ’amenity lobby’), and was to this extent unprepared for the 
storm of protest that his decision caused.
Interestingly Crossman does not refer to his original views on green 
belt, and in discussing possible counter measures does not seem 
prepared to put forward his argument based on the ’green belt is not 
really green’ concept as a public defence of his position. The 
elements of contradiction in Crossman’s arguments and decision seem 
to be the crucial factors in escalating this issue, and giving 
opponents a basis for strong counter arguments to be mounted.
Hartley - defusing the row
When Crossman writes of the issue in March it is clear that it is 
gradually subsiding as an issue. Crossman suggests that the line of 
defence that he decided on in January of attempting to defuse 
Hartley, by discussing it in a wider planning context, and of 
presenting it as an exceptional case have helped in this process. He 
has also taken particular care to personally draft the letters 
explaining other planning decisions at Sheffield and Water Orton
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(Chelmsley Wood), and so avoid Departmental intervention. His 
’private’ thought is that the decision was right but badly handled, 
mainly by Jim MacColl and the Department.
The most interesting intervention in this period came in the political 
arena as Crossman realized how critical the events might be for his 
own career, (although they turned out not to be). Later in January 
when the issue was at its public height, he sought support from 
Wilson on his handling of the issue.
A description of arguments
The proceeding sections show the use of cognitive maps to portray 
arguments. The maps do not each relate to specific pages of the 
diary, but a comparison of Figure 3.3 and the original text from the 
diary in Figure 3.4 illustrates to some extent the relationship 
between the original data and the cognitive map. In addition the 
description of the Hartley affair highlights some features of the 
event which require further explanation. This is attempted through 
the analysis of the cognitive maps produced, and is described in the 
following sections. Some of the issues are also discussed in the 
context of a broader examination of the issue in chapter 4.
Analysis of the Hartley issue
In looking at this issue as described above there are some striking 
features to explain.
a) Why did Crossman make a decision on Hartley which in retrospect was 
politically so dangerous?
b) Why was he so suprised by the strength of the support for the case 
against Hartley?
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c) Why did he choose to ’defuse* Hartley rather than defend it?
d) Why do planning arguments become much less important?
e) Why did he accept arguments which led him eventually to such 
a difficult situation?
To tackle these questions is to tackle the nature of persuasive 
argument, and the links between argument and individual values. 
Through the cognitive maps drawn from the Diary material changes in 
the way the issue is considered are highlighted. The maps form the 
basis of the data for building a picture of the values and their 
hierarchical relationship that Crossman held at the time. 
Identification of the ’things that matter’ for Crossman, that is of 
his values, provides a basis for answering some of the above 
questions.
The maps shown represent portions of larger cognitive maps which 
record Crossman’s writings on the Hartley issue. For the purpose of 
analysis each map was transferred to a computer model using the COPE 
software. The computer model similarly records concepts and the links 
between them but also offers analysis facilities. A large combined 
computer model was constructed by adding together the separate models 
built around the maps described above, but excluding the part of 
stage 1 which contains Crossman’s original thoughts on the planning 
issue, since the views stated in October seem to have been abandoned 
by Crossman, and are not subsequently considered. The process of 
adding maps together involved two operations. Firstly the concepts 
in each map were all placed in a new model and re-numbered. The links 
between concepts were not altered at this stage, so that there was no 
connection between the maps at this point except that they were all
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part of the same model. Secondly the concepts and their links were 
compared and new links were created by merging concepts which 
apparently had similar meanings. Merging concepts involved deleting 
one concept and replacing it with another, but retaining all the 
links of the deleted concept to other concepts. The resulting 
complete model is listed in Figure 3.6. The analysis procedures were 
then applied to the combined model to consider argument and values.
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Figure 3.6 Combined COPE model for Crossman
1 FIRST MAJOR PLANNING DECISION ........  [not]FIRST MAJOR PLANNING DECISION
2 THINK IT OVER CAREFULLY ....................  [not]THINK IT OVER CAREFULLY
3 NEED A SUBSTANTIAL REASON ................  [not]NEED A SUBSTANTIAL REASON
4 INSTINCT TO DISAGREE WITH OFFICIALS . .[not]INSTINCT TO DISAGREE WITH OFFIC
5 OVERIDE ..................  DO NOT OVERRIDE: DECISION OF PLANNING INSPECTOR
6 BUILD ON GREEN BELT LAND AT H A R T L E Y ............ DO NOT BUILD AT HARTLEY
7 AMENITY VALUE OF GREEN BELT IS VERY IMPORTANT . .[notJAMENITY VALUE OF GREE
8 DO NOT BUILD ON GREEN B E L T ..........................BUILD ON GREEN BELT
9 SPAN MODEL VILLAGE NEEDED ..............................  SPAN NOT NEEDED
10 EXPORT SURPLUS LONDON POP   [not]EXPORT SURPLUS LONDON POP
11 NEED TO COPE WITH LARGE LONDON P O P ................ NO OVERSPILL PRESSURE
12 CONTAIN URBAN SPRAWL ................................ FURTHER URBAN SPRAWL
13 CONTROLLED INCURSION INTO GREEN B ................  RANDOM USE OF GREEN B
14 NO CLEARLY DEFINED LEGAL DOCTRINE OF PRINCIPLE. . [not]NO CLEARLY DEFINED L
16 MINISTER HAS TO DECIDE FOR HIMSELF ACCEPT ADVICE OF OFFICIALS
17 SEND JM TO LOOK AT S I T E ............................ LOOK AT SITE ONESELF
18 [+]PUBLIC CONSTERNATION ..........................  [-]PUBLIC CONSTERNATION
19 TREMENDOUS R O W ........................................ [not]TREMENDOUS ROW
20 GREEN BELT IS ALREADY DEVELOPED IN PLACES . .[not]GREEN BELT IS ALREADY DEV
21 GREEN BELT IS NOT REALLY GREEN  [not]GREEN BELT IS NOT REALLY GREEN
22 GIVE WAY........................................DO NOT GIVE WAY: ON WYTHALL
23 VISIT BIRMINGHAM ................................  DO NOT VISIT BIRMINGHAM
25 I’M SURE IM R I G H T ..............................................UNCERTAIN
26 LOCAL MPS NOT CONSULTED ............................ LOCAL MPS CONSULTED
27 PREVENT BIRMINGHAM SPRAWL OUT TO REDDITCH . . . CREATE SPRAWL TO REDDITCH
28 JM PUT HIS FOOT IN I T ........................ [not]JM PUT HIS FOOT IN IT
29 [ + ]CONFIDENCE IN J M .................................. [-]CONFIDENCE IN JM
30 JM DID NOT WARN OF POLITICAL WRATH. . [not]JM DID NOT WARN OF POLITICAL WRA
31 NOT AFRAID OF R O W .......................................... AFRAID OF ROW
32 S E E P A G E ...............................................PLANNED INCURSIONS
33 PRESERVE TRULY GREEN BELT .......................... SPOIL ALL GREEN BELT
34 TAKE COMMONSENSE DECISION (PERSONAL JUDGEMENT). . [not]TAKE COMMONSENSE DEC
35 ABSOLUTELY VITAL MINISTER SHOULD SEE FOR HIMSELF. . [not]ABSOLUTELY VITAL M
36 MINISTER G O E S ...................................... MINISTER DOES NOT GO
37 DEPARTMENT THINK VISIT WILL FIND NEW EVIDENCE . .[not]DEPARTMENT THINK VISI
38 JUDGMENT WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING ........ [not]JUDGMENT WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING
39 DEPT SUGGEST IF YOU SEE ONE MUST SEE ALL. . [not]DEPT SUGGEST IF YOU SEE ON
40 NOT SEE FOR MYSELF........................................ SEE FOR MYSELF
41 BEGIN QUIET VISITS................................ [not]BEGIN QUIET VISITS
42 MOVING SAME WAY ON SHEFFIELD AS HARTLEY . .[not]MOVING SAME WAY ON SHEFFIEL
43 RIGID GREEN BELT P O L I C Y  FLEXIBLE GREEN BELT POLICY
44 CAN STRANGLE A C I T Y ............................ [not]CAN STRANGLE A CITY
45 SO MANY PEOPLE TO H O U S E ..................... [not] SO MANY PEOPLE TO HOUSE
46 NEW TOWNS NOT ENOUGH...................................... NEW TOWNS COPE
47 NEW TOWNS SOME DISTANCE AWA Y ..............[not]NEW TOWNS SOME DISTANCE AWAY
48 NEED...................................... DO NOT NEED: PLACES NEARER CITY
49 BELT NOT INVIOLATE........................................ BELT INVIOLATE
50 PLANNING DECISION QUITE DELIBERATELY MADE . .[not]PLANNING DECISION QUITE D
51 PLEASED ......................................  NOT PLEASED: WITH DECISION
52 GOOD GROUND ON WHICH TO FIGHT   [not]GOOD GROUND ON WHICH TO FIGHT
53 [+]DEPT PRESSURE FOR QUICK DECISION . . [-]DEPT PRESSURE FOR QUICK DECISION
54 WILD AND WHIRLWIND ATTACK ................  [not]WILD AND WHIRLWIND ATTACK
55 NEED FOR CAREFUL REFLECTION........................................HASTY
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Figure 3.6 (continued)
56 PUBLIC MEETING IN K E N T ........................ [not]PUBLIC MEETING IN KENT
57 JUDGE ............................  NOT ABLE TO JUDGE: PEOPLE'S REACTIONS
58 RESIST.................................. DO NOT RESIST: PRESSURE FROM DEPT
59 REALISE GREEN BELT IS SACRED COW . . .  . PEOPLE NOT TOO WORRIED ABOUT GR B
60 DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH SPECIAL CASE IN LARGE COMMITTEE. . [notJDIFFICULT TO
61 BUILD.......................................... DO NOT BUILD: AT SHEFFIELD
62 [ + ]TROUBLE WITH KENT MPS..........................[-1TR0UBLE WITH KENT MPS
63 HARTLEY RDC IS LABOUR .......................... HARTLEY IS CONSERVATIVE
64 HARTLEY DECISION ATTACKED IN PAPERS . .[notIHARTLEY DECISION ATTACKED IN PA
68 MISTAKEN................................................ CORRECT: DECISION
69 B A D .......................................GOOD: START ON PLANNING DECISONS
71 DIGEST ESSENTIAL INFORMATION [not]DIGEST ESSENTIAL INFORMATION
72 TAKE DECISION EASILY ............................  LINGER OVER DECISIONS
73 BEING A MINISTER.................................... [notjBEING A MINISTER
74 [+]UNPOPULARITY OF DECISION ................... [-jUNPOPULARITY OF DECISION
75 DECISION GOES DOWN BADLY........................DECISION GOES DOWN WELL
77 HARTLEY LOOMING BIGGER AND BIGGER . .[not]HARTLEY LOOMING BIGGER AND BIGGER
78 [+]NEED FOR OVERSPILL ESTATES ..............  [-]NEED FOR OVERSPILL ESTATES
79 [+]POPULARITY OF MINISTER ....................... [-IPOPULARITY OF MINISTER
80 NEED TO REFLECT ON HARTLEY ISSUE...................................FORGET
81 HARTLEY RDC U P S E T ................................. HARTLEY RDC NOT UPSET
82 DECISION LETTER GAVE P O L I C Y ............ DECISION LOOKS LIKE AFTERTHOUGHT
84 DID NOT CHECK DECISON LETTER .................... CHECKED DECISION LETTER
85 DEPT DID....................................DEPT DID NOT: ADVISE OF DANGERS
86 I WAS NEW MINISTER.................................. EXPERIENCED MINISTER
87 SPAN SITE IS VERY S M A L L  LARGE SITE
88 DEFENCE OF GREEN BELT IS VERY STRONG...................... LITTLE DEFENCE
89 STRONGLY ADVISED BY DEPT TO REVERSE INSPECTORS DECISION . .[not]STRONGLY AD
90 ANTI CARTOON.............................................[not]ANTI CARTOON
91 MAINLY PUBLIC ................................ MAINLY PRIVATE: DEVELOPMENT
92 LOOKS LIKE SELL OUT TO PRIVATE SECTOR . .[not]LOOKS LIKE SELL OUT TO PRIVAT
93 LA ESTATE TURNED DOWN AT HARTLEY . . .[not]LA ESTATE TURNED DOWN AT HARTLEY
94 LABOUR MINISTER OPEN TO C R I T I C S ............................ NO CRITICISM
95 ARGUMENT WITH LORD MOLSON AT DINNER . .[not]ARGUMENT WITH LORD MOLSON AT DI
96 DAMAGING DEBATE IN LORDS.................... [notIDAMAGING DEBATE IN LORDS
97 HAVE JUDICIAL POSITION.................... [not]HAVE JUDICIAL POSITION
98 MINISTER OF H O U S I N G ...................................... NOT A MINISTER
99 HOLD................................ DO NOT HOLD: CAREFUL PRESS CONFERENCE
100 PLACE HARTLEY IN WIDER CONTEXT ..............  HARTLEY IS OFFHAND DECISION
101 NATIONAL LOCAL: ISSUE
102 ABLE........................................NOT ABLE : TO REPLY TO ATTACKS
103 FAVOURABLE ARTICLES IN PRESS............ [not]FAVOURABLE ARTICLES IN PRESS
104 DESCRIBE HARTLEY AS SHORT TERM MEASURE ........  HARTLEY LOOKS LIKE POLICY
105 NEW A T T A C K S ..............................................ISSUE DIES DOWN
106 MAINTAIN................................ LESSEN: MY STANDING AS A MINISTER
107 JM HANDLED AFFAIR BADLY ....................  [notjJM HANDLED AFFAIR BADLY
108 P U B L I S H ......................................DO NOT PUBLISH STANNINGTON
109 JM IS TERRIBLE COWARD ........................  [not]JM IS TERRIBLE COWARD
110 STANNINGTON IS DIFFICULT TO ATTACK. . [not]STANNINGTON IS DIFFICULT TO ATTA
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Figure 3.6 (continued)
111 [+]CONSULATION BETWEEN LA AND RDC . . .  . [-jCONSULATION BETWEEN LA AND RDC
112 IMPORTANT PEOPLE WORRIED..................... IMPORTANT PEOPLE NOT WORRIED
113 GEORGE BROWN ATTACKS HARTLEY............[not]GEORGE BROWN ATTACKS HARTLEY
114 INVOLVE HAROLD   DO NOT INVOLVE HAROLD
115 [+]POLITICAL TROUBLE.................................. [-]POLITICAL TROUBLE
116 COMPROMISE ON APPOINTMENT OF PERMANENT SECRETARY. . [not]COMPROMISE ON APPO
118 NEED TO EXPLAIN POLICY MORE WIDELY..................DO NOT EXPRESS POLICY
119 HAROLD MAY DESERT M E .............................[not]HAROLD MAY DESERT ME
120 PRESS HAROLD FOR CABINET COMMIT MEN T........... DO NOT PRESS FOR CAB COMM
121 [ + JAMOUNT OF PREPARATION   . [-]AMOUNT OF PREPARATION
122 [ + 1SUCCESS OF PRESS CONFERENCE [-]SUCCESS OF PRESS CONFERENCE
123 GOOD............................................................BAD: PRESS
124 HAROLD WILL PRESS FOR HOUSING DRIVE . .[notlHAROLD WILL PRESS FOR HOUSING D
125 HARTLEY CAN BE SEEN AS PART OF HOUSING DRIVE. . [not]HARTLEY CAN BE SEEN AS
126 [ + 1SPEED OF LAND DEVELOPMENT [-]SPEED OF LAND DEVELOPMENT
127 PUT HARTLEY BEHIND US ........................  [not]PUT HARTLEY BEHIND US
128 [ + ]LCC USE OF HARTLEY.............................. [-]LCC USE OF HARTLEY
129 LEA VALLEY ISSUE.................................... [not]LEA VALLEY ISSUE
130 IVE GOT ANOTHER HARTLEY   [not]IVE GOT ANOTHER HARTLEY
132 DO...................................................... DO NOT: TRUST DEPT
133 DECISON WAS RIGHT BUT AT WRONG TIME . .[not]DECISON WAS RIGHT BUT AT WRONG
134 EXPLAIN POLICY MORE FULLY ................  [not]EXPLAIN POLICY MORE FULLY
136 DECSION WAS R I G H T ................................ [not]DECSION WAS RIGHT
137 EXTEND SPAN PROJECT TO PUBLIC HOUSING . .[not]EXTEND SPAN PROJECT TO PUBLIC
138 FIRM AGREEMENT WITH DEVELOPERS........ [not]FIRM AGREEMENT WITH DEVELOPERS
139 DEFUSE HARTLEY...........   HARTLEY GOES ON
140 BM IS L O Y A L ..............................................[not]BM IS LOYAL
141 BM IS POLITICALLY FIRST R A T E ............ [not]BM IS POLITICALLY FIRST RATE
142 LCC NEED OVERSPILL [not]LCC NEED OVERSPILL
143 BM IS LCC M A N ........................................ [not]BM IS LCC MAN
144 BM SUPPORTS..................................... BM DOES NOT SUPPORT: DEPT
145 BM AGREES WITH HARTLEY ...................... BM DISAGREES WITH HARTLEY
146 [+]CONFIDENCE IN B M ..................................[-]CONFIDENCE IN BM
147 RE-ESTABLISH PUBLIC OPINION OF ME . .[not]RE-ESTABLISH PUBLIC OPINION OF ME
149 RELATIONS WITH DEPT IMPORTANT .......  [not]RELATIONS WITH DEPT IMPORTANT
150 NEED............................... DO NOT NEED: TO DEVELOP PLANNING POLICY
152 I DO NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT PLANNING . .[not]I DO NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT PLANNING
153 RELY ON JM'S A D V I C E .................................. RELY ON OWN ADVICE
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Computer analysis, argument and values
In Chapter 2 it was argued that knowledge of values is important in 
understanding the nature of argument and in making an assessment of 
the arguments that will prove influential in a particular situation. 
The first difficulty in this process is the identification of values 
that others' hold. In terms of construct theory it is the ability to 
play a role in another's social processes; to be able to construe 
their construing and recognize those aspects of another's cognitive 
system which have a more pivotal role within that system. Fisher 
adapted Toulmin's logical scheme for the analysis of argument (see 
Chapter 2) to include the influence of values on the arguments 
outcome. He assumes however, that the identification of values is a 
relatively trivial task, that anyone with some intelligence can do 
this, that the argument is a fixed entity, and that values have no 
influence on the choice of argument. The Crossman data suggests that 
values are relevant in determining the argument strategy that is 
chosen, and that a wide range of values may come in to play in 
assessing any given situation. The following section substantiates 
this latter claim and through a computer analysis identifies part of 
a value system for Crossman.
Eden, Jones and Sims from their work with various decision makers in 
organizations sum up some of the characteristics of those parts of 
our cognitive systems which we would call personal values, namely;
- suggests a preferred outcome
- defines a purpose
- points to a direction I am going in
- relatively enduring
- provides a criteria for judging outcomes
- will expend energy defending them
- it is difficult to understand why other points of view are different
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These characteristics can be used to help identify areas of interest, 
things that matter to an individual, and which provide a motivating 
force in that context. The last point especially, ’it is difficult to 
understand why other points of view are different’, suggests that 
Fisher’s lack of concern with the identification of values may be 
misleading. For there may be a strong tendency to project our own 
values on to others since it is so difficult to effectively imagine 
other value systems. A scheme which more systematically attempts to 
identify values seems particularly important in avoiding ’traps’ of 
this sort. The areas of interest then form the frames of reference 
against which arguments proceed and can be evaluated.
a) Some concepts have no further consequences, they represent end 
points or goals within the cognitive map, and may be akin to 
preferred outcomes. Not all concepts which have no further 
consequences fall into this category as some end-points arise from a 
less full exploration of an area or from inaccurate coding. In this 
case the selection of concepts in this category was re-checked 
against the original diary material, and a decision made on this 
basis. Some changes were made to the model as a result of this check, 
for instance, providing additional links for some concepts which then 
excluded them as end-points. Note that a number of end-points 
(heads) occur because of incomplete coding, or through the existence 
on the map of small sections not related to the rest of the map.
These usually do not appear in the other analyses and so can be 
spotted easily.
b) Some concepts are returned to in discussion again and again, they
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are concepts which the speaker (diarist) is prepared to spend energy 
on repeating and emphasizing them to the listener. Concepts within a 
cognitive map which have a large number of direct links are
candidates for inclusion in this category. It may however be that
some concepts are returned to and emphasized as a way of not talking
about other more sensitive areas which may be more important to the
speaker. In this respect the diary is probably less misleading than 
an interview since the diary is written in the knowledge that it will 
only be available after the events concerned.
c) Some concepts are supported, or support, a large number of chains 
of argument, suggesting that they are important in providing or 
requiring argumentative backing, they are also clearly concepts whose 
meaning is more fully elaborated than others.
d) Some concepts seem to be at the ’heart' of the map. Suggesting 
that if they were to change then a lot of other meanings and links in 
the map would be changed as well. The meaning of the cognitive system 
relies on these concepts more than others.
The above four categories provide concepts which are candidates for 
inclusion in a list of concepts which point to or refer to 
significant areas of the cognitive map, which represents the 
individual’s cognitive system. It is important to note that values 
are not identified with specific concepts but with the areas of the 
map to which these concepts are pointers. The areas represent ’a 
matter of interest’ to the individual, and it will be a matter of 
interest because it impinges upon or affects in some way values that 
the individual holds. What makes the area a ’matter of interest’
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which the individual is prepared to spend time discussing and 
elaborating, are the values which underly that area. Consider the 
skeleton map in Figure 3.7. Concept 1 is identified on the above 
criteria as a pointer towards an area of interest, this is called a 
key concept. Of interest is the cognitive structure which explains or 
elaborates that key concept. This structure can be identified simply 
by tracing back through the map and picking out all concepts which 
directly or indirectly explain or lead to that concept. So for 
example in Figure 3.7 concepts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 form the explanatory 
structure for concept 1. If in the process of tracing back another 
key concept is reached then the set of concepts explaining the new 
key concept form a sub-group to the original key concept. The map can 
thus be divided into a hierarchical structure of interacting groups. 
These groups represent ’matters of interest to the individual’, and 
as such are indicative of values that the individual holds.
The computer analysis was performed as follows: Category (a) is 
determined by an inspection of all the end points of the model 
(called heads), category (b) is provided by a centrality analysis 
which gives a count of all the direct links for each concept.
Category (c) which is provided by a Path analysis which gives a count 
of all the different chains of argument leading to and leading from 
each concept. Category (d) is provided by a Trace analysis which 
gives a count of all the concepts which directly or indirectly affect 
or are affected by a given concept. In effect category (d) is a count 
of all the concepts on the chains of argument discovered in a Path 
analysis. In categories (b-c) the top 10% only were considered. A
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composite list was then constructed of key concepts. Key concepts 
were taken to be any concept that appeared in at least two of the 
categories (a-d) above. There was also a visual inspection of the 
final list and concepts which were judged significant but did not 
fall into the above criteria were also included. This visual check is 
very important since the analyses can only act as guide. For example 
some concepts can occur on both a trace and path analysis where they 
are part of a chain of concepts, in this case it is unnecessary to 
include both as key concepts, and the concept which is a consequence 
of the other is taken as the key concept.
This produced a list of 9 key concepts which were then used as the 
basis for an automatic grouping procedure as described above. The 
names of the groups were taken as the key concept descriptions. The 
resulting 'areas of interest' hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.8.
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map
concept 1 (HEAR) concept 8
concept 6 concept 5
concept 2
concept 3
concept 4 concept 7
CTAll^
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Figure 3.8 Group hierarchy for Crossman
Maintain my standing 
as a Minister (106)
Political Troiible
Press Harold for cabinet 
commit rnient (12 0)
\










Rely on JM* s 
advice (153) \ 4
Bad start on planning 
decisions (69)
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Figure 3.9 Key concepts and analysis
Cognitive centraj-ity analysis 
Forward and Backward search 
For complete model 
Result highlights
ihere are a lot of statements immediately 
associated with these concepts
No Concept In Out Kon Tot
6 BUILD ON GREEN BELT LAND AT HARTLEY ___ DO 6 7 3 0 10
19 TREMENDOUS ROW ___ 19 7 1 0 8
36 MINISTER GOES ___ MINISTER DOES NOT GO 36 5 1 0 6
61 BUILD ___ DO NOT BUILD AT SHEFFIELD 61 6 0 0 6
75 DECISION GOES DOWN BADLY ___ DECISION GOES 75 2 4 0 6
8 DO NOT BUILD ON GREEN BELT ___ BUILD ON GRE 8 4 1 0 5
11 NEED TO COPE WITH LARGE LONDON POP ___ . 11 0 5 0 5
50 PLANNING DECISION QUITE DELIBERATELY MADE 50 2 2 1 5
68 MISTAKEN ___ CORRECT DECISION 68 3 2 0 5
99 HOLD ___ DO NOT HOLD CAREFUL PRESS CONFEREN 99 2 2 1 5
115 POLITICAL TROUBLE 115 3 2 0 5
139 DEFUSE HARTLEY ___ HARTLEY GOES ON 139 4 1 0 5
21 GREEN BELT IS NOT REALLY GREEN ___ 21 2 2 0 4
26 LOCAL MPS NOT CONSULTED ___ LOCAL MPS CONSU 26 1 2 1 4
28 JM PUT HIS FOOT IN IT ___ 28 1 3 0 4
49 BELT NOT INVIOLATE ___ BELT INVIOLATE 49 3 1 0 4
69 BAD ___ GOOD START ON PLANNING DECISONS 69 1 0 3 4
106 MAINTAIN ___ LESSEN MY STANDING AS A MINIST 106 3 0 1 4
127 PUT HARTLEY BEHIND US ___ 127 3 1 0 4
153 RELY ON JM'S ADVICE ___ RELY ON OWN ADVICE 153 1 3 0 4
Path analysis
Forward and Backward search 
For complete model 
Result highlights
A large number of chains of argument are associated 
with these concepts
No Concept In Out Kon Total
61 BUILD ___ DO NOT BUILD AT SHEFFIELD 61 62 0 0 62
19 TREMENDOUS ROW ___ 19 32 1 0 33
106 MAINTAIN ___ LESSEN MY STANDING AS A MINIST 106 33 0 0 33
153 RELY ON JM'S ADVICE ___ RELY ON OWN ADVICE 153 1 31 0 32
115 POLITICAL TROUBLE 115 28 3 0 31
152 I DO NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT PLANNING ___ 152 0 31 0 31
114 INVOLVE HAROLD ___ DO NOT INVOLVE HAROLD 114 28 2 0 30
119 HAROLD MAY DESERT ME ___ 119 28 1 0 29
68 MISTAKEN ___ CORRECT DECISION 68 26 2 0 28
116 COMPROMISE ON APPOINTMENT OF PERMAMENT SECRE 116 28 0 0 28
120 PRESS HAROLD FOR CABINET COMMITTMENT ___ DO 120 28 0 0 28
6 BUILD ON GREEN BELT LAND AT HARTLEY ___ DO 6 21 6 0 27
69 BAD ___ GOOD START ON PLANNING DECISONS 69 26 0 0 26
73 BEING A MINISTER ___ 73 0 24 0 24




Forward and Backward search 
For complete model 
Result highlights
*hese concepts are affected by or can affect 
a lot of other concepts in the model
No Concept In Out Kon Tot
61 BUILD ___ DO NOT BUILD AT SHEFFIELD 61 62 0 0 62
106 MAINTAIN ___ LESSEN MY STANDING AS A MINIST 106 60 0 0 60
19 TREMENDOUS ROW ___ 19 51 1 0 52
115 POLITICAL TROUBLE 115 46 5 0 51
114 INVOLVE HAROLD ___ DO NOT INVOLVE HAROLD 114 47 3 0 50
119 HAROLD MAY DESERT ME ___ 119 48 1 0 49
120 PRESS HAROLD FOR CABINET COMMIT MENT ___ DO 120 49 0 0 49
116 COMPROMISE ON APPOINTMENT OF PERMAMENT SECRE 116 48 0 0 48
6 BUILD ON GREEN BELT LAND AT HARTLEY ___ DO 6 32 12 0 44
68 MISTAKEN ___ CORRECT DECISION 68 42 2 0 44
69 BAD ___ GOOD START ON PLANNING DECISONS 69 43 0 0 43
112 IMPORTANT PEOPLE WORRIED ___ IMPORTANT PEOP 112 33 6 0 39
18 PUBLIC CONSTERNATION 18 33 2 0 35
152 I DO NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT PLANNING ___ 152 0 25 0 25
153 RELY ON JM'S ADVICE ___ RELY ON OWN ADVICE 153 1 24 0 25
27 PREVENT BIRMINGHAM SPRAWL OUT TO REDDITCH . . . CREATE SPRAWL TO REDDITCH 
29 [ + ]CONFIDENCE IN J M .................................. E-]CONFIDENCE IN JM
60 DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH SPECIAL CASE IN LARGE COMMITTEE. . [not]DIFFICULT TO
61 BUILD.......................................... DO NOT BUILD: AT SHEFFIELD
69 B A D ...................................... GOOD: START ON PLANNING DECISONS
78 [+]NEED FOR OVERSPILL ESTATES .............. [-]NEED FOR OVERSPILL ESTATES
79 [+]POPULARITY OF MINISTER ....................... [-]POPULARITY OF MINISTER
80 NEED TO REFLECT ON HARTLEY ISSUE.................................. FORGET
106 MAINTAIN..................................LESSEN: MY STANDING AS A MINISTER
109 JM IS TERRIBLE COWARD ......................... [notjJM IS TERRIBLE COWARD
116 COMPROMISE ON APPOINTMENT OF PERMAMENT SECRETARY. . [not]COMPROMISE ON APPO
120 PRESS HAROLD FOR CABINET COMMIT M E N T .......... DO NOT PRESS FOR CAB COMM
130 IVE GOT ANOTHER HARTLEY .................... [not]IVE GOT ANOTHER HARTLEY
132 DO.......................................................DO NOT: TRUST DEPT
136 DECBION WAS R I G H T  [not]DE05ION WAS RIGHT
146 [ + ]CONFIDENCE IN B M .................................. [-]CONFIDENCE IN BM
147 RE-ESTABLISH PUBLIC OPINION OF ME . .[not]RE-ESTABLISH PUBLIC OPINION OF ME 
150 NEED................................DC NOT NEED: TO DEVELOP PLANNING POLICY
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The value framework behind the Hartley arguments.
The existence towards the top of the hierarchy of values related to 
Crossman's political career illustrate the wider context in which he 
viewed Hartley towards the end of the affair. The predominance of 
these values over sub-ordinate values on planning explains why 
planning issues are much less to the fore in Crossman's arguments in 
the later stages. In this hierarchy arguments to do with planning 
are less important because they affect sub-ordinate values. This 
would suggest that the position of a value in the value hierarchy 
will influence the persuasivness of an argument which is seen to 
relate to that value. Thus sub-ordinate arguments, as defined in 
this context of the hierarchy of values, will be less attended to and 
arguments related to them less persuasive. This echoes Boulding's 
suggestion (1966), that there is a link in decision making between 
the position of values in the value hierarchy and the decisions taken.
In this light the concentration on planning issues at the start of the
affair requires explanation. Within the political values are
concepts which express (as the earlier description of the issue also
showed) a concern by Crossman with 'being a Minister', part of which 
reflected a concern with taking decisions in a particular way. For 
instance the concept 'Planning decision quite deliberately made*, 
which is part of the group of concepts on the Hartley decision, 
reflects a felt need to make decisions in a deliberate and definite 
way based on available evidence. For Crossman the decision involved 
evaluating arguments and then deciding, which is the course he 
followed for Hartley. At that stage he did not seem to appreciate 
the full consequences for his political values of this decision. Note
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also that in explaining the Hartley decision there is a group 
concerned with concepts around 'Rely on JM's advice', which 
illustrates the influence of Crossman's advisors. The prominence of 
these other values (in terms of Crossman's interests at the time) 
seems to have precluded most of the arguments (which were later used 
by opponents) which linked the Hartley decision to other political 
factors. In this case Crossman's interpretation of the situation was 
that it did not affect other (more important) political values, and 
so could be decided without reference to these values.
The issues of personal political standing form a significant part of 
the map, and Crossman's stragegies reflect this concern, for example 
he eventually blames the 'outcry' on political mismanagement rather 
than Hartley being a bad planning decision, and the arguments he uses 
are geared to defusing the issue in political terms. Perhaps the most 
interesting feature of following the issue through the pages of the 
diary is the way in which as the situation escalates, different 
'areas of interest' come into picture. So that the final map 
represents a very complex picture of the interaction of Planning, 
Deparmental, and Governmental politics, which forms a template for 
the later decisions, so that on being presented with a planning 
decision some months later Crossman was able to say "I've got another 
Hartley". The separate maps highlight the developement of a decision 
template, and the group map represents a relatively stable final form 
of that template which can be used in other similar situations 
(Hansen, Heitger and McKell (1978). The predictive value of the final 
template can be quite significant in that it provides, for similiar 
issues, some idea of the factors which Crossman will attempt to
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assess or need information on. The balance of the map between the 
substantive planning issues and personal political issues is quite 
striking and may be quite different for someone who had a greater 
interest in housing issues. It might be different again for Crossman 
himself when tackling issues of social security in which he had a 
much longer term interest.
The development of cognitive systems
This section looks more closely at the way in which the final 
template described above developed, and thereby discusses some of the 
issues raised in Chapter 2 about development and change in cognitive 
systems. Also it attempts to explain further why Crossman was 
susceptible to the early arguments of his planning advisors.
Comparison of the early cognitive maps, and the subsequent maps from 
January 1965 onwards, illustrates the way in which the Hartley issue 
was perceived by Crossman to relate to many more areas of interest 
than he originally imagined it would. It is also a more complex view, 
in that meanings of concepts have been elaborated and there are more 
links between concepts. Crossman's original prediction that Hartley 
was a correct decision (and, because of that, that he could weather 
any possible political storms that may arise) was found, as events 
unfolded, to be inaccurate. Under the influence of these pressures 
his decision template to deal with planning issues gradually 
developed. It is interesting to note that, in the rest of his career 
as Minister of Housing, although there were a number of similar 
planning decisions to make, none produced a political row of the same 
order as the Hartley decision. What is most significant in terms of
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persuasive argument is why Crossman was persuaded by MacColl and 
Jimmy James to take a position which caused so much difficulty for 
him.
Most relevant here seems to be Burnstein and Vinkour's theory of 
novel argumentation (Vinkour and Burnstein 1974, Burnstein 1975), and 
Axelrod’s view of novel arguments in foreign policy settings (Axelrod 
1979). Vinkour and Burnstein suggest that to be persuasive an 
argument must be perceived to be valid by the target (the person who 
is being persuaded), and not already known and taken into account by 
the target. The previous analysis has already suggested that 
Crossman, through his background, had very little knowledge of the 
detail of planning arguments, and this suggests one reason why he 
found the arguments persuasive. They would also carry with them a 
certain authority of expertise, as both arguers were recognised by 
Crossman to be knowledgeable on planning matters. The notion of novel 
arguments is supported by Axelrod's work on foreign policy decision 
making, which studied using cognitive maps the verbatim discussion of 
high level policy groups, and by work with small groups by Vinkour 
and Burnstein. What may be happening is that targets do not have the 
necessary elaborated construct system to reject a novel argument when 
it is initially presented. It is thus persuasive through the absence 
of valid counter arguments. A not disimilar phenomena has been 
reported with work on mock juries, where jurors were sometimes 




This chapter has concentrated upon looking at Crossman's view of the 
issue, and the way in which values form an important part of 
understanding the arguments that he found persuasive, and his change 
in argument strategy as the issue was perceived to affect other and 
more important values. Proponents of a strictly rational view of 
decision making would find much of the debate and discussion of 
Hartley incomprehensible, since it has much more to do with 
Crossman's interpretation of events with himself at the centre than 
with housing issues. This illustrates though only one half of the 
proposed nature of argument from Chapter 2, namely that of values. 
The following chapter looks at Hartley as a public debate, and in 
particular at the arguments containing a charge of inconsistency, 
which Crossman himself considered to be very damaging to his case.
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Summary of Chapter 3 
Argument and valuing
The theories and methods developed in chapters 1 and 2 were used to 
explore the first research setting for the study of argument. It was 
argued that personal diaries provided that they genuinely reflect the 
thoughts of the writer, are a useful way of following the course of 
an issue in terms of the arguments involved. This is primarily 
because they are not written for a particular audience, and are 
written in the knowledge that they will only be available years after 
the events they record.
The decision to allow building on green belt land at Hartley in Kent 
was chosen because it is possible to follow Crossman’s arguments and 
reactions to others’ arguments through the development of a major 
political row. In the early stages the planning arguments put forward 
by Crossman's advisors are regarded by Crossman as persuasive, but in 
the later stages of the affair Crossman’s opponents are able to 
establish a strong case against the decision. The cognitive maps 
drawn to cover the separate stages of the issue are shown, and form 
the basis for the analysis of the arguments.
One especially helpful perspective in explaining Crossman’s arguments 
and later strategies is that of the values that Crossman holds. The 
subject of values is a vast and complex one, and the meaning attached 
to ’values’ varies considerably from generalized human needs to the 
specific motivations of individuals. In this context an operational 
definition of values is attempted which links them to the explanatory 
structure around ’key’ concepts in a cognitive map. Key concepts are
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identified by looking at the relationship of the concept to the rest 
of the cognitive map and assessing the significance of that concept 
in making sense of the whole map. The computer package COPE was used 
to assist in the analysis and thus enabled a greater volume of data 
to be considered than might otherwise have been possible.
The analysis of the arguments within a valuing perspective provided 
explanations of events which otherwise seemed suprising. For 
example, Crossman’s initial decision to allow building on green belt 
land at Hartley seemed odd when the political consequences were so 
serious, and he had initially been against building on green belt 
land in principle. The analysis of values revealed that Crossman was 
concerned at the time with the process of ’being a Minister’. The 
values that predominated at this stage were concerned with how 
ministerial decisions should be made. The influence of these values 
and Crossman’s felt lack of experience on housing issues made him 
susceptible to the arguments of his advisors, and explain his 
adoption of those arguments.
The adoption of those arguments and their relation to other aspects 
of Crossman’s cognitive system, provides the basis for the Hartley 
issue to become a damaging public debate. These latter issues are
discussed fully in Chapter 4.
The later stages of the issue show the development of a more useful 
(for Crossman) set of guidelines (decision template) which can be
used to evaluate similar planning issues. This template protects
important political values. So Crossman can say on a later issue 
’I’ve got another Hartley’, and then act accordingly.
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This chapter has concentrated upon the interaction between values and 
the persuasiveness of argument. It presents a more subtle picture of 
influence than the sub-ordination of reason to self-interest that is 
often argued in this context. It suggests rather that the relevance 
of particular arguments is assessed by the individual in relation to 
the values that he feels are affected by the argument. The 
persuasiveness of argument is thus linked to the position of the 
values that the argument affects in the individual’s value hierarchy.
Ill
Appendix to chapter 3 - Principal references to Hartley in Crossman
Diaries, Volume 1.___________________________________________________
32 - initial opinions
85-86 - change of mind on Hartley
87 - views on green belt generally
93 - meeting with Kent M.P.’s
113-115 - reflections on Hartley
119 - discussion with George Wigg
120-121 - meeting with Harold Wilson
123 - press conference on green belt
130 - conference on green belt
143 - Hartley causes embarrassment
178 - bombarded with abuse on Hartley at London Labour Party 
560 - Lea Valley
622 - I’ve learnt my lesson from Hartley 
Other matters
12-15 - introduction to writing of Diaries 
19 - summary of political scene in October 1964 





Chapter 3 discussed the relationship between argument and values and 
explored the ways in which one individual (Richard Crossman) tackled 
arguments over an important issue (Hartley planning decision). This 
perspective enabled an analysis of the events in terms of individual 
values and provided an explanatory structure for Crossman’s actions 
and arguments. However there was more than one person involved in 
the Hartley debate, and this chapter explores the wider public debate 
of the Hartley issue in terms of the arguments used. Information on 
the public debate is taken from the debate in the House of Lords, and 
the popular press. The picture of the alternative arguments is less 
detailed than that provided by the Diaries, nonetheless the data does 
provide insights into different arguments, and to the different types 
of argumentative attack that were made on Crossman. As in Chapter 3 
the emphasis will still be upon Crossman’s interpretation of events, 
since the purpose of these chapters is to develop useful techniques 
and theories for analysing argument, and not to provide a detailed 
analytical history of the Hartley planning decision. Of particular 
interest are the attacks which Crossman took most seriously (as 
judged by his attempts to provide counter argument), and why he 
considers these to be more damaging than others.
In Chapter 2 the following theoretical statements were put forward as 
a potential means of analysing arguments between individuals:
a) To what extent do arguers play a social role in respect of each other?
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b) What commonality do arguers perceive between their different construing 
of the debate?
c) To what extent do arguer and audience perceive their construing 
of an event to be supported by other people?
These are by no means mutually exclusive categories, but each 
emphasizes a feature of argument and consequently has explanatory 
power. These statements are applied to the arguments of the Hartley 
debate in the following sections, and provide further answers to the 
questions posed about the Hartley issue in chapter 3* In particular:
d) Why was Crossman so suprised by the strength of the support for the 
case against Hartley?
e) Why did he choose to defuse Hartley rather than to defend it?
In addition:
f) Why were the arguments of the opponents able to maintain a serious 
challenge to the decision over a number of months?
Sociality and argument
Chapter 2 argued that the ability of arguers to play a social role 
with respect to each other, that is, to understand each other’s view 
in an argument, significantly affects the nature of the debate 
between them. Reading the diary on the Hartley issue there is a 
phase in January and February when the debate was at a public climax, 
at which time Crossman’s feeling of a lack of control, almost of 
panic, is evident. At this stage he resorts to his most serious 
attempts to protect himself from potentially damaging consequences, 
for example by discussing the affair directly with Harold Wilson.
The Diary after that meeting probably reflects Crossman’s darkest
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mood in the Hartley affair, since Wilson’s response has been at best 
ambiguous. There is here a sense that the decision may have been a 
sufficiently serious blunder to blight his future career. How was it 
possible for the debate to reach this damaging and emotive level, how 
could an apparently astute politician so seriously mis-judge a 
situation?
In the Diary Crossman admits that the ’storm of protest’ was 
unexpected (see also chapter 3) and that he had completely 
underestimated the emotive appeal of ’green belt’ to certain sections 
of the community, especially in the South East. The amenity lobby as 
it was termed by Lord Chorley in the House of Lords Debate (Hansard, 
(Lords) 1964). Lord Chorley went on to suggest that opinion was 
hardening within the government against these interests (Times, 22nd 
December 1964). There was a very different construal around the term 
’green belt’ for Crossman as compared with this group. Chapter 3 has 
already shown that green belt was considered by Crossman to be in the 
realm of planning decisions, and not of particularly close personal 
interest. For instance his initial support of the arguments of the 
’amenity value of green belt’, are overturned during a 2 hour car 
journey. His new view was quoted in the Times newspaper, as:
"I am convinced that green belt policy around London can be 
preserved only by concentrating building in a few selected 
new sites and by stopping the dribs and drabs of development 
all over the place - the sort of infilling and rounding off 
which in this part of Kent has destroyed so much amenity."
(Times, 13th January 1965)
Crossman clearly expected that others who initially valued green belt 
as an amenity, would be persuaded to this later modified view. What 
Crossman seems to have mistaken is that for others the ’amenity
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argument’ may be more closely linked to other important personal 
values, and therefore as Kelly predicts less easily changed. The 
anger of letters in the Times Newspaper (Times, 13th, 21st January 
1965) reflects this different construal of green belt, where 
Crossman’s new argument is not seen as a way of truly preserving
green belt but as a flagrant destruction of it.
Also as noted earlier this lobby, which is never particularly well 
defined, is able to mobilize support in the House of Lords to put 
forward its arguments in the debate. It is significant that the lobby 
is not a defined pressure group but a series of individuals all 
attacking an ’erosion of green belt’. This suggests that Crossman is 
also arguing against a common theme which stands for certain 
generalized ideals, which a wide variety of individuals can in some 
way identify with. Moreover it is a theme which is still strongly 
present 20 years later, as a comment in the Sunday Times on fears 
about Conservative Government plans on green belt in 1984 illustrates, 
Apparently the Environment Secretary Patrick Jenkin is expecting a 
’rough ride’ from M.P.’s, local councils, and environmental groups, 
by accepting that ’some (Green Belts) were no longer worth preserving 
.... the effect would be to strengthen protection elsewhere’ (Sunday 
Times, 13th November 1983). In a public debate of this sort these 
influences can be dramatic. Discussion of themes is reserved for a 
later section in this chapter.
What is revealed here is that Crossman seriously lost control of the
debate by being unable to make sense of some of his opponents. That 
is, make sense of in a way that would enable him to predict their
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actions and the nature and force of the argument that they would 
bring to bear. This lack of control has arisen from Crossman being 
unable to play a social role in respect of significant actors in a 
situation. Crossman clearly thought that the decision would be 
unpopular, but he was equally sure that his new amenity argument 
would win the day: in the event it was never seriously debated.
Political life is plagued by mis-judgements of this sort, and 
Crossman’s mis-construal of potential opponents should not be over 
estimated as a blunder, and indeed there were other factors which 
contributed to the ’storm of protest’, as described later in this 
chapter. Chapter 3 suggests though that Crossman constructed this 
decision in relation to his own values and concerns at the time, and 
his arguments were geared to persuade himself, and not others. The 
Sociality corollary implies much more than being able to follow the 
logic or argumentative structure of an argument, it also suggests 
that there is a need to place that argument within the wider picture 
of the audience’s (potential opponents) construal. Such an idea is 
not new in the study of argumentation, and is described by Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), as ’audience centred’ argument.
Aristotle similarly advocated appeals to the audience (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica 1952), but was criticized by Plato in the Gorgias 
(Campbell 1980, Hamilton I960) that such an approach appealed only to 
the self-interest of the individuals in the audience, and that they 
had not been won over by argument at all. Later Sophists (who were 
professional teachers of the skill of debate), were similarly 
criticized as ’tricksters’. More recently the theory of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger 1961) investigated the effect of inducement
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(direct appeals to self-interest) on persuasion, and came to a 
similar view of inducement. Larger monetary awards were more 
effective than smaller ones in encouraging participants to support a 
particular view or action which they originally did not support. But 
later interviews found that those who had received smaller rewards 
were more likely to have genuinely changed their minds. Those in 
receipt of larger rewards were able to explain their actions by ’I 
did it for the money*. A direct appeal to values, which is sometimes 
advocated in audience centred approaches, seems unlikely therefore to 
be argumentatively persuasive as understood in this thesis. The 
audience may be pre-disposed by their values to listen to one 
argument rather than another, but they also need to be able accept 
the reasons for that argument within their current construal. The 
new argument, to be accepted, must be able to coherently link with 
their current thinking on the issue (Rokeach and Rothman 1965).
The issue raised by Plato, and in more recent research, is really a 
debate about the nature of argument. What is involved in persuading 
others? The notion of sociality implies that argument involves 
systems of personal constructs, and those systems consist of values 
and beliefs, expressed as a network of theories to make sense of the 
world. Persuading someone in this sense must mean them incorporating 
within their system new theories, or re-arranging links. This is 
much more than is implied by the usual description of audience 
centred research, which seems to imply an appeal to values directly, 
rather than an understanding of the other's construct system. In 
addition the understanding of the 'audience' supposedly required for 
audience centred argument is very often restricted either to an
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awareness of generalized human traits, or of the broad needs of the 
audience as a group with a particular interest. Chapter 3 suggested 
that the Sociality corollary implies that understanding another’s 
construal is a more careful and detailed process than these ’broad 
brush’ approaches. It seems likely that Crossman made a similar 
mistake in taking too broad a view of the amenity opponents. He seems 
to have argued that that his ’new’ amenity argument would eventually 
appeal to them because he was attempting to ’really’ preserve the 
amenity value of the countryside by focussing on those parts of the 
green belt which were unspoilt. But if green belt is symbol not only 
for preserving the countryside from urban encroachment, but also for 
preserving other values associated with this, then Crossman’s 
argument may be seen as an attack on these other values. The 
existence of a symbol implies a linked set of values underlying that 
symbol, and thus an attack on the symbol itself may meet with 
considerable resistance. Crossman did not make any real contact with 
the construal of the amenity lobby opponents. If through the use of 
cognitive mapping Crossman (or his advisors) had been able to capture 
in detail the thinking and arguments of just one of the amenity lobby 
opponents then he may have produced a very different argument to 
support Hartley.
Nelkin showed in a series of reports of public inquiries and debate 
how the lack of knowledge of the opponent’s construct system (view of 
the world), leads to impasse in the argument, and very often to a 
lack of control by one party or’the other on the course of debate. A 
lack of knowledge which is usually characterized by generalized 




The essence of playing a social role in respect of someone else is 
the ability to construe their construal, which as the preceeding 
section described involves much more than assuming that individuals 
hold particular general values. Once however an arguer has in some 
way adequately construed another’s view of the world in relation to a 
specific argument, there is still a process of interacting with and 
changing that other’s construal, so that he may be persuaded to a 
different point of view. The discussion between Crossman, Jim 
MacColl and Jimmy James comes into this category, in which Crossman 
is persuaded to change his mind, and support the ’new’ amenity 
argument. Arguments within this context fall more often into the 
realm of rational debate as it has been described in Chapter 1. In 
this context arguments are often presented by each arguer as being 
arguments about an objective world, for example, ’it is so that much 
green belt land is already spoilt’. If arguers accept this 
background to the debate then they are placed in the position of 
being right or wrong, and propositions are there to be proved or 
disproved. A series of arguments presented by the Chairman of 
Dartford Rural District Council (Leslie Reeves) illustrate argument 
as a debate about an objective world.
The sure and certain ’fact’ of Britain in 1964-65 was the much 
debated growth in the population, often termed the population 
explosion. Crossman always presents this as an objective fact (see 
also Chapter 3), and indeed the Labour government had been elected
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only a short while previously on a promise to create a Land 
Commission to deal with the problem of making land available for 
house building. The cognitive maps in Chapter 3, and the map of 
Crossman’s values show that the population explosion was the starting 
point of many of the chains of argument. An attempt to dispute this 
fact would then seriously threaten much of Crossman’s argumentative 
structure, and indeed have wider ramifications for the Labour Party. 
Such an attack was attempted by Leslie Reeves (Times, 30th November 
1964, 21st January 1965). He argued that the South East Study, on 
which the population figures were based, was mistaken in its 
assumptions, and had moreover been questioned by the government 
itself. In effect it is an attempt to remove a concept from Crossman’s 
cognitive map. Or rather it can be seen that Crossman’s construal was 
as a single pole concept:
[POPULATION EXPLOSION]
whereas Reeves construed the possibility of change in:
[POPULATION EXPLOSION PREDICTION CORRECT ___ POPULATION EXPLOSION
NOT PROVED]
In one case the concept has a taken for granted quality in the other 
there exists the possibility of change. However, this argument does 
not appear to have publicly had any impact, nor does Crossman mention 
it. Reeves is challenging a concept which has become a public theme, 
that is, it is similarly construed by large numbers of people, and 
consequently has become part of a ’sure and certain’ social life.
Such themes are consequently difficult to challenge.
Another aspect on which Crossman and Councillor Reeves differently
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construe the Hartley issue, is over their construal of the basic 
decision. Reeves and others (for instance Lord Connesford in the 
House of Lords debate) argued at some length that, even if Crossman’s 
premise of the need to build to relieve the populaton pressure was 
accepted. Hartley was a very poor site. Poor sewage facilities and 
poor commuter links to London at Hartley made it a difficult site and
there were others much better suited for the development (Times, 22nd
December 1964). Reeves’ construal in this context seems to imply a 
construct like:
[BUILD AT HARTLEY ___ BUILD ELSEWHERE]
whereas the concepts discussed in Chapter 3 suggest that Crossman saw 
the issue more in terms of constructs like:
[BUILD AT HARTLEY ___ DO NOT BUILD AT HARTLEY]
Crossman’s construal is interesting in this context since it excludes 
from his arguments, any discussion about the suitability of Hartley 
as a site, other than in terms of its proximity to London, and the 
availability of land there. For Crossman ’not building at Hartley' 
seems to have represented a failure to tackle the population problem.
Facts and themes
The established nature, in 1964, of the notion of ’the population 
explosion’ and the need to ’do something about it’, is an interesting 
example of what Holton describes as a theme (Holton 1973). It is an 
understanding of the social world which has almost assumed the status 
of a fact. Whilst through our everyday experience we are familiar
122
with physical objects as being taken-for-granted this is perhaps less 
explicit with cognitive aspects of experience. Yet our mental 
landscape contains many such basic assumptions and general rules 
derived (not necessarily consciously) from our interaction with 
society. The important aspect of social facts is that they have a 
high degree of commonality between construct systems, that is, they 
are events which are similarily construed (similarily experienced) 
across individuals. Challenging such aspects of a cognitive system 
will, Kelly suggests, provoke considerable resistance since these 
constructs impinge upon a wide range of other constructs, and may 
imply significant changes in the whole system.
At the level of public debate these social facts become influential 
because they are often the only constructs that individuals removed 
from the detailed consideration of the issue under debate have for 
assessing the arguments. A good example of this reliance of public 
argument on general themes is shown by the argument put forward in 
the House of Lords debate by Lord Molson. He argued against the 
Hartley decision by saying:
"I have known the Minister of Housing for many years. He is 
known in the Labour Party as a left-winger. He probably got 
on the Labour Party Executive because he was known as a left 
winger. I am sorry that my old friend Dick Crossman has 
changed. I should be pained and hurt if he now switches round 
to the right and becomes one of the reactionaries who advocates 
private enterprise speculative building development at the 
expense of green belt."
(Hansard, 21st December 1964)
The analysis of the Diaries showed that the concepts around [SELL OUT 
TO PRIVATE SECTOR] were considered important to Crosssman, so despite 
the flowery nature of the rhetoric, this was a damaging attack. But
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the effectiveness of this argument relies upon the audience for it 
having a particular view (at the level of a theme), about what left 
wing politicians believe. It also relies upon a significant number of 
people having some commonality through this theme, A U.K. reader of 
the above sentence may be tempted to suggest that such a statement is 
so obvious as to be not worthy of attention. This more than anything 
illustrates the taken-for-granted nature of social facts.
In one sense it can be seen as a mistaken social fact, since Crossman 
himself expressed the view that his actions on Hartley were in accord 
with his own views and with socialist policy. He considered it to be 
nonetheless a damaging argument, probably because he believed that 
others would construe his actions in a similar way to Lord Molson.
In relation to argument these themes which litter the social landscape 
act to support some arguments rather than others. Their generality 
across large groups of people make them difficult to challenge, and 
impose constraints in much the same way that physical facts constrain 
scientific argument. Crossman recognized that the contradiction 
between his new amenity argument and the social facts ascribed to 
Labour Party politicians could be seriously damaging, and it was 
these challenges that he concentrated on. The element of 
inconsistency is a very important part of these arguments and is 
considered in more detail in the following section.
The problem of inconsistency
Before looking at the Hartley example in detail the following section 
illustrates some other charges of inconsistency, taken from a short 
informal study of academic debates at the University of Bath by the
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author.
1) A frequent charge is that of inconsistency with others’ 
(established) views. This is linked to a belief in the growth of 
knowledge as an iterative and convergent process. For science these 
ideas have been explored in depth by Holton and Kuhn; of interest in 
the context of argument however is the psychological need for a 
consistent explanatory chain if arguments are to be accepted (Kuhn 
1962, Routley 1975).
2) Another charge of inconsistency, is that of inconsistency with the 
’facts’, often in the form of "but surely what really happened
is ". There is an assumption here that someone is in a position
to know what the facts were or that the facts can be unambiguously 
established. There seems to be a psychological need to understand 
events in a unique way.
3) A charge of internal inconsistency was also common, in which case 
the link between a current statement and what the arguer has 
previously stated is challenged. There seems to be a demand for the 
arguer’s knowledge to be self-consistent.
The interesting aspect of all such charges is in their psychological 
effect. A charge of inconsistency demands a response, and must be 
counteracted if the argument is not to discredited. Most people have 
experienced the personal emotions of having this sort of attack made 
on their arguments, and of the difficulty of maintaining the respect 
and credibility of the audience if such challenges are not adequately 
met. Singer (1968) refers to this as the ’bothersomeness’ of
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inconsistency. From this informal survey and from the data in this 
thesis charges of inconsistency seem to evoke personal discomfort at 
being seen to have a ’flawed' argument; destroy the credibility of 
the argument for the audience; demand immediate response. Powerful 
argument and consistency are therefore importantly linked, 
inconsistency is always a problem for persuasive argument.
Understanding inconsistency
The charges of inconsistency against Crossman stemmed from a number 
of aspects of the Hartley debate:
a) Lord Molson*s argument (above) stressed the failure of Crossman to 
protect green belt land, and the acceptance by a Labour Minister 
of a private firm to build the village.
b) The involvement of a private firm was particularly questioned because 
the Government had previously turned down an application by the Local 
Authority to build at the same location.
c) Lord Molson emphasized the inconsistency in Government policy generally;
"This decision was so flagrantly and deliberately in defiance 
of existing case law that it seemed to imply in spite of the 
Minister’s denial in the Commons a change of policy over the 
proposed green belt for London."
(Hansard, 21st December 1964)
d) The decision was also widely interpreted as contrary to Labour Party 
policy, for example Anthony Crosland had expressed Party Policy; 
only a few months before, as:
"only by the return of a Labour Government would what was left
the green belts be saved "
(Times, 30th November 1964)
Chapter 2 has already pointed out that the notion of consistency when 
used in a general sense creates difficulties in interpretation, since 
what may be seen as consistent for one person may be inconsistent for
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another. To understand consistency Kelly argues, it is necessary to 
use it as a construct, that is as a means of differentiating one 
aspect of experience from another (Kelly 1963). So for each 
individual ’consistency .... inconsistency’ will be with respect to 
something. Consistency is therefore a property of individual 
construct systems and is the basis of their predictive or 
anticipatory power. Inconistency is always a threat to man viewed as 
a Kellian scientist since it robs him of his ability to make sense of 
experience, other than as unconnected events. The degree of this 
threat varies, and will depend upon the relation between the parts of 
the system which are seen as inconsistent with each other, and the 
range of experience that the rules under threat cover, what Kelly 
refers to as the ranges of convenience of particular constructs.
Kelly also supposes that an individual construct system is not 
necessarily completely internally consistent, and that the system, as 
a hierarchical system, will be fragmented into different subsystems. 
Consistency between subsystems does not always exist. For example, 
beliefs about one part of experience may not be consistent with 
another, but if these parts of the construct system are rarely 
brought into direct juxtaposition then the inconsistencies will not 
be attended to by the individual. Kelly argues that this is a 
defensive mechanism since the variety of experience would, unless the 
system is partitioned in some way, render an individual unable to 
act. Only at the highest level of the system is consistency the rule 
since this holds all the subsystems together and guarantees the 
integrity of the individual as he construes himself. These arguments 
are covered by the Fragmentation corollary:
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"A person may sucessively employ a variety of construction 
subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with each other."
(Kelly 1955)
The charge by others, in argument, of inconsistency is a suggestion 
that they are unable to make sense of the arguer’s construal.
Whilst, as with Crossman, the arguer himself does not consider his 
arguments to contain an inconsistency, he may perceive that others do 
construe it as inconsistent. There is a danger that the arguer and 
audience are unable to play a social role with respect to this 
inconsistency. The inability to enter into a social role with 
someone, to be unable to make sense of their views, leads to a need 
to re-construe their actions so that they do make sense. This was 
the line of argument attempted by Lord Molson. His suggested 
re-construal was that Crossman’s original left wing views had 
changed, and his actions on Hartley were consistent with this change 
of view. The arguments over Hartley show both the resolution of 
inconsistency at a personal level and the resolution of inconsistency 
at a social level. The following sections look at these in more 
detail.
Resolving inconsistency
In the very early stages of the Hartley decision, there is within 
Crossman’s thinking around the issue, an inconsistency between his 
belief in the need to maintain green belt land and preserve its 
amenity value, and the need to build at Hartley. In some ways they 
can be viewed as two subsystems within his construct system which 
have been brought into a mental juxtaposition by his appointment as 
Minister of Housing. His original argument coped with this
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inconsistency by giving prominence to the preservation of green belt
over the need to cope with the population explosion.
Crossman’s change of mind, to build at Hartley, brings this 
inconsistency back into focus. The inconsistency is resolved by 
re-construing the meaning of the construct green-belt, so that it now 
refers to 'true* green belt land which still has amenity value, and 
other green belt land which is already spoilt. The inconsistency is 
for him now resolved in that building at Hartley will preserve 
unspoilt green belt land. The evidence of the Diaries confirms that 
this resolution is a genuine one and Crossman has come round to a
more complex view of green belt which enables him to make the Hartley
decision. That this is a genuine resolution is underlined by the 
fact that Crossman was under no particular pressure (as he described 
it) to agree to building at Hartley.
Opponents of the Hartley decision present the inconsistency as the
inconsistency in Crossman’s original arguments, before he developed a 
more complex view of green belt. In this way the apparent destruction 
of green belt is in contradiction to Crossman’s own previous views 
and the stated views of the government. As the preceeding section 
implies, the charge of inconsistency may also damage the credibility 
of the speaker on a wider level, since either the audience cannot
make sense of his views, or they must re-construe his actions and
views in order to accomodate (explain) this inconsistency. In 
addition to the re-construal suggested by Lord Molson it was also 
suggested, for example, that other outside factors had swayed the 
decision, such as the very high quality of the buildings proposed by
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the developers (Times, 30th November 1964), This seemed to argue that 
the loss of amenity value was thereby lessened, and so the action was 
not so obviously inconsistent with the preservation of green belt 
land.
Most interesting are the implied re-construals that suggest dishonest 
motives for Crossman, that his left wing views were only used to gain 
power within the Labour Party and readily discarded as the need arose 
(see quote from Lord Molson above) or that he had some link or 
sympathy with the property developers (Times, 23rd December 1964). 
This type of re-construal reflects a deeply held social stigma 
against inconsistency, very similar to the attitudes (see Chapter 2) 
attributed to irrationality. If you are inconsistent, then it seems 
that you are either doomed to be labelled either as wickedly 
deceitful, or as a fool. Perhaps this reflects the problems which 
apparent inconsistency creates, since the ability to explain and 
predict behaviour is lost. The vehemence of some of the public 
outcry contrasts sharply with Crossman’s cogent and straightforward 
description of his decision to allow building at Hartley, whilst he 
is aware that there may be some hostile reaction, he considers his 
case to be quite sound, and right.
Counteracting inconsistency
From what has been argued so far it is important for an arguer to 
counter charges of inconsistency, and in some debates to do so as 
quickly as possible. The Fragmentation corollary illustrates the 
power of such charges, since they may be made by an opponent bringing 
together two parts of a construct system which the arguer may himself
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have not considered together. The strategy can create therefore 
considerable shock, and lead to confusion until the arguer has had 
time to review his system in this new light.
One counter strategy attempted by Crossman was to explain his new view 
of green belt and how this had for him resolved the apparent 
inconsistencies. However he mentions in the Diary that this is not a 
strategy that he considers will be effective.
Another is to remove or allay the inconsistency by arguing that it is 
a special case, and consequently requires actions which are not 
covered by the normal rules. There was some attempt at this line of 
argument by Crossman and other Ministers, for example, the Times 
quotes Lord Mitchison as arguing that:
"The Minister’s decision was not be regarded as the first 
nibble potending the swallowing up of green belt. A 
courageous decision must be taken from time to time ....
(Times, 22nd December 1964)
In this way the inconsistency is admitted but is explained by other 
overriding factors.
A further strategy is to admit the inconsistency and then take steps 
to ameliorate, or answer some of the inconsistencies. So for example 
the Times reported that the government had offered a proportion of 
the housing to be built to the Local Authority, thus removing some of 
the apparent inconsistency of a Labour Government dealing solely with 
private firms.
Crossman’s main strategy was to follow the principle of placing 
Hartley as an exceptional case, and then arguing that more generally
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the government would stick to its policy on green belt. Thus a series 
of meetings and press conferences were organized to emphasize the 
wider aspects of government housing policy. Crossman clearly felt 
that the argument that had persuaded him to allow building at Hartley 
would not persuade others. He was still able to conclude in May 1965 
that the Hartely decision had been right, but had been badly 
presented.
The attempt to defuse Hartley rather than to try and convince 
opponents of the merits of his new ’amenity argument’ reflects both 
Crossman’s eventual realization of the strongly held values that his 
opponents held, and an attempt to isolate ’Hartley’ from the rest of 
his political life. If Hartley could be shown to be a ’one off’ 
decision then the inconsistencies are less easily transferred by 
opponents to other arguments. As the informal study also suggested 
the audience are continually seeking for a consistent explanation of 
events. Crossman, Lord Molson, and others all attempted to provide 
such explanations and so restore the coherency of the situation.
Predicting man
The effect of placing a Kellian view of man at the heart of any 
explanation of argument is to replace rationality by predictability. 
An audience to an argument must be able to play a social role with 
respect to the arguer, which means that his argument must be capable 
of being construed by them, or in short they must be able to make 
sense of the argument. If aspects of the argument are not easily 
construed within the current models that the audience have then there 
will problems of acceptance and credibility for the arguer. Whilst in
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this example arguments were rejected because they were not 
predictively useful, it conversely implies that arguments which 
enhance others ability to make sense of experience will be powerfully 
persuasive. Predictability is however a weaker condition than that of 
rationality, since it only requires that the audience can make sense 
of the argument, and not that the argument adheres to specific 
logical criteria or particular values. In this view argument becomes 
a way of communicating between construct systems, and is in part a 
process of arguers making some of their models of the world available 
to others. To gain acceptance these models must be useful aids to 
the fundamental activity of making sense of the world. They may fail 
to persuade on two counts:
a) They may contain internal inconsistencies and so not be capable of use 
as predictive models.
b) They may contradict existing models that the persuadee already has, 
and so not be capable of incorporation into his system.
As the discussion of Crossman shows, both these aspects of argument
may be present. Grossman was able to resolve an internal
inconsistency in his arguments over Hartley to his own satisfaction,
but was not able to persuade others of this new line of argument, as
it clashed both with important values that others held, and with
their construing of his views.
Right or wrong ?
The discussion of the arguments in this chapter has carefully avoided 
assessing the arguments of each side in any terms other than their 
ability to persuade others. Crossman clearly believed that his 
argument was right, but that it had failed because it had been badly
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presented, but what does he mean by this? It seems that he means that 
it was a good planning decision, that it would prevent infilling and 
spoiling elsewhere. But how could such a decision be evaluated in 
practice since it relies on value judgements about the outcomes?
There were some people that argued, for example, that infilling 
produced a more natural and attractive growth of a village or town, 
in which case the criteria for judging Hartley are turned upside 
down. Similarly the debate between Councillor Reeves and Crossman on 
the suitability of the site relies upon each side assessing the 
’commuter problem’ according to different criteria. The complexity of 
social life enables a variety of conflicting arguments which can each 
claim support from available evidence (Edelman 1977). Judgement in 
this context becomes a political not a judicial act, it is concerned 
with values and with proof. As Eden and Harris argue it is usually 
possible to establish the ’matter energy’ aspects of a problem (what 
happened), but what is crucial to understanding are the 
interpretations placed on that action (Eden and Harris 1975). Moving 
from a criterion of rationality to one of predictive usefulness 
emphasizes this more relative view of argument. Persuasion is linked 
not solely to demonstrable and logical proof, but also to the ability 
to create a network of ideas which enhances others’ ability to make 
sense of experience.
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Summary of Chapter 4 
Hartley - A ’poor* case?
Chapter 3 focussed upon Crossman’s view of the Hartley issue, and
explored the relationship between values and argument for his own 
assessment of the arguments. This chapter considered the wider 
public debate and the interaction between Crossman’s public arguments 
and those of his opponents. The overriding impression is that 
Crossman’s support for his decision was seen by many to be a very 
’poor case’, and the reasons for this are explored in terms of the 
theories developed in Chapters 1 and 2.
If, as Chapter 3 argued, there is an important link between values and
individuals’ assessment of argument, then the concept of sociality, 
that is the need to adequately construe others’ interpretations of 
experience, is important in being able to construct arguments that 
will persuade others. Crossman seriously mis-judged the strength of 
reaction against his decision, partly through not seeing that his 
decision challenged strongly held views about green belt land. The 
arguments put forward by Crossman seem to be more geared to 
persuading himself of the correctness of the decision than to 
persuading others.
The concept of commonality, that is the nature of shared construal of 
experience, was used to examine the other aspect of the debate which 
was very damaging to Crossman’s case. Crossman was accused of 
inconsistency in his arguments from a variety of sources. For 
example, giving permission to private developers to build on green 
belt land was argued by opponents to be a contradiction of Labour
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Party principles, and therefore also of Grossman’s own views. It was 
also argued that the decision directly contradicted previous 
assurances from the Government of their support for the preservation 
of green belt land.
A charge of inconsistency seems to demand attention and response. The 
power of this charge rests on its suggestion that the arguer no 
longer makes sense to others. His arguments cannot whilst they appear 
inconsistent have the same power to predict and control experience. 
Thus a Kellian view of man suggests that it is a loss of 
predictability with respect to an individual construct system, rather 
than a lack of rationality with respect to a logical system, that is 
called into question by charges of inconsistency. Placing a Kellian 
view of man at the heart of any explanation of argument is to replace 
rationality by predictability as a primary requirement of a good case. 
Kelly argued that man behaves in such a way as to construe experience 
in an inherently consistent and predictable way. Thus an argument 
which contradicts existing construal can be rejected because its 
adoption decreases the utility of the system of which it is a part. 
From his own point of view Crossman seemed able to resolve the 
inconsistencies by developing a more elaborate view of the concept of 
’green belt’, but in the public debate chose a strategy of protecting 
the rest of his system from the implication of inconsistency by 
defining the Hartley issue as a special case.
The debate between Crossman and Councillor Reeves reveals another 
aspect of debate. Underlying many arguments are features of the event 
which are taken-for-granted, which if they were to change in some way 
would significantly affect the support for particular arguments. For
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example, Reeves attempted to question the population figures which 
supported the assumption of a population explosion in the South East. 
This called into question the basis of the Hartley decision. This 
argument did not have much impact, and illustrated the difficulty of 
arguing against matters which are commonly construed. Common 
construal significantly defines and determines the arena of the 
debate, and is strongly supportive of some arguments rather than 
others. The effect of sucessfully challenging such construal is 
described in Chapter 5.
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Appendix to Chapter 4 - references to Newspaper articles.
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15th January 1965. p8.
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This chapter describes and discusses a research project which 
involved a group of senior officers in different organizations 
debating a matter of mutual concern. In contrast to Chapters 3 and 4 
the research event did not have a wider public interest and there was 
a much reduced sense of conflict and tension between the 
participants. These features of the debate mean that it may more 
easily be described as a debate rather than a conflictual argument 
and make it not untypical of discussions and meetings that form the 
basis of organizational life. This is not to say however that some 
level of personal difference and conflict did not exist, nor that the 
issues were not of significance to the participants, but it is to say 
that this was a less dramatic, less emotionally charged event than 
the argument over Hartley. This chapter will explore the differences 
between this event and that of Chapters 3 and 4, and examine the 
nature of argument in this setting. It also provided an opportunity 
to look at argument as it occurred.
The research setting
The research work on which this chapter is based formed part of a 
larger 18 month study into the nature of decision and policy making 
in U.K. charities. After the early stages of the main project, a 
separate area of interest to the participants emerged, which 
developed into a debate on the use of volunteers for charity work.
The study of this debate provided the research data on which this
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chapter is based.
The overall research aim of the main project was to examine and 
develop ideas about the ways in which groups of managers, or decision 
makers think about complex issues. Initial discussions with the 
participants identified two topics which each individual wished to 
use as the starting point for the discussions, these were:
a) What led people to become involved with their charity?
b) What led people to give money to their charity?
The organizations involved were:
The British Red Cross Society: a large organization which provides 
medical services and funds for disaster relief. It has a large 
number of local groups throughout the U.K.
The British Heart Foundation: a large charity raising funds primarily 
for medical research into heart disease. It has around 10 regional 
areas in the U.K. and many hundreds of small voluntary committees 
involved in fund raising in the community.
The Royal National Institute for the Deaf: the major charity for the 
deaf and hard of hearing. It acts as a pressure group and provides 
funds for a wide variety of projects affecting the deaf and hard of 
hearing.
Craigmyle Ltd: the largest firm of fund raising consultants in the 
U.K. dealing mainly with fund raising advice and support for specific 
appeals, for example fund raising for private schools.
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These charities will not be further identified in this thesis, and 
the data reported has been slightly modified so that specific data 
cannot be traced to individuals or charities concerned. This is 
important because the senior officers concerned are making statements 
about volunteers that they work with.
These charities were not chosen to represent the nature of charitable 
work in the U.K. as a whole, but were chosen so that compared to each 
other their work was sufficiently different so that there was no 
direct conflict of interest, and sufficiently similar that the 
exchange between charities would be of interest to all parties. Each 
of the charities is in the top twenty list of charities in terms of 
their annual turnover and assets, and each has a major involvement in 
what is usually called ’event fund raising’. The consultants provide 
a rather different perspective, but are similarily concerned with 
encouraging volunteers to raise money for a cause. The area of work 
was chosen (that is charities) because previous work by the 
researchers had indicated that full-time charity officers relied 
heavily on idiosyncratic and well elaborated theories of operation in 
performing their daily tasks. Although the objective in terms of 
raising money is often well-defined and agreed, the numerous factors 
which can affect a fund-raising event make it a difficult event to 
predict, and make it very difficult to pass wisdom and experience on 
to others in terms of guidelines and rules. Charity officers 
particularly at regional level are also to some extent isolated from 
each other. The pressure and irregular hours of working mean that 
formal meetings, reviews, and contact with others in the same 
professional field is not frequent. For these reasons it was felt
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that listening to charity officers talk about their work would 
provide a set of data with strongly elaborated arguments, and that 
the task of bringing some of this wisdom together would be of benefit 
to the officers themselves. These assumptions about the nature of 
charitable work are supported by reports such as that by Nightingale
(1973), and McKee (1974) and more recently that of Mullin (1980). 
Previous research by the author into charity work, of a similar kind 
to that described here, also reinforces the complexity of the task,
and the idiosyncratic nature of people's understanding of their
charity world (Eden and Smithin 1979).
The intention was to develop a rich qualitative picture of how senior 
officers in a charity saw their task. The work of the main project 
is fully described in Sims and Smithin (1982), and Smithin and Sims 
(1982). The following sections describing the research process now 
focus upon the part of the work which relates specifically to this 
thesis, although some of the more general points about the early
interviews also refer to the main project.
About three senior officers in each organization were involved in the 
debate on the use of volunteers, and represented the majority of 
those involved in the whole project. Their jobs within the 
organization were:
a) Regional Organizers: These officers were regionally based,
full-time professional fund-raising organisers, reporting to a 
centrally based senior manager. Typically their work involved 
forming, and supporting committees of volunteers to organize and run 
fund-raising events.
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b) Central Co-ordinators: Whilst they had different titles the jobs
were similar between charities, and involved monitoring and 
supporting full-time regional organizers, and also organizing 
nationally based fund-raising activities.
c) Senior Managers/Directors: These were managers involved in the 
fund-raising activities of the charities and were primarily concerned 
with public relations and advertising at a policy level.
The distribution of participants over these activités was:
Regional Organizers 4 
Central Co-ordinators 4 
Senior Managers/Directors 3
Each participant was initially interviewed separately using the two 
topics described above as the starting point for the discussion. The 
format of the interview was based on the criteria described in the 
methodology section in Chapter 2. That is the interview was 
unstructured, and the interviewer acted as a * listener’ rather than 
taking a more directed approach. The aim was to build up an initial 
picture of the charity officer’s view of this aspect of his work, and 
to listen for the theories and ideas that he used in this work. The 
process of recording the interview varied, but the data from the 
interview was in each case represented as a cognitive map, and 
transferred to a computer model. In this way computer models based 
on the initial interiew (which typically lasted 1 - 2 hrs) were 
constructed for each participant.
In some cases the interview was recorded on audio tape and later
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analysed in conjunction with notes taken at the time, in others the 
note taking took the form of a cognitive map drawn during the 
interview. In this latter case it was possible to show the map to 
the officer concerned at different points and more immediately gain 
feedback on it; checking for mis-understandings and clarifying 
meaning. It was also necessary to explain the nature of the 
cognitive map to the officer, but this as suggested in Chapter 2 is 
straightforward because the form and content of the map remains very 
close to the language and style of the interviewee, that is, it is a 
relatively transparent form of modelling.
Having produced the computer models for each indivdual (11 people), 
these were then analysed using the analysis procedures in the COPE 
software, as described in Chapter 3. The concepts in the models were 
grouped into related areas, based on choosing a 'key* concept as the 
starting point, and then looking for all the other concepts in the 
model, which provided an explanation for that key concept.
Key concepts were identified by the same procedure as described in 
Chapter 3. Briefly, concepts which appear in a large number of 
explanatory chains of argument; concepts which represent the end 
point or outcome of a chain of ideas (head concepts); concepts which 
if changed would directly or indirectly affect many other concepts in 
the model, were selected as key concepts.
The groups thus identified are indicative of areas of concern to the 
person whose model it is, that is they are closely linked to the 
values that the person may hold. A group structure for one of the 
participants is shown in Figure 5.1. These groups or explanatory
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structures are taken to be topics of interest to these individuals 
when thinking about their work. A series of different topics were 
identified (Figure 5.2). The 'use of volunteers' emerged as topic 
for the majority of participants, two small portions of the maps for 
different participants on the topic of volunteers are shown in Figures 
5.3 and 5.4. These were part of the feedback to participants in the 
earlier stages of the project. The use of volunteers was one of the 
topics which was further discussed with each individual. The Appendix 
at the end of the chapter shows all the concepts concerned with 
volunteers and the concepts directly associated with these, taken 
from each participant and combined into a single model.
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Figure 5.2 Topics of interest identified
REPLACEMENT OF MEANS BY ENDS IN FUND RAISING 
USE.OF VOLUNTEERS 
DISPERSAL OF FUNDS
GIVING TIME RATHER THAN GIVING MONEY 
FUTURE OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR 
THE NATURE OF GIVING
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Figure 5.4 * Snapshot' of map around volunteers for a participant
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A second round of interviews with each of the participants separately 
was held to feedback to them the results of the analysis as described 
above. Each participant was given a small booklet (11 pages approx), 
each page contained a part of the immediate explanatory structure 
round the key concepts that had been identified in that model. It was 
therefore a 'snapshot' of part of that group. The booklet also 
contained a full list of the model contents and a map of the 
relationship between the groups.
Working through the booklet (one page of which related to volunteers) 
it was possible to check on the interpretation of the original 
interview, making changes where necessary, and more importantly to 
check on the meaning of the group to the individual concerned, and 
whether it was important to him. In most cases participants found 
the booklet helpful, and in a number of instances described it as a 
very helpful procedure. Whilst some groups did not seem to be areas 
of concern, most groups were greeted with a comment like "that's 
exactly right", "yes, this is very important".
This suggested that the original coding had been faithful to the 
interviews, and that the grouping was helpful, and had identified 
significant areas. This conclusion must however be treated with some 
caution because this method of presentation can be socially 
self-fulfiling since attention is directed to a specific area by a 
researcher. It may be that the participant considers the area to be 
important because it is presented by a researcher who has spent some 
time working on it, and who may be seen as having skill at this type 
of analysis.
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The extent and nature of the participants* reaction can however 
depend upon the way in which a project is initially set up, and the 
way in which participants’ expectations are formed. In this project 
the researchers presented themselves as interested laymen (not 
experts in charity work), who had skills related to recording and 
reflecting individual wisdom (Sims and Smithin 1982) and that 
judgement lay with the participants and not with the reseachers.
Eden and Sims discuss these issues in greater detail (Eden and Sims
1979). It was argued previously that study of argument would require 
the collection of individually based accounts and reports of 
argument, rather than on macro-level surveys, because it is at this 
detailed level that argument normally occurs in organizations.
Generally the feedback did seem to make sense to the participants, 
and moreover the grouping structure identified areas which were of 
concern. In most cases the participants indicated a level of concern 
by;
Being prepared to elaborate on the topic.
Returning to the topic a number of times in the interview.
Expressing interest in and agreement on the grouping structure.
Saying that the isolation of the topic was a help to understanding.
Methodological issues of action research
Because this was ’action reseach’ where the researcher is closely 
involved in the events, the methodological issue of authenticity and 
self-fulfilment of research raised generally in Chapter 2, requires 
additional consideration for this fieldwork. The data collection 
techniques and research interviewing style are based on the work of
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social researchers, such as; the grounded theory of Glaser and Straus 
(1967); the notion of accounts as used by sociologists such as Harre 
(1979); theories of ’defining situations’ McHugh (1968); and the work 
of Eden, Jones and Sims (1983). In each of these areas of research 
the researcher attempts to define for himself a role which enables 
him to empathize with the world as it is seen by the participant, 
that is, using the concepts, categories and language as used by that 
participant in his world. Such a role is that described by Kelly 
(1963) as being able to construe another’s construal, to enter into a 
social role with him (the Sociality corollary). To do this 
effectively the researcher must to some extent abandon his own 
construing, which implies not taking up the role of an ’expert’, 
someone who has additional skill or knowledge in the area under 
research. This implies therefore the only expert available on his own 
world is the participant himself. If this is the case how could the 
effectiveness or adequacy of the interaction be judged? Jones argues 
that the self-assessment of the participant is of critical importance 
since he is the only one able to make this judgement (Jones and Eden 
1980). Measures such as those described above, in terms of the 
client’s expressed interest and support, and willing involvement are 
good guides to the effectiveness of the research.
Whilst these are important criteria they are subject to the 
methodological flaws of mutual or individual self-deception, and of 
being unable to account for covert influences. A classic example and 
discussion in recent research of covert influence is that of Lukes
(1974), who describes the influence of a large steel company on a 
town in Michigan, U.S.A. He suggests that the propaganda of the
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company over the years created a situation of exploitation which the 
workers themselves did not regard as exploitation. In such a 
circumstance it is Lukes' own values which define this as an 
exploitation and defines the workers as being deceived. Whether 
Lukes' explanation is valid in a particular situation or not there is 
clearly a possibility of self-deception.
Similarly it is possible that in this research project participants 
are also mistaken about the usefulness or effect of the research even 
using their own criteria of success. Evaluation of the reseach 
methods and results must also therefore look to other criteria as 
well as self-assessment to judge the work. Some of these criteria 
emerged during this project, and are described in detail later; 
briefly they include:
The ability to consider richer data and more varied data.
Increased flexibility in assessing data and events.
Increased ease of entering into others' construal.
Decreasing the possibility of missing options and influences.
There is evidence, as described in the following section, that the 
use of the techniques was helpful in facilitating debate, and 
recording it, and was actively used by the participants in the 
debates to access a wider range of data than would have otherwise 
been available. The methodology and use of cognitive mapping is 
discussed further in Chapter 7.
Despite the methodological reservations this was an important set of 
data for research into argument in the context of this thesis.
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because 'live* debate complements the diary research, and 
additionally provides information on argument as it occurs.
Later stages of the research process
Following the second round of interviews each individual model was 
revised according to the feedback from the participants. Some 
participants had explored the models in more detail using a computer 
terminal but this was not practicable in every case. This produced a 
set of models which represented the thinking of these charity 
officers on their work, grouped into topics which were of interest, 
including the topic of the use of volunteers which was common to all 
participants.
The next stage involved bringing together the views of each 
participant within each charity. To do this the individual models 
were, using the computer software, merged together. This simply meant 
adding the models to each other in a cumulative fashion, and then 
creating links between the models. Links between models were made by 
the researchers where concepts were similarily used, that is had 
similar direct consequences and explanations, even though the wording 
of each concept was slightly different (Eden, Smithin and Wiltshire
1980). A careful note was kept of these merging operations so that 
they could be checked with the participants, but in each case the 
number of merging operations was kept to a minimum, and only carried 
out in cases where there was no doubt about the intended meaning of 
the concepts. The effect of the merging process was to bring into 
close association the models for each individual in the charity, 
producing a larger model for each organization involved. For example.
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where one participant used the concept 'GIVING' and another 'GIVING 
TO CHARITY' the direct explanations and consequences of each concept 
were examined, and a judgement made as to whether the two concepts 
were being used in a similar way. If it was decided that they were 
then they were merged. This meant that one of the concepts was 
retained and the other deleted, but all the concepts which were 
linked to the deleted concept were now linked to the retained 
concept. A relatively small number of merges of this sort is usually 
sufficient to make a large number of connections between two models.
The larger model was then used as the basis for a feedback session to 
members of each charity jointly as an opportunity to share ideas and 
further discuss the topics. The topics were again chosen on the 
basis of a grouping procedure as described earlier. This process was 
repeated with each organization involved, and the subsequent debate 
and information fed back into the larger models.
These amended models then formed the basis for a discussion between 
all those involved, on the topics identified. The final session of 
the project involved a workshop, with most of the members present, 
working on the topics, using the computer as a way of accesssing the 
models, and using computer produced cognitive maps as visual aids to 
the discussion. Finally the researchers produced a summary report of 
the final session which was sent to all participants (Smithin and 
Sims 1983).
Common construal - inhibiting social facts
Previous chapters have described the commonality between arguers' 
construal as a very important aspect of accepting or agreeing with
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others' arguments. Whilst each of the experiences of the charity 
officers using volunteers is different in detail, they seemed through 
their arguments to construe the use and behaviour of volunteers 
similarly. For example, the arguments presented were nearly all 
about the problems of using volunteers, and followed similar themes, 
pointing to the difficulty of control of volunteers, the difficulties 
in volunteers not picking effective fund-raising events (in terms of 
raising money), and the unreliable nature of voluntary support, for 
example :
CHARITY Y CONSISTS MAINLY OF VOLUNTEERS ____ PROFESSIONALSV
CANNOT WIELD A BIG STICK ___ CANI
INCREASE IN ORGANIZATIONAL LIMITATIONS
I
NOT GIVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ___y
DECREASE IN GIVING TO CHARITY
and :
VOLUNTEERS WILL ONLY TAKE ON LIMITED RESPONSIBILITYV
INCREASE IN TIME SPENT ON COMMITTEES
I
DECREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF ORGANIZER
That individuals were similarly construing these issues was indicated 
during the joint debate by participants picking up arguments used by 
others, and then supporting them with anecdotes based on their own 
experience, for example, by participants saying 'that's exactly it'.
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'I agree wholeheartedly, a similar thing happened to me....'.
As part of a later analysis this notion of commonality was checked by 
building a separate model of the debate about volunteers. This was 
done by locating, in each of the larger models built for each 
organization, the concepts which were concerned with the use of 
volunteers, and then exploring the arguments directly related to 
these concepts. The related chains of arguments were then transferred 
to a new model so that argument about volunteers could be compared.
Using the computer software it was possible to analyse every chain of 
argument in the combined model in relation to its outcomes and 
compare these with all the other possible routes (arguments) through 
the model. This revealed that the overwhelming majority of outcomes 
for the use of volunteers were expressed as undesirable outcomes (in 
terms of money raised through giving), and there were very few 
arguments to contradict this.
This indicated that these arguments formed a self-consistent set of 
ideas about volunteers, common to each of the officers who 
contributed to the model. This contrasted with the individual model 
from one of the members of the fund-raising consultancy who referred 
only twice to volunteers and did not contribute to these stages of 
the debate. Volunteers were not a problem for him in his world.
Because of these agreed social facts the debate was not initially very 
productive. The officers of one charity (charity Z) had previously 
expressed considerable interest in this topic because they were 
thinking about using volunteers on a large scale for the first time.
In many ways they were in a similar position to Crossman, in wanting
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to listen to arguments on a topic with which they were not very 
familiar, but on which they needed to make decisions. The initial 
effect of the debate was therefore to confirm their own worries about 
using volunteers and so persuade them that it was not worth changing 
policy on this issue. The discussion reflected a taken-for-granted 
aspect of the some officers' charity world. Volunteers were always a 
problem, but the situation was not capable of change. The arguments 
represented the operation of a social fact. It operated in the early 
part of the final debate as a powerful means of persuasion, resting 
on the commonality of each experience and the consequent suggestion 
of inevitability, 'volunteers are always with us' as one participant 
put it.
However the researcher was able to intervene and change the course of 
the debate and this represents a potentially persuasive argument, 
counteracting the common construal. The intervention was to suggest to 
the participants that they spend a little time examing why one of the 
participants did not have problems with volunteers and was satisfied 
with his interactions with them. The resulting discussion proved 
much more fruitful in terms of persuading the participants from 
charity Z to consider ways of using volunteers.
Re-construal as an argumentative force
As the charity officers began to explore the use of volunteers by the 
officer who felt his interaction with them was satisfactory, it 
became clear that the volunteers that he used (because of the nature 
of the fund-raising) were usually individuals with professional 
qualifications, or people used to dealing with, or raising, money.
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This precipitated a discussion of the need for professionalism as 
opposed to using volunteers. For example:
CHARITY X IS MAINLY A VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION
V
PEOPLE DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE RIGHT EXPERIENCEI
LACK OF MANAGEMENT SKILL IN BRANCHES
and:
AN INCREASE IN PROFESSIONALISM
i
MORE SUCCESSFUL CHARITIES
The contrast between professionalism and volunteers, and one 
organization's use of volunteers with particular skills recalled, for 
some of the participants, portions of their models which discussed 
the construct (or constructs similar to this) of PROFESSIONAL rather 
than VOLUNTEER. It also suggested a new level of differentiation for 
VOLUNTEER of:
GOOD rather than BAD VOLUNTEERS
Compared to the previous construal of VOLUNTEERS rather than 
PROFESSIONALS, this new construal suggested new possibilities for 
change and action, so that the arguments about volunteers were seen 
as a way of describing desirable features that volunteers should or 
should not have rather than arguments about using or not using 
volunteers at all. This led to a number of officers picking up 
previous parts of their own and others' models which had looked at 
the way in which the availability of volunteers was affected by
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social change. In this case there was some suggestion that early 
retirement schemes, and increasing un-employment, made available a 
larger number of potential volunteers with 'professional skills'. 
There was also a discussion of the time span for involvement of 
volunteers in a charity, suggesting that this should be a much 
shorter period, since this was a striking feature of the one 
organization's use of volunteers. These later discussions on the use 
of volunteers seem to have produced some possible lines of thought 
for tackling the 'social fact' of the inevitable problems of using 
volunteers and made available to the participants a wider range of 
options and possibilities in the use of volunteers.
The effectivenes of this intervention came about through an 
intervention which challenged the taken-for-granted world, and did so 
by pointing to an example of an alternative construction. This 
seemed to encourage a re-construal of this part of the system. For 
example, by linking concepts of 'professionalism' and 'volunteers' 
more closely; by provding a new construct 'good .... bad volunteers'. 
This does provide pointers ways of constructing arguments which 
challenge social facts. A more successful challenge than that of 
Councillor Reeves when he challenged the population statistics.
The above discussion may give the impression that a radical change 
took place, but a study of the concepts in each of the individual 
models shows that many of the elements of this change already existed 
in some individuals' thinking about the situation. However, it seems 
that the 'social fact' of the problems of volunteers prevented then 
considering these ideas as potential actions. The discussion and
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challenge of this social fact acted as a way to re-explore these 
ideas, but to explore them as real possibilities for action, and it 
was this latter change which energised the debate. This suggests 
that the debate also operated as a kind of 'group-think* in which the 
needs for support and approval of the group outweighed the 
development of ideas. There are close links in this concept of 
persuasive argument to theories of bounded vision (Huxham and Dando
1981) and work on 'groupthink* (Janis 1972). More than anything else 
it illustrates the need in studying persuasive argument to take 
account of the taken-for-granted aspects of the situation, and to 
consider whether or not they can be successfully challenged.
Values and persuasion
Chapter 3 described the importance of knowing about values, and the 
relation between values in determining the effects of argument. The 
values or areas of concern for each officer involved were also 
determined in this project, as described above (Figure 5.1).
The debate about volunteers revealed an important link between two 
areas of concern common to many of those involved, namely, between 
the use of volunteers and charity policy for the dispersal of funds.
A typical argument was:
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TANGIBLE THINGS THAT PEOPLE CAN GET HOLD OF....... RESEARCH
PEOPLE LIKE TO HEAR WHAT LOCAL RESEARCHER IS DOINGI
LOCAL DISPERSAL OF FUNDS
and:
LOCAL DISPERSAL OF FUNDSI
INCREASE COMMITTEE'S EFFECTIVENESS
The general theme of the arguments was that volunteers were more 
motivated and effective in raising funds when the results of their 
activities were dispersed to support local needs and institutions, 
rather than being used on centrally or nationally based activités.
For the charities involved this was an aim which conflicted with 
their objects of providing research funds, or major capital facilites, 
This was especially the case for the organization not using 
volunteers on a large scale, since much of their work had a national 
bias or emphasis. This created a vicious circle that:
NOT USING VOLUTEERS USING VOLUNTEERSI
NATIONAL EMPHASIS...... NO LOCAL PROJECTSj
P
I
DIFFICULT TO ATTRACT VOLUNTEERS...VOLUNTEERS ATTRACTED TO CHARITY
NOT USING VOLUNTEERS USING VOLUNTEERS
This was an interesting example of value conflict for each of the 
charities, and in this case in the final debate the vicious circle 
was used as an argument for not using volunteers. The force of the
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argument rests on a predicted inevitability of the circumstances 
which is implied by the circular nature of the argument and the 
implication is that 'it is very hard to do anything about this*.
Some strategies were suggested for breaking this circle, for instance 
by severing the link between NATIONAL EMPHASIS and DIFFICULT TO 
ATTRACT VOLUNTEERS, by a process of explaining to volunteers the need 
for the dispersal of funds to be centrally based. The identification 
of the loop provides a number of possible argumentative strategies 
(see also Chapter 6), but in this case the officers were unable to 
effectively challenge the loop. An argument which could dispel the 
inevitability produced by the vicious circle would in this 
circumstance be powerfully persuasive.
So far the data produced by this action research has supported the 
conclusions of the study of the Crossman Diaries in respect of the 
role in argument of taken-for-granted aspects of social life, and the 
links between values and persuasive argument. There is also a 
similarity between the charity officers who were pre-disposed to 
listen to argument because they felt themselves to be in a relatively 
'new* situation, and Crossman's experience as Housing Minister. The 
joint support from two very different research settings is 
encouraging in terms of the utility of the theories of argument 
proposed. The following sections consider a further aspect of 
argument which could not really be studied by the diary research; the 
performance of argument.
The performance of argument
This setting also provided an opporunity to be involved in and observe
163
argument between individuals as a social event. The interactions 
between individuals when working in groups is a widely researched 
topic (see Reardon 1981 for a survey of this in the specific context 
of argumentation). Marwill and Schmitt (1967) propose a taxonomy of 
16 different forms of interpersonal persuasion. This section 
concentrates upon an individual’s ability to argue effectively in 
this context, which is taken to mean an individual’s ability for 
putting forward his arguments in such a way that they are attended to 
by the rest of the group, and have influence on the course of the 
debate.
Mangham (1979), and others (McLean, Sims, Mangham and Tuffield 1982) 
have recently looked at the way in which individuals are perceived by 
each other in this sort of setting, and the effect that this has on 
the individual’s ability to influence that group. They have also 
studied, more generally, the nature of small group interactions (see 
also Goffman 1959, and the original work of Lewin 1947). When groups 
come together to overtly undertake an agreed task, sometimes 
categorized as a task-oriented group (Luthans 1973), there are also 
other factors which need to be taken into account in understanding 
the nature of the event. For example, for groups with members from 
the same organization, the different status and power of individuals 
in their work roles (Jones and Smithin 1984) may influence what is 
openly discussed; differences in personal style and taste may lead to 
personal interactions between individuals (Duck 1980); differing 
abilities in personal communication and social skills may also 
significantly affect the ability of an individual to become fully 
involved in the group (Hollander 1964). Perhaps most importantly the
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past history of the individuals working together will affect the 
influence that the individual has on his colleagues (Mangham 1978).
In this setting these effects were present, for example, one officer 
was consistently described (to the researchers), by a colleague, as 
not worth listening to. In some debates it was clear that the views 
(which had previously been expressed to the researchers) of some 
officers were witheld when the meeting included a more senior 
colleague. Nonetheless the research setting and presentation 
attempted to account for these issues where possible, in particular 
the emphasis on the nature of the event as an ’opportunity to share 
ideas’ and the use of the computer models encouraged the groups to 
discuss the issues in a reasonably frank manner. Also the individual 
models provided the researchers with an opportunity to check for this 
effect by comparing the individual models with views expressed in a 
joint meeting.
The final meeting was introduced as an opportunity for officers from 
each of the three charities to get together and discuss issues of 
mutual interest, and feedback at the end of the day from the 
participants suggested that they had all interpreted and used the day 
in this way. Also the final meeting involved only two of the 
participants from each charity so to a large extent each officer came 
to the meeting with little knowledge of most of the other 
participants. The only way for each individual to judge the others 
was through their ability to take part in and influence the debate; 
on trial was each individual’s ability to argue.
It was readily apparent as the debate proceeded (and this was also the
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case in the meetings within the charities) that some members of the 
group were able to argue more effectively than others. For example, 
the effective arguers, were more attentively listened to, and the 
points that they made were more frequently referred to by others.
They were also able to suggest new directions as the debate proceeded 
and these were followed by others. In contrast less effective 
arguers, tended to be listened to politely and not attentively, and 
the theme of their argument was frequently not followed by the next 
speaker, nor referred to by later speakers. The audience were also 
noticeably less ’energetic* is responding to these less effective 
arguers. Whilst the above implies that the ability to argue 
effectively is personally based, there were a number of occasions 
where, as the topic changed, individuals who had previously not 
argued effectively had more influence on the new part of the debate, 
and others became less effective than previously.
Analysis of the tapes of the final debate, and further analysis of 
the model contents, suggests some of the features of effective 
argument :
a) An important skill was the ability to empathize with, to 
adequately construe another’s argument. Skilled arguers noticeably 
used previous arguments and points made earlier by other participants 
as the starting point for their own intervention. Although there were 
occasions when this picking up of previous comments was used as a 
conversational device to enter the debate, and the following argument 
was not substantially related to previous arguments, this method of 
beginning an intervention usually reflected some careful listening to
166
what had gone before. The empathy seemed to lie in an ability to 
relate others' experiences to the arguer*s own experience, and in 
this way link the two experiences. If a speaker was using his own 
experience to argue a point then the act of linking it to other 
arguments increased the support for that point, and directly involved 
the other participants whose experiences were included in this way.
b) In contrast to this, and perhaps more striking were those 
interventions which had no effect on the course of the debate. In 
these instances, for example, an individual related an anecdote which 
was not directly linked to the current topic; or an individual simply 
repeated or reinforced a previous point. The effective arguer added 
something additional to the debate, as well as reinforcing previous 
points.
It became apparent during the course of the debate that individuals 
who only repeated points or tended to speak in isolation to the 
current topic, were less readily listened to than others even where 
their argument was in a particular instance more substantive. That 
is, once they had presented themselves as 'ineffective arguers* then 
all their arguments tended to be ignored regardless of the actual 
content or force of the argument. Although as mentioned above it was 
possible for individuals to be seen as ineffective arguers in 
relation to a particular topic, and effective arguers on a different 
topic. This follows Mangham*s observations on the influence of 
previous interactions between participants influencing 
interpretations of later interactions.
c) Gaining the interest and attention of the audience was however
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only a part of the argumentative process. During the day some 
individuals were able to present arguments which were noticeably 
persuasive, in terms of the future items that were discussed in the 
debate. That is, they were able to suggest a line or theme for the 
discussion which was taken up by others. An interesting example 
occurred after a fairly lengthy discussion, full of anecdotal 
illustrations, on the use of volunteers. There came a point at which 
everyone who wished to had contributed to this topic, and the debate 
was gradually coming to a temporary halt. At this point one of the 
participants drew a link between the use of volunteers and the 
dispersal of funds, saying at the conclusion 'they always act as if 
it's their money'.
This link was quickly taken up by a number of others, and they each 
pointed to areas in their models where they had discussed this issue, 
and this was then expanded into an important debate on the structure 
of charities. The argument for a link between volunteers and problems 
over the control of dispersal, drew on the previous discussion, and
added a new link to the debate. It was an idea which linked two
values which for some of the participants had not been previously 
explicitly linked in this way. A noticeably influential feature, 
which occurred on other occasions as well, was the use of a phrase 
which summed up the essential theme of the argument, often as a two
or three line summary, or as above, as a colloquial phrase.
There is a close link here to the work of Axelrod on the use of novel 
argument as he termed it (Axelrod 1979) and the initial discussions 
that were described for Crossman in Chapter 3- Links between
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concepts which are presented in a way that they are novel to other 
participants, that is, not yet linked to their construct system, seem 
to be powerfully influential. Axelrod suggested that in the debates 
that he analysed, which were each negotiations between different 
groups, the introduction of novel argument, that is, argument which 
the 'other side' had not previously addressed or been prepared for, 
was a common tactic. This type of argument occupied a considerable 
proportion of the debating time. It should be noted however that the 
negotiation setting is a very different one to that described in this 
chapter and the link would need to be more carefully investigated. In 
this example the arguer seems to have been able to put forward a link 
between two areas of interest to most of the participants (as shown 
by their computer models), which in some way makes clearer or sums up 
arguments which they had also thought about but not expressed in this 
way. The argument thus established new links between areas of 
concern (values) for the participants, and so elaborated their 
construct system, opening different channels of thought. In Kelly's 
terms the arguer has been able to suggest for others (and himself) 
new links between existing parts of construct systems which are 
elaborative. They increase the utility of the construct system in 
making sense of experience, which is part of Kelly's definition of 
the growth of a construct system.
In this debate there was no use of counter-argument in the sense 
described in Chapter 4, and participants did not attempt to find 
inconsistencies in each others’ arguments. Nonethless in order to 
gain the attention and claim the belief of others there was a need to 
argue persuasively but in an elaborative rather than a critical
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fashion.
d) Loop analysis and conflict analysis (checking the all consequences 
of chains of argument in relation to outcomes, described earlier) 
have suggested that the participants viewed some of the arguments as 
inevitable and unchanging, and this acted as a powerful argument for 
the status quo. For example the vicious circle shown earlier relating 
to the dispersal of funds and the use of volunteers, as with all such 
loops, suggests an inevitable consequence. In this case a 
self-regulating situation. This raises the possibility that the use 
of this form of presentation can itself be a powerful form of 
argument. An argument to the effect that ’whatever we do will have no 
effect* is really an attempt to persuade people that their current 
construal is adequate. This is often an attempt to determine the 
boundaries of a discussion, and so limit change in a predictable way. 
This can be used in a deliberately argumentative way (as opposed to 
bounded vision and group think which are not usually described as 
deliberate) to limit the boundaries of discussion, and in effect 
ensure that some arguments are more persuasive than others. This 
effect was discussed in Chapter 1 in relation to bounding arguments 
as ’value laden’ or ’rational’.
Different types of argument
The initial discussion for Grossman described in Chapter 3 and the 
setting described in this chapter are in sharp constrast to the 
conflictuel public debate in which Crossman was embroiled, described 
in the latter parts of Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4. In the 
conflictuel circumstances powerful arguments relied upon pointing out 
inconsistencies in others’ arguments, and possibly their values, as a
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way of destroying the credibility of an argument. In the less 
directly conflictuel circumstances powerful arguments stem from an 
elaboration of commonly held beliefs and the introduction of new 
ideas and links related to these beliefs.
In each case the ability of arguers to adequately construe the other’s 
argument significantly influences the nature of the interaction that 
is possible between them. Also in each circumstance there is a 
’pool’ of definition or construal around the interaction which is 
common to all involved which thereby becomes a socially defined and 
agreed fact. Such social facts and themes have a marked influence on 
the course of the debate and the possibilités that are envisaged in 
the interaction.
If argument is therefore viewed as an interaction between different 
construal then a persuasive argument can defined as an argument which 
enables the arguee to significantly elaborate or change his 
construal. For example, if inconsistencies are pointed out then the 
arguer must take action to resolve those inconsistencies in some way; 
or if new links are made then these can be added to an existing 
construct system. This is in agreement with Kelly’s definition of 
the direction of change of a construct system.
The differences between argumentative situations described in the 
foregoing chapters might be interpreted, following a number of 
authors on argumentation (Rieke and Sillars 1975), that argument is 
situationally specific and determined. It seems however more fruitful 
to see each argument setting as capable of different interpretations 
by the participants, interpretations which they will moreover attempt
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to ’impose* on others’ definitions of the event. The nature of the 
argument depends therefore crucially on the negotiation (often 
implied rather than explicit) between the participants involved. This 
is more fruitful because it does not pre-suppose particular 
expectations about the argument, and can account for the situations 
in which participants construe the argument setting very differently, 
and does not impose a fixed categorization on argument.
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Summary of Chapter 5 
Argument in progress
This chapter described a research setting very different from the two 
others used in this thesis. It was an ’action research’ setting in 
which the researcher was involved with the other participants and so 
may influence intentionally and unintentionally the research process. 
It is additionally a method in which the data is not completely 
available to other researchers. Such a setting is methodologically 
more prone to the self-fulfilment discussed in Chapter 2 and to 
hidden biases. This particular piece of research was also 
methodologically complicated by forming part of a larger study with 
other aims than the study of argument. Nonetheless it was worth 
attempting because some of the participants were apparently 
pre-disposed to listen to arguments. Like Crossman, described in 
Chapter 3, they were moving into an area which they felt they had 
less experience in, and were anxious to elaborate their ideas by 
listening to other arguments. The opportunity to study at first hand 
a number of arguments between individuals was also an important 
motive for the research.
The arguments between Crossman and Reeves described in Chapter 4 
suggested that the taken-for-granted features and assumptions which 
form the background to any argument can significantly influence the 
persuasiveness of particular arguments. The work involving the 
charity officers included a discussion on the use of volunteers. In 
this debate the views put forward formed an agreed and consistent set 
of arguments about the difficulties of using volunteers. This 
overwhelming consensus initially blocked debate, and had almost
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persuaded those looking for advice on the use of volunteers not to 
use them. Whilst the need for group approval may have turned 
participants away from the development of ideas (group think), their 
previous individual models suggested that these views on volunteers 
were well established for each individual. These social facts 
precluded even the possibility of there being a persuasive argument 
(for those looking for advice) for using volunteers. An intervention 
by the researcher encouraged participants to construe ’volunteers’ in 
a way which opened up some new possibilities for action on the use of 
volunteers. In this sense arguments which can foster or encourage a 
re-construal of parts of the system have a persuasive power.
A further inhibition to some arguments was the realization that change 
suggested by one line of argument had negative implications for 
another value. For example, the use of volunteers would inhibit the 
degree of central control over the dispersal of funds. As similarly 
described in Chapter 3» there was an important link between the 
persuasiveness of arguments and the values that they were seen to 
impinge upon.
Being able to study the debates as they occurred enabled the 
construction of a picture of the effective performance of argument. 
Whilst the data is limited to one setting and therefore not 
necessarily applicable more widely, it did reveal some noteworthy 
features of the arguments which markedly guided the course of the 
debate, and were in that sense effective. For example effective 
arguers were better able to construe and use others’ arguments when 
presenting their own, and normally added to the content of the debate
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rather than reinforcing or repeating points already made. Some skill 
at playing a socical role with respect to others seems important here,
Effective arguers seemed also better able to use arguments to link 
areas which had previously not been linked, and so potentially create 
for others concepts and links which elaborated their own construct 
systems. That is to say, a persuasive argument has the property of 
increasing the utility of the audience’s own construct system for 
making sense of experience.
Whilst the techniques of cognitive mapping again proved useful for 
recording and presenting argument it is more difficult in this 
setting to separate the use of the techniques from the course of the 
events, since explicit use was made of cognitive maps and the 
computer package during the debates.
In a similar way to Chapters 3 and 4 the research setting illustrated 
the link between values and persuasive arugment. It emphasized the 
influence of common construal on defining the background to a debate 
and thus the support given to one set of arguments rather than 
another. In addition the practice of argument was examined suggesting 
that there are skills of argumentation, in addition to social skills 
of self-presentation, which are worthy of attention in studying 
argument in small group settings.
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Appendix to Chapter 5 - list of combin' ed model on volunteers and 
'snapshots' of part of the model as cognitive maps.
ARGUMENTS ON USE OF VOLUNTEERS
I CHARITY X FINDING OUT EXTENT OF PUBLIC AWARENESS. . [not]CHARITY X FINDIN 
2. FEEDBACK FROM ADVISORY(CONSUMER) GROUP. . [not]FEEDBACK FROM ADVISORY(CON
3 FUND RAISING FOR SPECIFIC EVENTS ......... FUND RAISING FOR GENERAL NEEDS
4 LINKING A PARTICULAR NAME OR CAUSE TO WHAT IS GOING . .[notlLINKING A PAR
6 NEEDS CHANGE QUICKER THAN PLANS . . [not]NEE.DS CHANGE QUICKER THAN PLANS
7 SMALL LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS ............... [not]SMALL LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS
8 SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE CUSTOMERS. . [not]SOCIAL WELFARE ORG 
10 NEED TO BE BUSINESSLIKE IN OPERATION. . [not]NEED TO BE BUSINESSLIKE IN 0
II CHARITIES ARE COMPETITIVE LIKE SELLING DETERGENTS . .[not]CHARITIES ARE C
12 BREAKING AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL.PATERNALISTIC: WAY OF WORKING WITH 'CUSTOM
13 SOCIAL CHANGE ......................................  [not]SOCIAL CHANGE
14 OTHERS BEING ARTICULATE ON BEHALF OF THE 'CUSTOMERS'. . [not]OTHERS BEING
15 FRICTION BETWEEN OLD AND NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEM. . [not]FRICTION BETWE
16 PEOPLE WITH NO FAMILY CONNEXIONS WITH PROBLEM WORKING WITH 'CUSTOMERS' .
17 PEOPLE WANT TO IDENTIFY WITH SPECIAL PROJECTS . .[not]PEOPLE WANT TO IDEN
18 PEOPLE'S WILLINGNESS TO BECOME CONCERNED WITH PROBLEMS. . [not]PEOPLE'S W
19 VERY HANDICAPPED YOUNG PEOPLE . . . .  [not]VERY HANDICAPPED YOUNG PEOPLE
20 CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE...................[not]CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE
21 LOCAL GROUPS AND CLUBS RAISE THEIR OWN MONEY. . [not]LOCAL GROUPS AND CLU
22 NOT ENOUGH PEOPLE LOCALLY TO MAKE IMPACT. . [not]NOT ENOUGH PEOPLE LOCALL
23 NATIONAL...................................................LOCAL: APPEALS
24 [+]NATIONAL COMMITTMENT ......................... [-]NATIONAL COMMITTMENT
25 DO NOT.............................. DO: IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS IN APPEALS
26 PROBLEMS WITH SCOTLAND...................... [not]PROBLEMS WITH SCOTLAND
27 PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT PROBLEM . .[not]PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH
28 CHARITY X HAS NO CORE OF VOLUNTEERS . .[not]CHARITY X HAS NO CORE OF VOLU
29 NO ADMINISTRATIVE OR ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT FOR VOLUNTEERS. . [not]NO ADM
30 AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS ONLY . . . .  [not]AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS ONLY
31 PROBLEMS OF USING VOLUNTEERS ..........[not]PROBLEMS OF USING VOLUNTEERS
32 PUBLIC NOT AWARE OF COST OF PROBLEM . .[not]PUBLIC NOT AWARE OF COST OF P
33 HIGH COST OF A I D S .............................. [not]HIGH COST OF AIDS
34 FIXED AMOUNT OF MONEY AVAILABLE FOR CHARITIES . .[not]FIXED AMOUNT OF MON
35 [+]COMPETITION WITH OTHER CHARITIES . .[-]COMPETITION WITH OTHER CHARITIE
36 LIMIT TO GIVING ..................................  [not]LIMIT TO GIVING
37 U S E ............................ DO NOT USE: VOLUNTEERS FOR FUND RAISING
38 NO COST INVOLVED................................... [not]NO COST INVOLVED
39 PROBLEM IS DIFFICULT TO PORTRAY . . [not]PROBLEM IS DIFFICULT TO PORTRAY
40 REPUTATION IS AT STAKE...................... [not]REPUTATION IS AT STAKE
41 USE PROFESSION ................................  . . .[not]USE PROFESSION
42 CHARITY X NOT COMPETITIVE WITH MORE EMOTIVELY APPEALING CHARITIES . .[not
43 FUND RAISING IN LOCALITIES [not]FUND RAISING IN LOCALITIES
44 [+] PROFESSIONALISM..................................... [ -]PROFESSIONALISM
45 [+]COMPETITIVENESS OF THE CHARITY BUSINESS. . [-]COMPETITIVENESS OF THE C
46 [ + ÎMORE SUCCESSFUL CHARITIES.................[-]MORE SUCCESSFUL CHARITIES
47 ADOPTING THE SAME BRAND IMAGE AS OUR COMPETITORS. . [not]ADOPTING THE SAM
48 [+]PRODUCING SUCCESSFUL FORECASTS . . . [-]PRODUCING SUCCESSFUL FORECASTS
49 SET UP BRAND IMAGE ACCORDING TO OUR ORGANIZATION. . [not]SET UP BRAND IMA
50 CHARITY Y TAKING OFF . . .   ............... CHARITY Y NOT QUITE TAKING OFF
51 ONGOING ........................................  NOT ONGOING: ACTIVITIES
52 VOLUNTEERS WAITING AROUND FOR SOMETHING TO DO . .[not]VOLUNTEERS WAITING
53 [+]APATHY ....................................................  [-]APATHY
54 [+ÏPEOPLE GIVING......................................... [-]PEOPLE GIVING
55 THE NEED FOR FUNDS HAS GROWN...........[not]THE NEED FOR FUNDS HAS GROWN
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56 CHARITABLE WORK IS LABOUR INTENSIVE . .[not]CHARITABLE WORK IS LABOUR INT
57 GIVING........................ NOT GIVING: PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE
58 [+]ORGANIZATIONAL LIMITATIONS ............ [-^ORGANIZATIONAL LIMITATIONS
59 COUNTY BRANCH STRUCTURE..................[not]COUNTY BRANCH STRUCTURE
60 FUND RAISING............................ SERVICE AND FUNDRAISING: CHARITY
61 VOLUNTEERS DO NOT NECESSARILY WANT TO FUND RAISE. . [not]VOLUNTEERS DO NO
62 DAY TO DAY RUNNING OF THINGS IS DONE BY TRAINED PEOPLE. . [not]DAY TO DAY
63 [ + ]PUBLIC'S IMAGE OF CHARITY Y............ [-]PUBLIC'S IMAGE OF CHARITY Y
64 CHARITY Y CONSISTS MAINLY OF VOLUNTEERS . .[not]CHARITY Y CONSISTS MAINLY
65 C A N ........................................ CANNOT: WIELD A 'BIG STICK'
66 PERSUADE PEOPLE TO GIVE JUST A LITTLE TIME   RECRUIT VOLUNTEERS
67 [+]DIFFICULTY IN HARNESSING TALENT. . .[-]DIFFICULTY IN HARNESSING TALENT
68 [+] EXTRAORDINARY VARIABILITY OF LOCAL BRANCHES . .l-] EXTRAORDINARY
69 [+ÎMORALE ....................................................  [-]MORALE
70 [+]NEED TO SHOW THE VALUE OF VOLUNTEERS . .[-]NEED TO SHOW THE VALUE OF V
71 PUBLIC DOES NOT FOLLOW ACCOUNTS . .[not]PUBLIC DOES NOT FOLLOW ACCOUNTS
72 [+]GOOD ASSOCIATIONS GET ATTACHED TO THE EMBLEM . .[-]GOOD ASSOCIATIONS G
74 VOLUNTEERS ARE GETTING HARDER TO COME BY. . [not]VOLUNTEERS ARE GETTING H
75 [+]COMPETING ACTIVITIES IN SOCIETY. . .[-]COMPETING ACTIVITIES IN SOCIETY
76 CHANGING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CLIMATE. . [not]CHANGING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
77 CHARITY Y DOES A WIDE VARIETY OF WORK . . [not]CHARITY Y DOES A WIDE VARI
78 CHARITY Y HAS A WIDE APPEAL . . . .  [not]CHARITY Y HAS A WIDE APPEAL
79 [+]POTENTIAL VOLUNTEERS   [-]POTENTIAL VOLUNTEERS
80 PEOPLE WHO WERE HELPED IN THE LAST WAR . . [not]PEOPLE WHO WERE HELPED IN
81 CHARITY Y NOT ALWAYS SEEN AS ACHIEVING WHAT IT SHOULD . . [not]CHARITY
82 LOCAL GROUPS CANNOT ALWAYS MEET HIGH EXPECTATIONS . . [not]LOCAL GROUPS C
83 GOOD.................................................. POOR: COMMUNICATION
84 LACK OF RESOURCES .........................  [not]LACK OF RESOURCES
85 LACK OF MANAGEMENT SKILLS IN BRANCHES . .[not]LACK OF MANAGEMENT SKILLS
86 PEOPLE DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE RIGHT EXPERIENCE . . [not]PEOPLE DO NO
87 CHARITY Y IS PARTLY A VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION . . [not]CHARITY Y IS PARTL
88 PEOPLE LOWER DOWN DO NOT HAVE INFORMATION TO COMMUNICATE. . [not]PEOPLE L
89 SOME PEOPLE ARE NEVER COMMUNICATED WITH . . [not]SOME PEOPLE ARE NEVER CO
90 [+]MORALE OF VOUNTEERS............................ [-]MORALE OF VOUNTEERS
91 [+]NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS ........................ [-]NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS
93 NEWLY RETIRED PEOPLE ......................  [not]NEWLY RETIRED PEOPLE
94 PEOPE WHOSE IMAGINATION CAN BE CAPTURED . . [not]PEOPE WHOSE IMAGINATION
95 PEOPLE WHO NEED SOME 'DRAMA' . . . .  [not]PEOPLE WHO NEED SOME 'DRAMA'
96 CHARITY Y DEPENDS ON VOLUNTEERS . .[not]CHARITY Y DEPENDS ON VOLUNTEERS
97 VOLUNTEERS JOIN TO DO A PARTICULAR JOB. . [not]VOLUNTEERS JOIN TO DO A PA
98 FORMS OF GIVING ..............................  [not]FORMS OF GIVING
99 SPONSORED EVENTS ..............................  [not]SPONSORED EVENTS
100 [+] VOLUNTEERS'TIME.....................................[-]VOLUNTEERS'TIME
101 [+]PUBLIC AWARENESS ................................  [-]PUBLIC AWARENESS
102 ADVERTISING ..........................................  [not]ADVERTISING
103 50$ OF POPULATION DIE OF DISEASE. . [not]50$ OF POPULATION DIE OF DISEASE
104 SUCCESS IN SETTING UP LOCAL GROUPS. . [not]SUCCESS IN SETTING UP LOCAL GR
105 FUND RAISERS............................ CO-ORDINATORS OR ADMINISTRATORS
106 GETTING.........................NOT GETTING: VOLUNTEERS TO DO IT FOR YOU
107 ABILITY   INABILITY: OF ORGANISER TO DELEGATE
108 [+]REGION GETTING MONEY IN.................... [-]REGION GETTING MONEY IN
109 [+]TIME TO MOBILISE NEW VOLUNTARY EFFORT. . [-]TIME TO MOBILISE NEW VOLUN
110 [+]ORGANIZERS FEELING ABLE TO COPE WITH VOLUNTARY GROUPS. . [-]ORGANIZERS
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lia L+] RELIEVING ORGANIZERS OF ADMINISTRATION. . [-] RELIEVING ORGANIZER
112 GETTING THE RIGHT ............  GETTING THE WRONG: LEADER FOR A COMMITTEE
113 [+]QUALITY OF COMMITTEE ........................  [-IQUALITY OF COMMITTEE
114 [+]COMMITTEE GETTING DEPENDENT ON ORGANIZER . .[-]COMMITTEE GETTING DEPEN
115 [+ÏORGANIZER OFFERS HELP........................ [-]ORGANIZER OFFERS HELP
116 [+] COMMITTEE WANTS HELP FROM ORGANIZER . .[-]. COMMITTEE WANTS HELP F
117 [ + ] COMMITTEE’S EFECTIVENESS............ [-] COMMITTEE’S EFECTIVENESS
118 ORGANIZER LEAVES COMMITTEE TO GET ON WITH IT. . [not]ORGANIZER LEAVES COM
119 [+]EFFECTIVENESS OF ORGANIZER ............  [-^EFFECTIVENESS OF ORGANIZER
122 PROBLEM WITH GIVING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT . . [not]PROBLEM WITH GIVING CAPITA
123 [+1NEED FOR STAFF, BUILDING, MAINTENANCE ETC. . [-]NEED FOR STAFF, BUILDI
124 [+]COMMITTEES ............................................  [-^COMMITTEES
125 [+]ONRUNNING COMMITTEES ......................... [-lONRUNNING COMMITTEES
126 [+]COMMITTEES FOR SPECIAL EFFORTS . . . [-]COMMITTEES FOR SPECIAL EFFORTS
127 [ + ]BOREDOM.....................................................[-]BOREDOM
128 [+]PEOPLE WHO ARE LIKELY TO BE PERSUASIVE . .[-]PEOPLE WHO ARE LIKELY TO
129 [+1SPECIAL EFFORTS FOR JUBILEES ETC . .[-]SPECIAL EFFORTS FOR JUBILEES ET
130 [ + 1LAYAB0UTS.................................................[-]LAYABOUTS
131 REPLACE ABOUT 1 IN 5 MEMBERS OF COMITTEE EACH YEAR . . [not]REPLACE ABOU
132 [+]EXTRA LOCAL GROUPS ............................  [-]EXTRA LOCAL GROUPS
133 [ + ] PUBLIC GET FED UP................................ [-3PUBLIC GET FED UP
134 [+ÎPEOPLE GETTING INVOLVED.................... [-jPEOPLE GETTING INVOLVED
135 TOO MANY DIFFERENT GROUPS ..........  [not]TOO MANY DIFFERENT GROUPS
136 LOCAL DISPERSAL OF FUNDS... .............. [not]LOCAL DISPERSAL OF FUNDS
137 [ + ]LOCAL WISH TO G I V E ............................. [-]LOCAL WISH TO GIVE
138 COMMITTEE PICK LOW-RETURN PROJECTS. . [not]COMMITTEE PICK LOW-RETURN PROJ
139 PRODUCING IDEAS BUT NO WORK . . . .  [not]PRODUCING IDEAS BUT NO WORK
140 DISRUPTS THE PEOPLE WHO DO THE WORK . .[not]DISRUPTS THE PEOPLE WHO DO
141 FUNDS FOR LIMITLESS NEEDS ..........  [not]FUNDS FOR LIMITLESS NEEDS
142 [+]TARGET APPEALS   [-]TARGET APPEALS
143 CHANGES IMAGE OF THE TARGET GROUP . . [not]CHANGES IMAGE OF THE TARGET GR
144 SOMETHING FOR PEOPLE TO GET INVOLVED IN . . [not]SOMETHING FOR PEOPLE TO
145 PROJECTS THAT DO NOT ATTRACT A WIDE PUBLIC. . [not]PROJECTS THAT DO NOT A
146 [+]BEING SEEN TO MEET LOCAL NEEDS . . . [-]BEING SEEN TO MEET LOCAL NEEDS
147 LOCAL HOSPITAL OR CHAIR ..............  [not]LOCAL HOSPITAL OR CHAIR
148 GIVING....................................NOT GIVING: CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
149 COMMITTEES THAT ARE OUT OF CONTROL. . [not]COMMITTEES THAT ARE OUT OF CON
150 COMMITTEE MEMBERS MAKE RASH PROMISES . . [not]COMMITTEE MEMBERS MAKE RASH
151 MAKING UNTRUE STATEMENTS .............. [not]MAKING UNTRUE STATEMENTS
152 CAUSING TROUBLE LATER .................  [not]CAUSING TROUBLE LATER
153 COMMITTEES DON’T DO THINGS I DON’T LIKE . .[not]COMMITTEES DON’T DO THI
154 [+]ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM UNCHANNELLED . .[-]ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM UNCHANN
155 ORGANIZER HAS TO GO IN AND DO FIRST AID . .[not]ORGANIZER HAS TO GO IN
156 VOLUNTEERS REPRESENT YOU IN THEIR TOWNS . . [not]VOLUNTEERS REPRESENT YOU
158 VOLUNTEERS LET YOU DOWN .............. [not]VOLUNTEERS LET YOU DOWN
159 [+]BEING KIND TO VOLUNTEERS ................ [-]BEING KIND TO VOLUNTEERS
160 [+]TIME SPENT ON COMMITTEES ...............  [-]TIME SPENT ON COMMITTEES
161 VOLUNTEERS WILL ONLY TAKE ON LIMITED RESPONSIBILITY . . [not]VOLUNTEERS W
162 THERE ARE TIMES WHEN COMMITTEES WANT TO COPE ON THEIR OWN . . [not]THERE
163 PEOPLE LIKE TO HEAR WHAT A LOCAL RESEARCHER IS DOING . . [not]PEOPLE LIKE
164 [+]TANGIBLE THINGS THAT PEOPLE CAN GET HOLD OF. . [-]TANGIELE THINGS THAT
165 [+]PEOPLE LIKING OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS. . [-]PEOPLE LIKING OTHER COMMIT
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165 [+]PEOPLE LIKING OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS. . [-]PEOPLE LIKING OTHER COMMIT
166 FORMING A COMMITTEE FROM COLD . . [not]FORMING A COMMITTEE FROM COLD
167 PUBLIC MEETING ............................... [not]PUBLIC MEETING
168 ALL SORTS OF PEOPLE END UP ON THE COMMITTEE . . [not]ALL SORTS OF PEOPLE
169 COMMITTEE GOES SOUR ...................... [not]COMMITTEE GOES SOUR
170 [+]REALIZING THAT RESEARCH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EQUIPMENT . .[-]REALIZI
171 [+]WANT TO SUPPORT THE LOCAL HOSPITAL . .[-]WANT TO SUPPORT THE LOCAL HOS
172 [+]IMAGE OF CHARITY Z ............................  [-]IMAGE OF CHARITY Z
173 VOLUNTEERS MAY DO SOMETHING SILLY . . [not]VOLUNTEERS MAY DO SOMETHING SI
174 PRESS PUBLICITY .................... [not]PRESS PUBLICITY
175 MAY LEAD TO PUBLIC ARGUMENT (EG . . [not]MAY LEAD TO PUBLIC ARGUMENT (EG
176 [+]LOCAL INCIDENCE OF DISEASE ............  [-]LOCAL INCIDENCE OF DISEASE
177 [+]FORMATION OF SPLINTER GROUPS ........  [-]FORMATION OF SPLINTER GROUPS
178 PERSONAL APPROACH ......................  [not]PERSONAL APPROACH
179 APPROACHES BY VOLUNTARY HELPERS . .[not]APPROACHES BY VOLUNTARY HELPERS
180 IDENTIFY THE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF BENEFACTION . . [not]IDENTIFY THE POTEN
181 PITCH TOP GIFT AT AROUND 10$ OF TOTAL . .[not]PITCH TOP GIFT AT AROUND
182 TRY TO GET TOP GIFTS EARLY .......... [not]TRY TO GET TOP GIFTS EARLY
183 IDENTIFY POTENTIAL MAJOR GIVERS . .[not]IDENTIFY POTENTIAL MAJOR GIVERS
184 LIKELY............................ NOT LIKELY: TO HAVE SUCCESSFUL APPEAL
185 PROJECT MUST SATISFY REQUIREMENT THAT IS UNIQUE . . [not]PROJECT MUST SAT
186 PROJECT MUST BE PROPERLY PLANNED . .[not]PROJECT MUST BE PROPERLY PLANNE
187 MUST HAVE NECESSARY PLANNING CONSENTS ETC.. . [not]MUST HAVE NECESSARY PL
188 RECOGNIZABLE CONSTITUENCY OF GIVERS . . [not]RECOGNIZABLE CONSTITUENCY OF
189 PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ................. [not]PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
190 PROFESSIONAL FIRM ..........................  [not]PROFESSIONAL FIRM
191 COMPANIES ..........................................  [not]COMPANIES
192 GRANT-MAKING TRUSTS ......................  [not]GRANT-MAKING TRUSTS
193 STATUTORY BODIES ..............................  [not]STATUTORY BODIES
194 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ..............................  [not]LOCAL GOVERNMENT
195 FUND RAISING STUDY .................... [not]FUND RAISING STUDY
196 [+]MONEY RAISED ........................................  [-]MONEY RAISED
197 FINDING PEOPLE PREPARED TO INFLUENCE POTENTIAL BENEFACTORS . .[not]FINDI
198 [+]LEADERSHIP ............................................  [-]LEADERSHIP
199 PREREQUISITES WHICH SHOULD BE SATISFIED FOR AN APPEAL . . [not]PREREQUISI
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ARGUMENT DESIGNED TO PERSUADE
Introduction
This chapter discusses the nature of persuasive argument during the 
course of a parliamentary debate, and attempts to isolate features of 
individual speeches which observers and participants felt at the time 
were influential, and those which were considered, conversely, to be 
’weak* or counter-productive in terms of persuading people to the 
arguer's point of view. Each of the features is discussed in 
relation to the theories and ideas developed in the foregoing 
chapters. This setting focusses on the arguments put forward during 
the debate and their effect on the course of the debate. As with the 
other chapters the focus is on the arguments used and less attention 
is paid to other aspects of the social event. There is strong 
evidence to suggest that this was a setting in which persuasion by 
verbal argument was particularly important and was seen to be so by 
the participants.
The research setting
On 13th July 1983, the House of Commons debated a motion and series 
of amendments on capital punishment. The main motion (proposed by Sir 
Edward Gardiner a respected Conservative back-bench M.P.) was:
This house favours the restoration of the death penalty for murder
In addition five amendments were also tabled adding the following 
phrases to the motion:
185
a) ....resulting from acts of terrorism
b) .... of a police officer during the course of his duties
c) .... of a prison officer during the course of his duties
d) .... by shooting or causing an explosion
e) .... in the course or furtherance of theft
The full text of the debate is given in Weekly Hansard (13th July 
1983).
The debate had arisen from a government pledge at the recent general 
election (June 1983), to allow a free vote in parliament on the issue 
of capital punishment at an early opportunity. In the preceeding 
weeks there had been considerable discussion outside parliament on 
the issue, primarily conducted through the press and television, and
public interest in the debate was very high (see for example:
Woffinden 1983, Tysoe 1983). The complete debate was broadcast live
(on radio only) on July 13th by the B.B.C. whose decision to
broadcast the entire debate when they did not do so for the previous 
debate in 1982 was a further indication of the high level of public 
interest in the debate (Rutherford 1983).
Background to capital punishment in the U.K
This section describes the background to capital punishment in the 
U.K. It is deliberately brief since background which the participants 
consider to be relevant is included in the discussion of their 
arguments. A longer discussion would itself be an argument (on one 
side of the debate or the other) and arguing for or against capital 
punishment is not the purpose of this chapter.
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Capital punishment was abolished for the crime of murder in 1965
through the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965. The
majority in favour of abolition was 185 (Hansard, 21st December 1964). 
Previous debates in the House of Commons in 1948 and in 1956 had also
resulted in a vote for abolition but had been overturned by
subsequent votes in the House of Lords. (Capital punishment is still 
technically available in England for crimes of treason, piracy and 
setting fire to dockyards and arsenals, but since 1918 (and only 
rarely before then) has not been used or considered in such cases.)
The most recent debates on capital punishment in the House of Commons 
were in July 1979 and in May 1982 on motions supporting the 
re-introduction of the death penalty for various categories of murder. 
On every vote the majority against was not less than 100, for example, 
in 1979 the majority against the general re-introduction of capital 
punishment was 119, and in 1982 the majority against the general case 
was 162, and the majority against the re-introduction of capital 
punishment for murder through acts of terrorism was 124 (Weekly 
Hansard, 11th May 1982, Weekly Hansard, 19th July 1979). The number 
of homicide cases reported in the United Kingdom in 1982 was 619. 
Discussions of capital punishment in the United Kingdom can be found 
in (Ryan 1983), and (Blom-Cooper 1974) and one of the most 
comprehensive discussions of capital punishment is the report of the 
Royal Commission under Sir Ernest Gowers in 1953, Royal Commission on 
Capital Punishment 1953.
An influential debate?
It is important for the objectives of this chapter to carefully 
examine why this debate may be considered to have influenced M.P.’s
187
when voting as opposed to other influences. It has often been argued 
(Stacey 1975, Sedgemore 1980) that arguments on the floor of the House 
of Commons are becoming increasingly irrelevant in determining the 
outcome of any debate, when voting tactics and decisions are made 
prior to the event through the use of whips. A ’whip* is the 
expression used when party leaders instruct Members to vote in a 
particular way in a debate.
However issues such as capital punishment which fall outside the 
realm of government policy, are usually debated on the principle of a 
’free vote’, that is, each Member is free to vote as he wishes and 
there is no whip applied. Also neither party has a specific policy 
on the issue of capital punishment as it is usually considered to be 
a matter of conscience for each M.P. In this sort of circumstance the 
debate in the House often acts as the main focus for argument and 
decision, (see also Sedgemore*s discussion of Private Members’ Bills). 
Another pressure on M.P.’s was their recent election promises or 
speeches to their local constituency party. Edward Heath, for 
example, specifically advises them to ignore this pressure in his 
speech. Most of this pressure urged the undecided M.P.’s (who were 
mainly Conservative) to vote in favour of restoration.
The debate considered in this chapter was thought by most observers to 
be the closest that parliament has come to re-introducing capital 
punishment. For example the Guardian referred to:
” ... a House of Commons where opinion is more evenly divided than ever 
before.. .”
(Guardian, 12th July 1983)
and
188
"...The evidence continued to point rather shakily towards a defeat 
for the pro-hanging lobby..."
(Guardian, 12th July 1983)
Similarly the Observer on the previous Sunday suggested that the vote 
would only be lost by 20 votes (Observer, 10th July 1983), and the 
Times later in the week suggested that the closest motion would only 
be lost by 10 or 20 votes (Times, 13th July 1983). Other papers whose 
editorial was more generally in support of the motion were more 
optimistic of victory by a few votes for the general motion, and some 
of the amendments. Opinion differed on which of the amendments would 
be the closest when it came to a vote. The amendment supporting 
murder for acts of terrorism and that supporting murder for shooting 
or causing an explosion were however the most frequently tipped as 
likely to be lost (or won) by just a handful of votes (Guardian, 11th 
July 1983, Guardian 12th July 1983). Hewitt in the ’New Statesman* 
similarly suggested that ’the motion most likely to succeed is 
execution for terrorist murder’. She further considers that even a 
narrow defeat for the restoration will be a sufficient ’victory’ to 
keep the issue alive as a public topic for a further five years 
(Hewitt 1983). This latter point illustrates the importance of the 
debate to supporters of restoration since if the motion and 
amendments were once again defeated heavily, against the believed 
climate of public support for the motion, then there would be little 
likelihood of the topic’s being considered again in the forseeable 
future.
The potential closeness of the vote was thought by most commentators 
to be due to the arrival in the House of a large number of new (since
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the general election) Conservative M.P.’s who were under pressure in 
their constituencies to support the motion, and many of whom it was 
felt would vote in favour. Edwina Currie (Conservative) perhaps most 
closely summed up in the debate the arguments which most commentators 
had suggested the new M.P’s would support:
"Something is wrong. We seem to have become a lawless and 
dangerous society in which brutality no longer shocks but 
becomes commonplace, and in which the carrying of weapons 
of all kinds in the furtherance of crime has become an 
everyday matter. From many people there is the cry that 
something must be done. My sense of natural justice is 
offended by the feeling that there is no appropriate response, 
Why should decent citizens go in fear of their lives?
If the abolition of capital punishment has anything to do 
with it or is in any way to blame, and if any criminal 
sees its disappearance as condoning his activity, its return 
may help to reverse this trend."
(c. 917)
In constrast the Labour Party representation (most Members of which 
had always voted against the restoration of the death penalty), was 
at its lowest level since 1930.
It was felt by most observers that the ’arguments on the day’ could 
be particularly significant in persuading a sufficient number of 
these new Members one way or the other. The result as the debate 
started was considered to be very much in the balance. No-one 
suggested that the result would be anything like the large majority 
against restoration, after the debate in 1982.
190
The results of the divisions on the motion and amendments which began 
at 10pm were therefore a considerable suprise, and were as follows;
FOR AGAINST MAJ
  resulting from acts of terrorism 245 361 116
  of a police officer in the course
of his duties 263 344 8l
  of a prison officer during the
course of his duties 252 348 96
  by shooting or causing an explosion 204 374 170
  in the course or furtherance of theft 194 369 175
This house favours the restoration of the
death penalty for murder 233 368 135
Commentators and participants on the following day suggested that the 
debate had strongly influenced a large number of M.P.’s to vote 
against, where they had before the debate considered voting for at 
least one of the amendements. The Times on the following day (Times, 
14th July 1983) suggested that the opening speech by the Home 
Secretary (Leon Brittain) had been ineffective and that his failure 
to give an adequate definition of acts of terrorism had led to the 
large swing against that amendment. Conversely it was argued that the 
speeches by Roy Hattersley the Labour Party spokesman on Home Affairs 
(Shadow Home Secretary), had been ’fluent and forceful’, and that the 
contributions by Edward Heath (former Conservative Prime Minister 
(1970-1974), and Roy Jenkins (former Home Secretary 1974-76), were 
persuasive for the case against the re-introduction of capital 
punishment.
The rest of this chapter analyses and discusses the speeches made by 
these four principal contributors and the responses to them in terms
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of the arguments that they use, as most of the available evidence 
points to these being significant events in determining the course of 
the debate and the final outcome.
Figure 6.1 shows the timetable of the early part of the debate.
Figure 6.2 lists the main speakers in the debate.
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Figure 6.1 Timetable of the early part of the debate
3.31 pm. Start of debate introduced by the Speaker
Case for restoration presented by Sir Edward Gardiner
3.51 pm. Summary of arguments and case for restoration for
murder resulting from acts of terroism, presented by
Leon Brittain (Home Secretary).
4.20 pm. Case against restoration put by Roy Hattersley.
4.45 pm. Case against restoration put by Edward Heath.
5.03 pm. Case against restoration put by Roy Jenkins
5.21 pm. Case for restoration put by Edwina Currie.
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Figure 6.2 Major speakers in the debate, 
In order of debating sequence.












Dame Judith Hart (AGAINST)
Eldon Griffiths (FOR)
John Hume (AGAINST)
Rev. Ian Paisley (FOR)
John Lewis (AGAINST)
Sir Hugh Fraser (FOR)
William Ross (FOR)





William W Hamilton (AGAINST) 
George Gardiner (FOR)
Betty Boothroyd (FOR)






This setting is a further opportunity to look at the practice of 
argument in a situation in which verbal argument is a significant and 
potentially influential feature. The methods used are very similar 
to those described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 for the collection of data 
and for the subsequent analysis. As with the study of the Crossman 
Diaries access to the participants was not possible, and the emphasis 
in using the data is on whether the data gathering, analysis and 
theories can improve an observer’s understanding of the arguments and 
their effect, and add to knowledge on the nature of argument. In this 
chapter the use of cognitive mapping as a means of recording 
argument, and of being able to highlight the essential steps in an 
argument, and so more readily compare different arguments is stressed 
as this was a particularly helpful feature in working with the ’raw* 
data.
The entire debate was recorded on audio tape, from the B.B.C radio 
broadcast, with some notes made at the time on the background 
features of the debate, such as the immediate reactions to speeches 
in the House, the nature of interruptions, and the impression of the 
reception of a speech by others in the House. On the following days 
the reactions to the debate in the press, television and radio were 
closely monitored and recorded. The general approach follows that of 
Nelkin (1979) who with other colleagues has extensively observed 
public events and debates through written and broadcast media.
After re-studying the tapes and media material four speeches in the 
debate were selected for more detailed study on the basis that they 
were reported by observers and participants (see above section) as
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being very influential in determining the outcome of the debate. 
These were, as mentioned above, the speeches of:
Leon Brittain - Home Secretary (in favour of restoration for acts
of terrorism)
Roy Hattersley - Labour Party Shadow Home Secretary (spoke against 
all the amendments).
Edward Heath - Former Prime Minister (spoke against all the 
amendments)
Roy Jenkins - Former Labour Party Home Secretary (spoke against 
all the amendments).
In each case cognitive maps were drawn up covering the speech, based 
on the audio tapes of the debate. The written record (Weekly 
Hansard, 13th July 1983) was used to clarify indistinct passages, and 
to check phrasing and references to other Members of Parliament 
(since names are not used in speeches in the House of Commons). The 
difficulties of a published written verbatim transcript as a base for 
interpreting a speech are well known (Axelrod 1976) and in the case 
of Hansard the volume of material, and lack of description of the 
events surrounding the speeches, can be mis-leading as to their 
impact at the time. Therefore the tapes form the primary source, and 
decisions of inclusion or exclusion of material was based on the 
taped source not the written record.
Each cognitive map was transferred to the computer as a separate 
model. Extracts from each of the models are shown as cognitive maps 
in the figures at the end of this chapter, and a full list of each 
model is given. The rarity of explicit opposite poles is noticeable 
in this coding. These were essentially the maps that resulted from 
coding the debate as it occurred. It may be that in a debate arguers
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are anxious to stress the poles that they wish to put forward, and to 
(not necessarily consciously) leave unsaid the constrasts, since 
these constrasts may provide the basis for counter argument from 
opponents.
The chains of argument used in each speech were then compared and 
examined by exploring the respective cognitive maps, and each model 
was additionally analysed, key concepts selected and grouped (in the 
same way as described in Chapter 3). The groups or areas of interest 
are shown for each speech in Figure 6.11.
The analyses performed were:
Cognitive centrality analysis: This works through each concept and 
sums the number of concepts which are directly linked, either 
connotatively, or causally to a given concept. It is a guide to the 
amount of elaboration or discussion that there has been around each 
concept.
Trace analysis: The trace analysis examines for each concept the 
number of other concepts that can be affected by, or affect, the 
given concept. It represents the extent to which a given concept can 
influence or be influenced by other concepts.
Path analysis: The path analysis looks at each chain of reasoning or 
argument which stems from a given concept, and gives some indication 
of amount of support for or support given by a particular concept.
Loop analysis: This searches for and reports any circular arguments 
in a model.
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Each concept which was in the top 10 percent of each of the 
Centrality, Trace and Path analyses was selected as a key concept, 
and thus used as the basis for automatically grouping the models into 
hierarchical clusters of concepts which form the explanatory 
structure around the key concepts.
Study of the models and the results of the analyses were then used as 
the starting point for looking at the interactions between the 
models, which represents the interaction between the speeches in 
terms of the arguments used. Discussion of other speeches in the 
debate, and the overall features of the debate were also included.
Arguments about capital punishment
Note that throughout the remaining sections of this chapter to avoid 
tedious repetition the following abbreviations are used: Speakers for 
the motion on the re-introduction of the death penalty, and any of 
the amendments, are referred to as 'supporters'. Speakers against the 
motion on the re-introduction of the death penalty are referred to as 
'opponents'. The re-introduction of the death penalty is also 
referred to as 'restoration'.
Facts and statistics
Nearly every speaker in the debate (Figure 6.2) made some reference 
to crime statistics, and attempted to link their arguments to some 
aspect of these. For example, a number of supporters attempted to 
show that since abolition in 1965 the number of crimes of violence 
had risen dramatically, and attempted to establish a causal link 
between abolition and the violent crime rate. Opponents argued that
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the figures were inconclusive, the rise in crime had begun in I960 
before abolition, and there was no causal link. As with many of the 
arguments described in this thesis the linking of a particular 
argument with a set of 'facts' is a very common persuasive technique, 
in this case facts in terms of crime statistics, for the charity 
officers (Chapter 5) facts in terms of their own experiences with 
volunteers. The persuasiveness of this tactic rests both upon the 
agreement that can be reached on the facts, and on the interpretation 
of these facts, that is, the support that they can offer to the 
argument. In this debate the facts as matters of historical record 
were generally agreed, but the support that such facts could give to 
an argument was differently argued by many speakers.
In this debate the use of statistics by supporters and opponents 
whilst prevalent seems to have been inconclusive in terms of deciding 
the outcome of the debate. A number of speakers expressed the 
uncertainty and inconclusive nature of the facts, and attempted 
consequently to rest their arguments on other bases. This was 
apparently a more serious problem for supporters than for opponents. 
This was put most clearly by Edward Heath in his speech:
51 statistics not an unambiguous guide .... clear evidence
4 case for capital punishment not proved beyond any shadow of doubt
1 capital punishment .... status quo
To change the status quo (abolition) more certain evidence than that 
available is needed. Heath argued. This was echoed by Hattersley who 
argued that:
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"we ought to re-introduce hanging on more than a hunch" 
Another phrase that was received very enthusiastically was:
"the only certain fact is that if hanging was not 
abolished in 1965 then 5 innocent men would be dead today"
The attention paid in the debate to the support or attack of arguments 
in relation to established facts and statistics is an illustration of 
the influence that general expectations of argument have on the 
nature of debate. Chapter 1 discussed the link between a desire for 
sure and certain knowledege and the concept of rationality and 
rational debate. It was suggested that these culturally bound and 
common aspects of construal influence the type of support that is 
considered to be adequate to support a proposition. 'Factual* 
support is often taken to be pre-eminent as a persuasive means, and 
the influence of particular examples can be considerable (see later 
in this chapter for one illustration of this). This is also linked to 
the notion of modality discussed in Chapter 2, following Toulmin.
Both Heath and Hattersley introduce into their arguments a concept of 
the degree of certainty that is required for an M.P. to be persuaded 
on this issue. If the available factual evidence is seen to be 
ambiguous in its direct support, then arguers can attempt to define a 
setting in which this ambiguity is itself support for their case. 
Edward Heath and Edwina Currie did this from different sides of the 
argument.
Heath construed the debate as being about 'capital punishment rather 
than status quo' , he could then argue that very certain evidence is 
required to change the status quo. The appeal of this argument rests
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on the contrast between a state of affairs which is known (certain), 
the status quo, and an envisaged state of affairs which is less 
certain. It is a similar appeal to that described by Goodwin and 
Wenzel (1979) in their study of the logical reasoning implied in folk 
lore, where they quote the saying, "Better the devil that you know
Currie on the other hand argues (see above quote) that because murder 
and violent crime are such hideous acts, if capital punishment can 
deter just one criminal from commiting them it is worth 
re-introducing. This was supported by Atkins later in the debate who 
said that:
"If we can save even a few innocent lives - is it not our 
duty to do so?"
(0.933)
Currie and Atkins attempted to set up a context in which only minimal 
evidence is strong support for their case. They can thus argue 
against or nullify the problems of the inconclusive nature of the 
evidence as direct support for their arguments.
Thus by envisaging and arguing for different contexts for considering 
the 'facts' available, each side of the argument can use what was 
generally agreed to be inconclusive factual evidence, as strong 
support for their case.
Consistency
Chapter 4 suggested that in conflictual debates of this nature 
internal consistency between aspects of an argument was a very
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necessary feature of persuasive argument. Crossman by taking on new 
ideas about housing without fully thinking them through in relation 
to his construct system, created temporary discrepancies between 
different parts of his construct system which others were able to 
highlight and exploit. Brittain's arguments on each amendment show 
an inconsistency (as seen by a number of speakers in the debate) 
which was exploited by Hattersley. For example, on the amendment 
relating to murder commited in the course of theft, Brittain argued:
32 only minor theft may be involved ....V
33 evidence for theft would be crucial ....i
31 public debate and concern over individual cases ....
i -
30 capital punishment for murder in course of theft .... imprisonment
This is one the many arguments (often called the 'anomaly' arguments) 
that were used in relation to the various categories of murder 
defined by the amendments.
In relation to the amendment for murder of a prisoner officer in the 
course of his duties, Brittain argued against capital punishment:
38 only two officers killed in 40 years ....V
37 difficult to make judgement about effect of capital punishment ....
34 capital punishment for murder of prison officers .... no capital pun
However on the amendment relating to murder resulting from acts of 
terrorism Brittain argued in favour of restoration In this case he
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suggested another argument, namely that the state must signify its 
repugnance of such acts.
In his speech against the motion and all amendments which directly 
followed Brittain (see timetable in Figure 6.1), Hattersley attempted 
to establish an inconsistency between Brittain's arguments. He did 
this by arguing that the two arguments that Brittain has used to 
reject capital punishment for other amendments also apply to the 
terrorist amendment. For example: The 'anomaly' argument also 
applied:
8 robberies to give support to IRA .... obvious acts of terrorismV
9 problems of definition ....I
10 chaos and anguish ....
I "
1 re-introduce hanging .... do not re-introduce hanging
The argument that not many murders are involved also applied:
4 terrorist crime in Northern Ireland ....i
5 less than one quarter of all murders ....
I
6 deterring one in five murders ....
I
2 deterrent effect will be negligible .... significant deterrence
1 re-introduce hanging .... do not re-introduce hanging
In this way Hattersley used his opponent's arguments to support his 
own, and significantly attempted to show that there was an 
inconsistency in Brittain's arguments. If these arguments apply to
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the terrorist amendment then Brittain must reject this as well since 
these were precisely the arguments that Brittain used to reject other 
amendments.
The influence of this argument by Hattersley is indicated by the 
number of references by other speakers to this illustration of an 
inconsistency in the Home Secretary's arguments. There was, however, 
another line of argument against the Home Secretary which was also 
frequently used by speakers and this is discussed in the following 
section.
Expectations, argument and sociality
A number of speakers made reference to another feature of Brittain's 
speech. He suggested that in Northern Ireland a new system would 
need to be devised (other than the Diplock courts) to try capital 
cases, for example a judge and two assessors. Many speakers severely 
criticized this suggestion, not primarily because of the content, but 
because they argued that the way in which this suggestion was raised 
was inappropriate behaviour for a Home Secretary. Roy Jenkins 
perhaps emphasized this more than others, saying of the Home 
Secretary:
"He is floating a possible idea and not submitting a clear 
proposition. He has no idea whether the procedure of a 
judge and assesors would work, and he has no idea whether the
judiciary would accept it .... That is one of the most
extraordinary propositions that a Home Secretary or any 
other Cabinet Minister has ever put before the House."
( c . 914)
This argument is based on a construal by Jenkins of how other Members 
expect senior Members of the House to behave. There is an implication
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that 'floating an idea' is not acceptable behaviour for a Home 
Secretary. It is not the feasability of the idea that is under 
attack (this was attempted by Heath), but the way in which it 
has been put forward. This was an effective means of 
undermining Brittain's credibility in the debate, judging by the 
number of Members who make a similar reference to the 'sorry 
performance of the Home Secretary'. For example:
" .... it causes me grave discomfort that a Home Secretary ..."
(Leo Abse, c. 929)
" .... with all respect to him, that is not something that 
should come from the Home Secretary. It might come from me 
or one of my right hon. or hon. Friends on the Back 
Benches ....
(Sir Ian Gilmour, c.948)
This argument relies upon each Member similarly construing the 
way in which a Home Secretary should act in a debate and the 
kind of arguments that he should bring forward.
Such construals are based on the history and practice of 
Parliament as it is experienced by each Member, and for some are 
undoubtedly linked to important values concerned with the nature 
of Parliamentary activity. This form of attack would not have 
been effective (and was not used) against any other Member 
taking part in the debate, although a number of proposals were 
made which were similarly 'floated'. Perhaps because he was 
relatively new to the position of Home Secretary, Brittain had 
not fully developed an appropriate template for presenting his 
arguments as a Home Secretary, rather than as a more junior 
member of the Government. That is to say that he was not able to
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adequately play a social role in respect of other Members in his 
new position, because he had not been able to empathize with 
their view of his role.
Similarly, Richard Crossman (Chapter 4) was unable to play a 
social role in respect of his 'amenity lobby' opponents, and was 
unable to effectively anticipate their arguments. Brittain's 
difficulties in this aspect of his arguments illustrate quite 
vividly the implications, as discussed in Chapter 2, of the 
Sociality corollary when attempting to present arguments which 
are intended to persuade others.
Another difficulty arose for Brittain from 'floating an idea' in 
that when asked by a number of speakers to clarify the points he 
was making he was apparently reluctant to respond. There does 
seem to be a need in argument of this sort, not only to prepare 
arguments beforehand, but also to be responsive to points made 
during the debate. In Chapter 5 the effective arguers were 
described as those officers who were able to link their 
arguments to points previously made, which is also a reflection 
of a need to be sensitive to the current debate.
Values
It might be expected that in a debate which often aroused deep 
emotion, that the values of speakers and audience would play a 
significant role in the debate. The group analysis of the four 
speakers considered by many to be the most influential shows 
however that the areas of interest tackled in their speeches 
focusses more on the practicalities of capital punishment.
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Hattersley's model is the only one to lay some emphasis on the 
moral and value-laden aspects of the motion. For instance there 
are groups around the concepts ’debases us all' and 'degrades 
society'. This is not to say that these issues are not 
mentioned by the other speakers, but that group analysis 
suggests that they form a less significant part of the speeches.
At issue here is the relation of values to persuasion. This has 
been frequently researched in terms of mass 'laboratory' style 
experiments, and for example Meltsner (Meltsner 1979) quotes 
Berelson and Steiner's generalizations to the effect that:
"people respond to persuasive communications in line with 
their pre-dispositions, and they change or resist change 
accordingly"
(Meltsner 1979)
That is to say that the values we hold pre-dispose us to 
particular arguments. At the extreme, as has been argued in 
Chapter 1, differences in values will lead to a state in which 
neither arguer can play a social role in respect of the other, 
there can be no argument between them. In this debate there was 
clearly one major group of M.P.'s (like Hattersley) who were 
opposed to capital punishment on moral grounds, and primarily 
opposed the motion for that reason. However their task is to 
persuade M.P's who do not hold such a moral commitment to 
support them. In this task, whilst it is important to express 
their moral commitment, this is not likely to be the primary 
means of persuasion for influencing un-decided M.P.'s.
So for example, both Heath and Jenkins (and others) concentrate
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upon the practicalities of capital punishment as an effective 
deterrent rather than on the moral arguments. Hattersley does 
make some attempt to win the moral argument, and in doing so, 
points to the effect of sharing or not sharing values with the 
source of the argument.
For example:
19 Sun is not part of liberal enlightened establishment ....
\
18 article in Sun newspaper regards hanging as brutalising .... 
17 degrades society ....
I
3 debases us all ....
/ -
1 re-introduce hanging .... do not re-introduce hanging
Concept 19 is the crucial part of this argument, in that, it 
brings to mind the editorial policy of the Sun, which is usually 
regarded as a strident supporter of the Conservative party, and 
more generally a supporter of right wing policies. By 
introducing this example Hattersley argues that undecided M.P.s' 
can easily reject the arguments put forward by 'the Bar, the 
Bench and the Bishops' since these espouse values of the 
'enlightened liberal establishment' which are not likely to be 
shared by the new Conservative M.P.s'. However the same argument 
put forward by the Sun newspaper cannot be so easily rejected, 
as the Sun frequently espouses values which the Conservative 
M.P's support.
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This agrees with the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) 
who argue that the audience’s values are significant both in 
affecting the nature of the arguments that they will find 
persuasive, and the credibility that will be attached to the 
source of an argument.
The note of caution in respect of a discussion of values sounded 
in Chapter 1 must however be repeated here. In terms of 
persuasion of individuals it is difficult to talk in terms of 
values in the global, wide ranging sense that they tend to be 
used in this section. Individual values are (as shown in Chapter 
3) particular and idiosyncratic. Therefore the effect of shared 
values (at a general level) between an individual and groups in 
society can really only be seen as affecting the ’climate’ in 
which an argument is received. This as suggested by Meltsner 
affects an individual’s pre-disposition to any particular 
argument, but is not critical in terms of persuading him.
The opponents of capital punishment by focussing on other 
aspects than the moral issues, reflect this understanding of the 
working of values when used at this general level. Also values 
related to moral aspects of life, which form a deep-seated part 
of an individual’s construct system will be as Kelly suggests 
resistant to change, because of the consequences for the rest of 
the system that such a change would entail. It is unlikely then 
that deeply held values will be sufficiently influenced by a 
single debate (although of course there are isolated examples to 
the contrary).
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This argument is additionally interesting because it relies 
crucially on being able to construe, at a very general level, 
others’ reactions to the Sun newspaper. These reactions form 
part of a taken-for-granted social world. The argument relies 
both on finding support for a point of view from groups with 
which the audience may share values, and on being able to access 
construal common to large numbers of individuals involving 
aspects of social life. Another common example of this type of 
argument was seen in the press prior to the debate, with the 
reported statements of relatives of murder victims arguing 
against capital punishment.
Countering assertions
We have seen previously that Brittain supported the 
re-introduction of hanging for acts of terrorism, partly on the 
grounds that it was right for society to signal its repugnance 
of this type of crime. He also argued that it would deter 
terrorists. The likelihood of deterrence occurred as a critical 
feature in many of the arguments. Brittain argued that:
17 many people are bullied or bribed into acts of terrorism ...\
15 not all terrorists are fanatics ....i
16 must not accept terrorists view of himself ....
i
14 risk of capital punishment will deter terrorists ....
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Conversely Hattersley argued:
31 hunger strikes by IRA prisoners ....I
38 terrorists are not weak and undetermined ....
i-
31 deterrent effect of hanging
The question is, which of these arguments will be accepted by 
those who are unpersuaded? From the reactions in the House at 
the time and the unexpectedly heavy vote against the terrorist 
amendment, it seems likely that Hattersley was more influential 
than Brittain. Hattersley points to a relatively recent event as 
support for his proposition, Brittain provides none, but relies 
on implying that terrorists are in some way particularly liable 
to 'fear of consequences'. It is an appeal perhaps to what the 
audience would like to believe, that is, that terrorists are 
'weak and cowardly*. These are two contrasting assertions about 
the nature of terrorists, and in this case, a recent event 
strongly suggests that one interpretation is more likely. So 
again Brittain's argument is seen as the weaker one. If there 
had been, for example, a recent instance of the I.R.A backing 
down under pressure, then perhaps the arguments would have been 
differently received.
Of note here is the influence of a particular event in 
determining a general interpretation of I.R.A terrorists, almost 
regardless of any other evidence which may be relevant to the 
interpretation. It is a further and quite striking illustration 
of the pre-eminence given to events and facts in deciding
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between propositions. It is similar to the strength that 
particular anecdotes had for charity officers (Chapter 5) in 
supporting arguments about volunteers.
Vicious circles and inevitable consequences
Chapter 5 described the influence on the course of a debate of 
the presentation of arguments which imply that there are 
inevitable or unchangable consequences in a particular setting. 
The identification of circular argument (sometimes called 
vicious circles) often points to this type of effect. During 




hanging for terrorist murder...
terrorist deaths
British Government become oppressors
support for I.R.A.
acts of terrorism
Thus restoration will lead to this vicious circle, in which 
capital punishment increasingly escalates violence. The 
strength in terms of the ability to persuade, lies (as in 
Chapter 5) with the concept of inevitability that such a 
circular argument implies. There is no escape from the 
consequences if hanging is re-introduced is the underlying 
implication of the argument.
Note that if the alternative poles were explicit then the 
re-generative aspects of the loop may be apparent. However 
these are not expressed, and it would matter (for the opposite 
argument) what these were. For example if the alternative to 
hanging is [not] hanging then this is a reflection of the 
current state of affairs, and this would not be a particularly 
strong counter argument, since current acts of terrorism are the 
basis for the argument.
Arguers for restoration had to tackle this circle, and chose a 
number of different ways of doing it, which are similar to the 
strategies discussed in Chapter 5. For example, one of the links 
may be reversed, so changing the argument to support the
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opposite case. For example Leon Brittain was one of many who 
argued that capital punishment would deter support for 
terrorists. If this link is substituted then the argument is 
reversed.
Alternatively attempts can be made to lessen the significance of 
the loop (if it cannot be effectively broken) by arguing that 
there are other factors involved. For example, Humphrey Atkins 
argued that the I.R.A. 'can always find martyrs' (eg. the hunger 
strikes), and whether they find them through restoration or some 
other means is not significant. This then enabled him to discuss 
other reasons for restoration.
This vicious circle acted throughout the debate (in slightly 
different forms) as an important persuasive argument for the 
opponents. Perhaps the failure of supporters to effectively 
tackle this loop, rather than to deflect attention from it was a 
significant contribution to their failure to win the debate. 
Typical deflecting arguments were (in summary):
The state should signify its repugnance no matter what the 
consequences (Leon Brittain).
The I.R.A will create martyrs anyway. (Humphrey Atkins).
We should not be deterred from doing what is right 
(Humphrey Atkins).
Hanging is a just punishment for terrorist no matter what (Sir Ian 
Percival).'
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Summary of Chapter 6 
Argument designed to persuade
The occurrence of what was generally believed to be a very 
influential debate on capital punishment in the House of Commons 
provided an opportunity to look at arguments which were probably 
the most carefully prepared and designed of those considered in 
this thesis. Most observers prior to the debate felt that the 
result on at least some of the amendments would be very close, 
and that the arguments 'on the day' could be decisive in 
persuading many M.P's to support or oppose the motion. This was 
therefore an interesting example for the study of argument.
The final votes produced large majorities against the main 
motion and all of the amendments, and were a considerable 
suprise for participants and observers alike. Later comment 
suggested that a poor performance by Leon Brittain the Home 
Secretary who spoke in favour of the restoration of the death 
penalty for murder by acts of terrorism, and contrastingly 
strong arguments by opponents such as Edward Heath, Roy 
Hattersley, and Roy Jenkins were major influences on the 
outcome. This chapter explored the features of these arguments, 
and some other aspects of the debate which made them 'weak' or 
'strong'.
A large number of speakers linked their case to the factual 
evidence that was available. Generally speaking the inconclusive 
nature of this evidence acted in favour of opponents, since they 
argued that more certainty was needed to take the drastic step
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of restoration. Some supporters however attempted to define a 
context in which this modality could be lessened. That is they 
argued that murder was such a hideous act that even if only a 
few lives could be saved, it was worth re-introducing the death 
penalty. This aspect of the debate emphasized the influence on 
debate of factual evidence, and showed the role that the context 
of the argument has in determining acceptable levels of 
’certainty’ or modality.
In establishing inconsistencies in the Home Secretary’s 
arguments, Roy Hattersley seriously damaged the credibility of 
the former’s arguments. In many ways this interaction is similar 
to that between Crossman and his opponents, and like Grossman, 
Brittain attempted to argue that ’terrorism* was a special case, 
and thus protect his arguments from the charges of inconsistency,
Also damaging for Leon Brittain was his failure to adequately 
construe the expectations of the House about the nature of the 
arguments expected from him in his relativlely new role as Home 
Secretary. In the same way that Crossman failed to anticipate 
the reactions to his decision over Hartley, Leon Brittain had 
somehow failed to form sin adequate model of his audience in 
relation to the arguments that he needed to prepare.
The strategies chosen in this debate also reveal another 
interesting point about sociality. In the main, opponents who 
were generally opposed to capital punishment on strongly held 
moral principles, chose not to emphasize these. They focussed 
instead on practical issues such as the deterrent effect of
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capital punishment. This strategy suggests that they believe 
that the undecided M.P.’s hold different values to themselves on 
this issue. Therefore no persuasive argument is possible on this 
basis, since they are not able to play a social role with 
respect to each other in the context of these values.
As in other settings some circular arguments were identified, 
these had a persuasive effect because they implied that the 
argument has an inevitable outcome. A change can only come 
about if the circle is broken in some way. Some ways of 
counteracting these ’loops’ are discussed in terms of argument 
strategy, but failure to adequately challenge a loop of this 
sort, set up by opponents, marked a weakening of the cases of 
the supporters.
More than any other setting this debate emphasized the 
difficulties that anyone wishing to persuade others by argument 
faces. Those involved were well aware that their arguments 
could be crucial, for example, Leon Brittain is reported to have 
spent many hours preparing his 40 minute speech. Yet Brittain’s 
speech was for many a weak case, and certainly failed in its 
ostensible task. The task of arguing persuasively is complex 
and uncertain and research which can provide assistance for 
arguers is surely needed.
Figure 6.3 Part of map for Leon Brittain
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Figure 6.4 Part of map for Edward Heath
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Figure 6.5 Part of map for Roy Hattersley
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Figure 6.6 Part of map for Roy Jenkins
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Figure 6.7 List of model for Leon Brittain
1 capital punishment for terrorism. . [notjcapital punishment for terrorism
2 terrorist is at war with society. . [not]terrorist is at war with society
3 violence against the state violence against the individual
4 crime against civilised society . . [not]crime against civilised society
5 overthrow of law itself ..................  [notjoverthrow of law itself
6 state must signal its absolute repugnance . .[not]state must signal its a
7 majority of convictions are in Northern Ireland . .[not]majority of convi
8 [+]martys ....................................................  [-]martys
9 [ + ]value to I R A ..........................................[-lvalue to IRA
10 [+]difficulty of securing convictions for terrorist murder. . [-Idifficul
11 terrorist backlash...............................[not]terrorist backlash
12 there is always a risk of reprisals and hostages . . [not]there is always
13 [+]there is almost the same number of non-Irish acts of terrorism . .[-]t
14 risk of capital punishment w i l l .............. will not: deter terrorists
15 not all terrorists are fanatics terrorists are fanatics
16 must not accept the terrorists view of himself .accepting terrorists view
17 many people are bullied or bribed into acts of terrorism. . [notlmany peo
18 trial by judge and possibly two assessors................ trial by jury
19 risk of e r r o r ...................................... [notlrisk of error
20 insufficient basis for general introduction . .[notlinsufficient basis fo
21 capital punisment for ’shooting or explosion’ . .[notIcapital punisment f
22 capital punishment for ’murder in the course of theft’. . [notIcapital pu
23 cases will inevitably arise which public feel are outside the category .
24 [+]feelings of injustice........................ [-Ifeelings of injustice
25 around 40 percent of reprieves in murder convictions before 1965. . [not]
26 difficult to see why ’shooting’ is more abhoirent than pois-oning. . [not]
27 may deter parties who assist terrorism. . [not]may deter parties who assi
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Figure 6.8 List of model for Roy Hattersley
1 re-introduce hanging.......................... [not]re-introduce hanging
2 hanging is a reversion to barbarism . . . .some murderers deserve to die
3 debases us a l l ...................................... [not]debases us all
4 terrorist crime is Northern Ireland . .[not]terrorist crime is Northern I
5 less than one quarter of all murders. . [not]less than one quarter of all
6 deterring one in 5 murders...............[not]deterring one in 5 murders
7 deterrent effect will be negligible ............  significant deterrence
8 Robberies to give support to I R A .obvious acts of terrorism
9 [+]problems of definition ....................  [-]problems of definition
10 [+]chaos and anguish................................ [-]chaos and anguish
11 evidence is not conclusive.......................... evidence is certain
12 ought to re-introduce hanging on more than a hunch. . [not]ought to re-in
13 hanging lobby .......................................  [not]hanging lobby
14 hanging is a solution for all crimes. . [not]hanging is a solution for al
15 effort on crime is mis-directed . . . .  effort on certainty of detection
16 the act of judicial execution . . . .  [not]the act of judicial execution
17 degrades society.................................. [nct]degrades society
18 even article in Sun newspaper regards hanging as brutalising. . [not]even
19 [+]Sun is not part of enlightened liberal establishment . .[-]Sun is not
20 hanging for terrorist murder.......... [not]hanging for terrorist murder
21 executing men who have not been convicted by jury system. . [not]executin
22 [+]for terrorist murders we are thinking of Northern Ireland. . [-]for te
23 concedes IRA’s most passionate demand . .[not]concedes IRA’s most passion
24 terrorist crimes will be treated differently to any others. . [not]terror
25 distinction would be made between terrorists and common criminals . .[not
26 terrorist deaths.................................. [not]terrorist deaths
27 British government become oppressors. . [not]British government become op
28 [ + ]support for IRA cause........................ [-]support for IRA cause
29 acts of terrorism ..............................  [not]acts of terrorism
..........  [not]wholly unacceptable
[not]hunger strikes by IRA prisoners 
. [not]IRA have persuaded men to die
30 . wholly unacceptable ............
31 hunger strikes by IRA prisoners
32 IRA have persuaded men to die . .
33 IRA have no concern for human life including their own. . [not]IRA have n
35 it is disturbing that the Home Secretary would vote for it . . [not]it is
36 office of Home Secretary [not]office of Home Secretary
37 [ + ]derrent effect of hanging [-]derrent effect of hanging
38 terrorists are not weak and undetermined . . [not]terrorists are not weak
39 violence by state is same as violence by individual . .[not]violence by s
40 legalize violence ..............................  [not]legalize violence
41 violence becomes accepted and institutionalised . .[not]violence becomes
42 more violent.......................................... civilised: society
43 if hanging had not been abolished in 1964 . .[not]if hanging had not been
44 5 innocent men would be dead today for certain. . [not]5 innocent men wou
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Figure 6.9 List of model for Edward Heath
1 capital punishment re-introduced   status quo
2 there have now been 20 years of abolition . .[not]there have now been 20
3 onus of proof rests with proposers........ onus of proof with opponents
4 case for capital punishment not proved: proved beyond any shadow of doubt
5 demand for retribution and revenge. . [notjdemand for retribution and rev
6 unacceptable from moral point of view . .[notjunacceptable from moral poi
7 not a matter for Mouse of Commons . .[not]not a matter for House of Commo
8 increase in homicides began before death penalty . .began after abolition
9 confusion in public m i n d .................. [not]confusion in public mind
10 [+]pressure for hanging ........................  [-]pressure for hanging
11 large rise in lesser crimes ..........  [not]large rise in lesser crimes
12 decision cannot rest on instinct. . [not]decision cannot rest on instinct
13 death penalty is irreversible . . . .  [not]death penalty is irreversible
14 condemnation by mistake ..................  [not]condemnation by mistake
15 ’is he prepared to hang by mistake’ . .[not]’is he prepared to hang by mi
16 hanging for terrorist murder.......... [not]hanging for terrorist murder
17 Home Sec underestimates determination of terrorist. . [not]Home Sec under
18 there is no hope of jury verdicts in NI . .[not]there is no hope of jury
19 problems in deciding a definition of terrorism. . [not]problems in decidi
20 Judge plus two assessors.................. [not]Judge plus two assessors
21 Problems of 1974. ...................................[not]Problems of 1974
22 Judiciary not prepared to act in this way . .[not]Judiciary not prepared
23 astonished at H S ...................................[not]astonished at HS
24 impractical suggestion by H S .......... [not]impractical suggestion by HS
25 1957 Homicide act failed.................. [not] 1957 Homicide act failed
26 public not prepared to support definitions. . [not]public not prepared to
27 one kind of murder is worthy of penalty another is not. . [not]one kind o
28 [+]specific cases debated ....................  [-]specific cases debated
29 effective police action .............................  capital punishment
30 reduce status of terrorist ...........................  capital punishment
31 other European nations do not use capital punishment. . [not]other Europe
32 growth of media in last 20 years. . [not]growth of media in last 20 years
33 rouse public feeling on occasion of execution . .[not]rouse public feelin
34 not raising the spiritual nature of man .raising the spiritual nature of
35 horrifying stories from USA ..........  [not]horrifying stories from USA
36 emphasis on capital punishment . . . .[not]emphasis on capital punishment
37 prevents attention on problem crime in a democratic society . .[not]preve
38 ’hanging and flogging’  [not]’hanging and flogging’
39 number of terrorist cases in mainland UK is small . .[not]number of terro
40 cannot deal with Arab terrorist differently to IRA. . [not]cannot deal wi
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Figure 6.10 List of model for Roy Jenkins
1 Home Sec destroyed case on all amendments accepts terrorists. . [not]Home
2 coolly and rationally...........................................emotional
3 crimes against the state ............ .. . .[not]crimes against the state
4 Home Sec moved away from cool clear look. . [notjHome Sec moved away from
5 sorry performance by Home Sec . . . .  [not]sorry performance by Home fee
6 other crimes are not regarded by Home Sec with same repugnance. . [not]ot
7 neglecting duty as Home Secretary . .[not]neglecting duty as Home Secreta
8 Threat from NI 600 times as great as on mainland. . [not]Threat from NI 6
9 capital punishment in GB only .........  capital punishement in GB and NI
10 [+]problems of convictions.................... [-Iproblems of convictions
11 Diplock courts...................................... [not]Diplock courts
12 would be hanging someone for first time in centuries without jury . .[not
13 cannot get jury conviction for terrorism in NI. . [not]cannot get jury co
14 capital punishment for terrorists . .[notIcapital punishment for terroris
15 [+]Home Sec is floating an idea ........ [-]Home Sec is floating an idea
16 ’judge plus two assessors’ .............. [not]’judge plus two assessors’
17 not appropriate action for a Home Secretary . .[not]not appropriate actio
18 [+]deterrent effect of capital punishment . .[-]deterrent effect of capit
19 cannot hang supporters......................[not]cannot hang supporters
20 boys and women and grandmothers . . [not]boys and women and grandmothers
21 cannot deter ’baggage’ ..................... [not]cannot deter ’baggage’
22 [+]danger to innocent lives ................ [-]danger to innocent lives
23 possibilities of repercussions from judicial killing. . [not]possibilitie
24 may create triumphant martyrs . . . .  [not]may create triumphant martyrs
25 go back to trial by jury in NI . . . .[not]go back to trial by jury in NI
26 majority will be acquitted.............. [not]majority will be acquitted
27 they will carry on their nefarious trade. . [not]they will carry on their
28 hunger strikes...................................... [not]hunger strikes
29 terrorists willing to kill themselves . .[not]terrorists willing to kill
30 terrorist willingness to die .......... [not]terrorist willingness to die
31 position of funeral in IRA mythology. . [not]position of funeral in IRA m
32 capital punishment...............................[not]capital punishment
33 years of experience as Home Sec . . [not]years of experience as Home Sec
34 there were many capital cases where convicition was clearly wrong . .[not
35 cases where there was a lingering flicker of doubt. . [not]cases where th
36 too high uncertainty................................... acceptable doubt
37 execution of terrorists in Spain. . [not]execution of terrorists in Spain
38 nine policeman killed in reprisal . .[not]nine policeman killed in repris
39 [+]the finality of punishment is too great for the certainty of human jud
226
Figure 6.11 Group structure of models based on speeches
MODEL OF LEON BRITTAIN’S SPEECH
6.aouP5>
C-1 capital punishment for terrorism $1
G2 terrorist is at war with society $14
G3 insufficient basis for general introduction $20
G>1 capital punishment for terrorism $1 
G2 terrorist is at war with society $14
Model of Roy Hattersley’s speech
G1 debases us all $3
G2 re-introduce hanging $1
G3 hanging for terrorist murder $20
G4 degrades society $17
61 debases us all $3
G4 degrades society $17
G2 re-introduce hanging $1
G1 debases us all $3
G3 hanging for terrorist murder $20




61 capital punishment for terrorists $14
G2 problems of convictions $10
G3 deterrent effect of capital punishment $18
G2 problems of convictions $10
G7 cannot get jury conviction for terrorism in NI $13
G4 capital punishment $32
G1 capital punishment for terrorists $14
G5 sorry performance by Home sec $5
G6 neglecting duty as Home Secretary $7
G6 neglecting duty as Home Secretary $7 
G5 sorry performance by Home sec $5
61 hanging for terrorist murder $16
G5 astonished at HS $23
G6 impractical suggestion by HS $24
G2 capital punishment re-introduced $1
G3 case for capital punishment proved beyond any shadow of doubt $4
G3 case for capital punishment proved beyond any shadow of doubt $4
G4 confusion in public mind $9
G5 astonished at HS $23
G1 hanging for terrorist murder $16
G6 impractical suggestion by HS $24.
G1 hanging for terrorist murder $16
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Appendix to Chapter 6 - references to Newspaper Articles
Observer, 10th July 1983, pi.
Observer, 10th July 1983, p15.
Guardian, 11th July 1983, pi.
Guardian, 11th July 1983, p22.
Guardian, 12th July 1983, p1.
Guardian, 12th July 1983, plO.
Times, 13th July 1983, p1.
Times, 13th July 1983, plO.
Times, I4th July 1983, pi.
Times, I4th July 1983, p4.
Times, 15th July 1983, leader.
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CHAPTER 7 
A GOOD CASE FOR ARGUMENT?
End of an argument
This thesis is an example of the topic that it explores. It is 
intended to persuade the reader by putting forward a series of linked 
propositions to a point of view. It is an argument. As this is the 
end of the argument it is perhaps the appropriate point to refer to 
the role that the ’end of the argument’ plays in the persuading 
process, before proceeding to the conclusion of this thesis.
Chapter 5 revealed that the more effective arguers were often able to 
find a suitable phrase to sum up or capture the essence of their 
proceeding argument. Simiarly many of the speakers in the capital 
punishment debate described in Chapter 6 ended their speeches with a 
careful summary of their arguments. Work by Miller (1964) showed that 
repetition and recency increase the ability of subjects to remember 
information. In addition data which is connected in some way can be 
more easily recalled. These experimental features and more general 
work on argumentation point to a significant role for the end of the 
argument in making that argument generally more or less pesuasive.
The end of the argument presents an opportunity to draw together the 
different features and themes that have been presented in the main 
body of the argument. This latter activity has the effect of creating 
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) refer to as ’convergence’. 
That is, the different themes come together to support each other and 
so add persuasive force to the argument as a whole. Convergence is 
closely related to the idea of consistency discussed in Chapters 4 
and 6. The power of convergence lies in its ability to create for the
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audience a system of concepts and links which is apparently 
self-consistent. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out however that 
this can be a double-edged sword, in that a conclusion which is too 
'neat and tidy' when tackling a complex subject can be viewed 
suspiciously. In this case the convergence creates a lack of 
credibility for each argument, rather than strengthening them, 
because there is an expectation about the degree of convergence 
suitable to a particular area of study.
What is an appropriate level of convergence for this thesis? Because 
it is concerned with a subjective model of man, and thus of argument, 
the complexity and particularity of the data foreclose any 'tidy' 
solutions or proposals. For the activity to be practically useful 
however there should emerge guidelines and themes about the theory 
and practice of argument which would enable others to prepare or 
participate in argument which is more able to persuade.
The task of this thesis
Aristotle's advice on the conclusion of an argument was:
".... observe that you have done what you undertook to do.
You must then state what you have said and why you have 
said it "
(Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book III)
This thesis has been concerned with the role of argument in 
influencing people, with an emphasis on argument in an organizational 
setting. Argument has been defined for this purpose as the activity 
of persuading others to a point of view, through a primarily verbal 
or written interaction, in which propositions are made and supported.
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It was the contention of Chapter 1 that persuasion of this sort is an 
important feature of organizational life, but one which has been 
neglected by theorists in favour of an emphasis on the social and 
political aspects of organizations. This neglect has occurred 
because argument studies have usually been set within a framework of 
logical and rational thought and philosophy which has little contact 
with the reality of everyday argument settings. However, the 
expectations of rational behaviour and discussion that arguers 
frequently bring to bear during an argument are powerful influences 
on the course of debate and need to be carefully examined. The aim 
was to re-consider argument as a means of persuading others rather 
than as a study in logical thought.
To achieve this aim a framework for the study of argument was 
constructed, in Chapter 2, based on a theory of man and a theory of 
thinking elaborated originally by Kelly. In this theory man is 
viewed as being who continually seeks to make sense of his 
environment through a process of interpreting events. He interprets 
events in such as way that they form a predictive base for future 
interpretation. It was argued that this framework is more useful for
studying particular argument events than a framework of logical
thought, since it reveals the cognitive system of each arguer, and is 
therefore able to explain the interpretation that each will give to 
arguments involved. A framework based on the presumed rationality or
logical thinking of arguers' is not able to explain the frequent
failure of arguers to act according to the pre-determined rules, 
other than to say that the arguers are not behaving according to the 
rules.
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It was not a conceptually simple task to discuss argument, and take 
full account of the notion of rationality within a subjective model 
of man, since ideas of rationality are firmly welded to an altogether 
different model of man as a rational being. However the generality of 
the expectation of rationality in argument, as shown for example by 
attempted reliance on factual support, and in the expectation of 
consistency, demands that some explanation of rationality be included 
in any model of argument. The concepts of sociality and commonality 
within the framework of Personal Construct Theory provide a unified 
basis for attempting such a task. For Kelly each individual's way of 
making sense of experience (construct system) is necessarily unique 
to him, but through his interpretation of others' views he can come 
to an understanding of their way of making sense of the world. The 
existence of such an understanding potentially enables an argument 
between individuals, to the extent that they can play a social role 
with respect to each other. The interactions between Crossman and 
some of his opponents (Chapter 4) reveal the importance of sociality 
in being able to construct an argument that will persuade others. 
Beyond sociality where arguers may understand each other but still 
differ, lies the realm of common construal, where individuals 
construe experience in a similar way. They therefore agree on the 
interpretation that should be placed on experience. This leads to a 
vast reservoir of taken-for-granted interpretations of the world 
which influence debate by denying the feasability of certain chains 
of thought. For instance, the debate between charity officers in 
Chapter 5 is markedly influenced in this way. Also to the extent 
that individuals agree upon the construal of experience their future
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construal must take into account this agreement. In this way a notion 
of rationality is introduced into a subjective picture of construal.
A further aim, but one which follows from the adoption of Kelly's 
theory was the construction of a set of ideas and methods which would 
be of use to arguers in the course of argument. That is, it was 
important to build a theory which has practical consequences. The 
technique of cognitive mapping which is based on Personal Construct 
Theory was chosen as a practical method of recording and analysing 
argument.
Three settings were chosen for study in which it was felt by the 
researcher, and by those involved, that argument was significant in 
affecting outcomes. These were, a dispute over a planning decision as 
seen through the diaries of a significant actor in the event (Richard 
Crossman); a debate between charity officers on the use of volunteers; 
a debate in the House of Commons on capital punishment.
Each of the settings was intended to provide a rich source of data on 
on a small number of arguments, and so explore the individual 
interpretation of each argument. The Hartley issue through the 
Crossman Diaries gives an insight into a private (not publicly 
expressed) assessment and consideration of arguments, and was used to 
explore the relationship between an individual's construct system and 
the arguments that he found persuasive, or constructed to persuade 
others. The research on the use of volunteers gave the opportunity 
to look at the progress of a debate between a number of individuals 
as it occurred, but with some insight into each arguer's views which 
had been developed in the proceeding stages of the research. The
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final setting, the debate on capital punishment, took public 
arguments only and considered the effect of these during a debate. 
This was an important perspective because arguers often do not have 
access to others’ views other than as expressed during a debate or 
meeting.
The above is a summary, following Aristotle's advice, of what was 
intended, what was done, and why it was done. But what sort of theory 
of argument has emerged from this thesis? There are two parts to the 
answer of this question. Firstly the type of theory that has emerged 
needs some explanation as a way of making sense of argument. Secondly 
the content of that theory needs to be summarized.
Making sense of argument
At the end of over one million words on the subject of argument, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca express the difficulty that they have 
had in keeping their treatise to a manageable size! The difficulty 
only partly reflects the pervasiveness of argument as a human 
activity, it also arises from their method of categorizing each 
aspect of argument as a separate entity. For example there are 
sections on argument and values, argument and logic, argument and 
authority. This obscures the underlying theory of argument, and since 
the categories can only function as a 'checklist' of issues to 
consider they are robbed of explanatory power. Rather than 'survey' 
aspects of argument in this way (which is a common approach to a 
large subject like this), this thesis aims to focus on a working 
theory which can be applied to any aspect of argument, and can 
explain and predict arguments in practice. It is therefore the
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development of a ’way of looking' at argument. This way of looking 
has two parts; practical methods for the study and analysis of 
argument and a conceptual framework for making sense of argument. The 
next section tackles the issues of practice, and the final sections 
present a theory of argument.
Practical methods for the study of argument
In Chapter 2 it was argued that one aim of this thesis is to produce 
practical ways of representing and studying argument. Chapters 3 to 
6 described different research settings in which the methods of 
cognitive mapping were used in different ways to assist with the 
collection, analysis and study, of research data on argument. This 
section re-considers the propositions of Chapter 2 in relation to 
methodology and method in the light of the research experience.
It was established in Chapter 2 that the purpose of methodological 
choice is to match the methods with the aims of the research. Viewed 
in this way the adoption of particular research methods is itself a 
research proposition about the nature of the research, and the kind 
of theory that can be supported by the research (Blalock, F. and 
Blalock A. (1968). Whilst ultimately there can be no escape from the 
circular nature of methodological choice at a philosophical level, in 
as much as a research choice is a construal of experience it has a 
predictive utility in enabling the researcher (and others) to make 
sense of the world. In this latter context research choices can be 
compared to each other in respect of their utility for elaborating 
understanding. Therefore it is worthwhile to examine the usefulness 
of a particular method, but this would not be to argue that that one
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method is necessarily better than others in all situations. Buckley 
and others for example suggest that a variety of methods are 
available for research each with strengths and weaknesses in relation 
to specific research aims (Buckley, J. Buckley, M. and Chiang, 1976).
The aim of this research was the understanding of persuasive argument, 
specifically an understanding of arguments which occur in 
organizational settings. This necessarily involves a study of 'how 
arguers actually argue' and thus the research is based on, and the 
conclusions are evaluated in respect of, data external to the 
researcher. This constrasts with many studies of argument where the 
research data is the reflections of the researcher alone. It also 
implies a more detailed and complex set of data than is sometimes 
used in logical studies of argument. This has implications for the 
type of research undertaken. For example, each of the settings 
described above, represented the ways in which arguments can be 
presented in organizations. Between them they cover the acts of 
reading arguments, listening to argument, and being involved in 
argument. In each case the arguments were those actively put forward 
by an arguer to whom the acceptance (or rejection) of those arguments 
mattered. Cognitive mapping seemed a natural choice to represent 
this sort of argument because it has already been extensively used in 
work involving active participation of clients, and the 
representation of individual cognitive systems (Eden, Jones and Sims 
1983).
Chapter 2 stressed that cognitive mapping has similarities to other 
methods such as argumentation studies and Balance Theory, but offered
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significant advantages as a practical tool. Have those advantages 
been realized in the research?
(1) Collecting and representing qualitative data
a) The causal nature of a cognitive map provided a way of representing 
the essential reasoning of an argument. It highlighted the structure 
of the argument and the links between different chains of argument.
The presentation of a cognitive map as a linked picture of the 
argument did seem to be helpful, for example to the participants in 
the charity project. Similarly in the recording of the capital 
punishment debate the map assisted considerably in identifying (as 
the debate occurred) arguments that had been used previously by the 
same speaker, or by other speakers.
b) Whilst the maps condense information to a certain extent, the use 
of contrasts where appropriate and the ability to stay close to the 
original language of the participants enabled the meaning intended to 
be retained. This was significant for example in Chapters 3 and 4 in 
interpreting the meaning of 'green belt' as used by Crossman.
c) The availability of a supporting computer package to assist with 
the process of cognitive mapping greatly simplified the storage, 
collection and comparison of data. It also incidentally encourages 
the researcher to more frequently change and re-consider data, and so 
avoid some of the bias inherent in 'first impressions'. It also more 
importantly enables the researcher to handle a much larger volume of 
data, and so there is less pressure to reduce data to a manageable 
level of aggregation in the early stages of research. The thesis has
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deliberately treated the computer aspects of this work in a low key 
fashion, as though it were just another aid like a pencil. Readers, 
especially those less used to computers, may be concerned at this. 
Crucial to this treatment however is the complete sub-ordination of 
the computer software to the theory of cognitive mapping. That is, 
the computer representation is conceptually identical to cognitive 
mapping, and the constraints of the computer operation do not 
intefere with the data collection. In this regard the only feature 
of the software that was problematic was the restriction to concept 
descriptions of 80 characters. On occasion this did tend to 
encourage coding of concepts on original maps within this constraint. 
For the development of the software the ability to handle longer 
concepts and phrases would be useful.
d) In the charity project the participants found the use of cognitive 
maps and the computer models to be very useful ways of representing 
and recalling argument, especially where they had an idea that 
'something had been said about this before*, and could use the 
computer (or map) to search for relevant concepts and arguments. A 
similar advantage accrues to the researcher when comparing and 
working with the research data in the form of a computer model.
e) The simplicity and flexibility of a cognitive map in recording 
argument as a set of causally linked concepts is a neglected 
advantage of cognitive mapping. It was pointed up by the 
difficulties described in Chapter 2 of transferring an argument into 
a Balance Theory representation. Also the theoretical constraints of 
a cognitive map are less predominant at the data collection stage.
For example, in argumentation studies, the need to distinguish
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different categories of statement in the representation make the 
initial coding more difficult, and thereby more prone to theoretical 
bias.
In relation to theoretical bias however, cognitive mapping contains 
an implicit model of argument as a causal, * if-then* process. It 
cannot therefore provide any statements on the wider issue of the 
utility of envisaging and representing argument in this way. This 
would require a study of another sort. However the work in Chapter 2 
strongly suggests that this is a much used and common model of 
argument and is supported by other work on problem solving and 
thinking.
(2) Analysis
Argumentation studies similarly collect statements and link them in a 
causal structure, not dissimilar to that of a cognitive map. However 
cognitive mapping provides theories and techniques which enable the 
researcher (or arguer) to go beyond description and to explore other 
features of the cognitive map. In this thesis use has been made of 
the analysis theories of cognitive mapping, which essentially relate 
theories of cognition to the structure of the map.
So for example, end points of an argument can be linked to concepts 
which have no further consequences. In the context of the Hartley 
debate, knowledge of Crossman’s values identified in this way, was 
significant in explaining the persuasiveness of arguments. Thus the 
map is not only a method of representing cognition it also implies a 
complex theory of cognition. Other features of the map also provided 
interesting insights into the nature of argument. For example, the
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lack of explicit contrasting poles in the representation of the 
capital punishment debate suggested that in public argument of this 
sort arguers may stress the poles that they support and ’hide' the 
opposite poles, which may provide the basis for counter argument, 
from opponents. Other methods related to cognitive mapping also 
provide structural analyses, although in these cases the emphasis is 
upon the mathematical properties of the structure rather than upon 
the significance for cognition of the appearance of particular 
structures (Hansen, Heitger and McKell, 1978).
As with the representation of data the use of the computer was an 
advantage, since the process of analysing and grouping maps for any
reasonably large model would be time consuming and error prone.
Moreover its tedious nature would actively discourage manual analysis 
of this sort. For the future development of the software a greater 
variety of analysis based on theory would be helpful.
Enough has been said of the research aims and design and the practical
use of mapping, to support the overall approach proposed by this 
thesis to the study of argument as a method which can be generally 
and easily used by arguers. However, the resulting theory of 
argument must act as the principal basis for a final evaluation of 
the research.
A theory of argument
The theory is concerned with argument in organizations. An argument 
is taken to be a set of linked propositions or statements intended to 
persuade others to a point of view or course of action. This thesis
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proposes that argument in this sense is conceptually isolable and is 
significant in many situations in determining or influencing 
outcomes. However, the neglect of argument as a study in its own 
right suggests that this view of argument as a significant influence, 
is either erroneous or unhelpful in making sense of events in 
organizations, and that attention to the social and political aspects 
of organizational life is more fruitful. Plato puts a similar 
thought in the words of Phaedrus:
"But I have been told, my dear Socrates, that what a budding 
orator needs to know is not what is really right, but what 
is likely to seem right in the eyes of the mass of people 
who are going to pass judgement."
(Hamilton 1973)
This is to focus on values and motivations as a cause of behaviour 
and to assume that under such influences argument will be less 
influential. It is to assume that self-interest necessarily supplants 
reason.
The research of this thesis strongly suggests that there are occasions 
when argument can be used to persuade others, and that values cannot 
always drive out reason. The link between persuasive argument and 
value is more complex than this. Moreover there is considerable 
scope for improving the study and practice of argument.
(1) When argument is significant
It would be naive and contrary to the findings of other research into 
organizational life to suppose however that there are not many 
occasions on which having a good argument is the least important 
factor in persuading others. Therefore it would be helpful to
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identify features of settings which encourage participants to attend 
to argument, or increase the likelihood of argument having an 
influence. The settings studied in this thesis suggest the following 
aspects may be important;
a) Both Crossman, and the charity officers looking for advice on the 
use of volunteers, felt themselves to be in a situation where they 
had little previous specific experience in the issues involved. 
Chapters 3 and 5 suggest that they were looking to elaborate their 
construct system in these areas, and so improve their ability to cope 
with the situation. They were then prepared to hear arguments from 
others who they felt were better informed. Thus being placed in a 
"unknown* situation prompts a search for arguments to elaborate a 
construct system, and thus in Kelly's terms make it more useful, that 
is, more able to predict and control experience.
b) The development of the Hartley issue also revealed that Crossman 
quite rapidly overturned his previous arguments in favour of the new 
arguments of his close advisors. This indicates that because it is a 
new area for him, he did not have the constructs to be able to reject 
a new argument. This is supported by Axelrod's work on the effect of 
novel argument in negotiations where arguments which were new to the 
audience had most effect in terms of persuading them to the arguer's 
point of view.
c) In the debate on capital punishment it was clear that a large 
number of M.P.'s were for various reasons undecided. It is unlikely 
that any of the arguments that they heard were new to them in the 
sense that planning arguments were new to Crossman, especially as
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there had been a widespread discussion of the issues in the preceding 
weeks. However some arguments were clearly decisive. In this case 
it seems likely that those who are undecided on an issue were 
searching for aspects of an argument which it made it more credible. 
So for example the presentation of a ’poor case* by one side can be 
very significant.
In each of these instances there is some sense that the audience does 
not currently have a model of the situation that will enable them to 
predict and control events. They are searching for additional 
argument to supplement their current construct system. Moreover in 
each of the examples studied the need is apparently for a linked set 
of ideas, that is, for additional explanatory power, rather than for 
additional information.
(2) Consistency and persuasive argument
But Crossman’s difficulties over Hartley, and the problems for Leon 
Brittain in the capital punishment debate indicate that an argument 
can be more powerful than just something that flourishes when the 
audience is particularly susceptible to persuasion. The charges of 
inconsistency brought against Crossman and Brittain were perhaps the 
critical features of the arguments which led to them being rejected. 
Consistency it seems is a necessary condition of a ’good case’, 
although it may not be sufficient. A Kellian view of man as a being 
who essentially strives to create for himself an explainable and 
predictable world provides the basis for understanding the need for 
consistency in argument. Each of the settings, and much of the 
research in traditional argumentation, illustrates the disastrous
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effects on the persuasivenes of arguments if they can be shown to be 
in some way inconsistent.
Inconsistency means that the audience is unable to make sense of an 
argument, and so are reluctant to adopt it within their cognitive 
system. Also it throws doubt upon other aspects of the arguers 
arguments, which explains why Crossman chose a strategy of attempting 
to isolate the Hartley decision from the rest of his policies.
Without a Kellian view of man consistency and rationality are linked 
primarily to notions of logical consistency and the explanatory power 
of consistency is much reduced. The concept of man developing a 
personal construct system to to make sense of his world, enables a 
much wider and more useful interpretation of consistency. This is 
because the meaning of consistency is specifically related to a view 
of the world, and can be judged in relation to that view. As Chapter 
2 discusses, a global conception of consistency has no meaning, 
consistency is always 'consistency with respect to something else*.
In effect the concept of rationality which has logical associations 
is replaced with the notion of predictability which is individually 
based, but will have wider implications when individuals play a 
social role with respect to each other.
(3) The influence of the taken-for-granted world
But each individual is not free to develop a uniquely idiosyncratic 
view of the world in order to explain it to himself. Through 
interaction with others he becomes aware of their construal, and to 
the extent that individuals construe experience in similar ways they
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can be said to share experience. For the researcher a suprising 
feature of the arguments described in the thesis was the extent to 
which they refer to, and make use of a vast reservoir of shared 
understandings. The taken-for-granted aspects of the world pose 
significant constraints on the persuasivenes of arguments that are 
not seen to be in accord with such ’social* and ’physical* facts.
Thus in Chapter 5 the debate about volunteers was virtually blocked 
by the social facts created by the anecdotes of the charity officers, 
and the arguments on capital punishment were frequently linked to 
agreed statistics in one way or another.
The relationship between consistency and ’facts* introduces the idea 
of degree of certainty or modality in argument. Chapter 1 demonstrated 
the effect of agreed context on the modality that was acceptable as 
persuasive, by comparing simple arguments in physical and social 
science. In many instances audiences demand a measure of the 
certainty with which the argument can be established. The bait of 
sure and certain knowledge was described in Chapter 1 as a crucial 
appeal of rationality. In a Kellian view of man, the lure of 
certainty is the lure of being able to create a truly predictable 
explanation of experience. A certain world is a predictable world.
Thus many arguments attempt to link their propositions with aspects 
of the world which are generally taken to be more certain, and 
physical evidence plays an important role here. What is interesting 
about the capital punishment debate is not that the physical evidence 
was particularly conclusive in this case, but that so many arguers 
felt the need to pay some attention to it regardless of its ’quality*.
Linked to these notions of a taken-for-granted world is the influence
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of argument that presents an impression of inevitability of its 
consequences. In both arguments around the use of volunteers and in 
the capital punishment debate vicious circles of argument were 
identified and had a significant influence on the persuasiveness of 
opposing arguments. The failure of supporters of restoration to 
adequately tackle this sort of loop seriously weakened their case.
The implication of this is that a persuasion can either occur through 
the statement of the loop, or alternatively through breaking the loop 
with a counter argument. The development of the arguments in the 
later stages of the work with charity officers showed how arguments 
which can challenge the ’taken for granted* features of the world can 
be persuasive. But such arguments run the risk of creating 
inconsistencies with widely held beliefs, as Crossman’s attempt to 
re-define the nature of green belt indicated.
(4) Values and persuasive argument
At the opposite end of the conceptual spectrum to physical evidence 
(within this thesis), are the values which motivate and influence 
each arguer. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put it no stronger than 
that people are pre-disposed by their values to accept some arguments 
more readily than others. In effect this thesis has explored the 
workings of this mechanism and has proposed that values, as was shown 
with Crossman, significantly determine the argument strategies 
chosen, and the arguments that are likely to appeal. But this is not 
to argue that reason can be ignored for the sake of self-interest.
If reason is understood as a need for an individual to have a 
coherent model for making sense of the world, then, as Brittain’s
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defeat shows, his values led him to propose a model for dealing with 
capital punishment which many found to be inconsistent, and thus not 
reasonable. It was a view of his arguments as inconsistent and not a 
disagreement with his value judgements that led many M.P.’s to vote 
against Brittain on this issue.
Man is both valuing and reasoning, and values will influence the 
persuasiveness of argument. Chapter 3 in particular showed that the 
more important a value is for an individual (further up the value 
hierarchy) then the greater is the influence of those values on the 
assessment of argument and the choice of argument strategy.
Whilst an operational definition of values was attempted in this 
thesis, the meaning of ’values’ and the relation between them and 
argument is still complex and confused, and much more research will 
be needed on this aspect. Other lines of inquiry suggested by this 
thesis are discussed in the following section.
Further research
Whilst the thesis has shown good support for the relevance of 
argument as a means of persuading others, a different type of design 
is needed to explore the nature and extent of situations in which 
this may be relevant, since it is not a comprehensive work in the 
style of Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca. A wider range of settings 
would need to be explored, and more explicit attention paid to 
factors other than argument. This thesis has concentrated on 
situations where the influence of argument is relatively well 
established, but in many settings this is more problematic, and
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indeed in the work with charity officers, it was clear that, for 
instance, interpersonal issues were relevant to an understanding of 
some of the debates.
On a lesser point if the theories are to be more widely accepted and 
used then some attention must be paid to the language of Personal 
Construct Theory which is itself a bar to understanding. Some 
attempt has been made to cast theory into more everday terms, but
this needs to be done on a more complete scale.
The relationship between a taken-for-granted world, and the support 
that this offers for one line of argument rather than another is a
fascinating area of study. Whilst it has been tackled to some extent
through work on bounded vision, a study of the prevalence of themes 
and an understanding of logic would reveal more basic assumptions 
about argument and what it is to persuade others. The work of Holton 
(1973) on themes and Goodwin and Wenzel (1979) on the logic of 
folklore could provide starting points for a larger study of the 
influence of the taken-for-granted understandings of the world.
Again in this study there is not enough variation between settings to 
look more generally at the link between the specific context in which 
an argument occurs, and the expectations of the arguers of the type 
of argument ’required’ by the context. A wider study is needed on 
this since the evidence from these settings firmly suggests a powerful 
influence of the context on the course of the argument. Perhaps the 
work of Toulmin on different arguments for different disciplines may 
be a suitable starting point for this. Related to this is need for a 
more detailed look at the links between modality and persuasive
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argument, In this respect additional features to take more account of 
the strength of belief and the relative importance of concepts in a 
cognitive map would be helpful, although obtaining a good balance 
between the ease of use of cognitive mapping and a more detailed 
coding requirement would be difficult.
A considerable amount of work on the study of argument is progressing 
through the work of persuasion and communication theorists and 
argumentation studies; there is a research need to more 
comprehensively survey and relate this work to organizational theory.
Argument as a means of persuading others
But what does this thesis tell the potential arguer about the nature 
and practice of argument? Perhaps this is best answered through the 
response to questions that an arguer might ask of argument.
(1) What is an argument?.
Argument should be placed in a wider context than that of logical or 
rational demonstration. An argument which is designed to persuade 
others offers the audience a set of linked ideas which enables them 
to elaborate their thinking, to better make sense of experience. 
However, the context should not be too widely interpreted since 
argument as a form of persuasion carries with it expectations about 
the nature of that activity which influence the way in which 
arguments are evaluated. Nonetheless there is something about having 
a good case, as Thorndike put it, that makes it worth achieving.
That something is the ability to persuade others through offering 
them a system of ideas which makes their experience more predictable.
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(2) How may argument be represented?
Perhaps the study and practice of argument has been limited by the 
lack of methods which can be easily applied to record argument as it 
occurs. Cognitive mapping offers one way of simply and quickly 
recording a debate in such a way that the structure of the argument 
can be highlighted and readily accessible. Such other methods that 
are available are more generally linked to rational theories of 
argument, and so have been avoided by those concerned with argument 
in everday settings.
(3) When may argument be influential?
Organizational theory sometimes gives the impression that the act of 
persuading someone by argument is the last and most naive resort of 
the skilled organizational politician. Yet this thesis has provided 
examples of argument powerfully capturing the adherence of 
organizational actors. In each case there was a sense of an 
individual searching for new explanations on a topic with which they 
considered themselves to be less experienced. It was also apparent 
that provided the arguments presented were a coherent set of ideas 
then the individual was not able to reject the argument, because he 
did not have the concepts with which to do this.
(4) What makes argument persuasive?
For a set of ideas to be accepted the audience must not only be 
susceptible to receiving ideas, the ideas themselves must form a 
coherent, consistent body of explanation. Gilbert and Mulkay (1982) 
suggest that anyone who attempts to persuade others must make their 
argument plausible, realistic and usable. This thesis can give some
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meaning to these terms. Arguments must be plausible in that they link 
to the expectations and common construal that the audience have. 
Arguments must be realistic in that they link to the theories and 
beliefs that each individual holds. Arguments must be usable in that 
they provide concepts which enable others to make better sense of 
experience. This thesis has revealed a variety of situations where 
some or all of these requirements were not met and consequently the 
arguments failed to persuade.
(5) How do values affect argument?
Man is both a valuing and a reasoning being. The paradox of arguing 
man is that he will argue ’rationally* for a cherished ideal, and 
hold as a supreme value the concept of rational argument. This 
thesis suggests that values must be understood in terms of specific 
individual matters of interest. Arguers tend to assess argument in 
relation to their value hierarchy, and when arguments are judged to 
affect particular values, then this will affect the argument 
strategies chosen, and the perceived persuasiveness of arguments. 
Knowledge of individual value systems is therefore important in 
constructing arguments designed to persuade others.
In conclusion
We think we know, suggested Roger Bacon, when we know causes 
(Lindberg 1982). Argument is a tentative matter (Law and Williams 
1982); it is to propose a set of relationships and values which 
create a more explainable world.
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